"WELCOME HOME" - Again!
National WAMU Homeowners Support Group.com
“WaMu Screwed … The Wrong People.”
Read the official NWHSG Report located below, and share with your qualified attorney:
Welcome to the new official
National WAMU Homeowners Support Group.com website.
(The old website was stolen by a large corporation...?)
This resource is here for one purpose...to help you educate yourself (and your qualified attorney) about events and details surrounding what the United States Congressional Oversight Panel and other sources have exposed as potential "Mortgage Irregularities" in your WaMu loan origination/appraisal, subsequent loan servicing, and foreclosure ... and how they potentially affect you and your family.
Do not deceive yourself. No matter what your goal is, you are in a tug of war with companies of nearly unlimited resources that have demonstrated very little desire or proof of helping many WaMu homeowners. Their main desire is to protect themselves and their interests of "certain assets." Is your home ONE OF THOSE "CERTAIN ASSETS" and what exactly is their PROOF of their claim? It is only through continual education, extreme organization, and intense participation that you have any hope of any personal satisfactory final outcome in your foreclosure.
For over 3 years now, we have been sharing the same message -
Get educated, get organized and get involved!
Before you do anything, take the time and read the NWHSG report located below:
Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy: A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)
Welcome Home - again!
- Rob Harrington
Original founder of the National Wamu Homeowners Support Group
PLEASE NOTE: WE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS. NOTHING IN THIS WEBSITE IS INTENDED AS A LEGAL OPINION NOR SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS SUCH. THE AUTHORS AND PARTICIPANTS OF THIS SITE ENCOURAGE ALL HOMEOWNERS TO CONSULT LICENSED PROFESSIONALS FOR OPINIONS AND SUBJECT MATTER DIRECTION. IT IS LIKELY THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO DEFEND YOUR RIGHTS IN A COURT OF LAW. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF A QUALIFIED ATTORNEY LICENSED IN THE STATE WHERE YOUR PROPERTY IS.
PLEASE ALSO NOTE THAT SEVERAL OF OUR MEMBERS, INCLUDING ROB HARRINGTON, ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A LICENSED PRIVATE INVESTIGATION COMPANY THAT SPECIALIZES IN EXAMINATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE LENDING, SERVICING, & FORECLOSURE PRACTICES. THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED ON THIS SITE ARE THE OPINIONS OF THE INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR CAPACITY OF INDIVIDUALS. FOR A FREE CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES PLEASE CLICK HERE.
Photograph, illustrations, and video attributions: All photographs and illustrations throughout this website are attributable to http://4closurefraud.org/. Joshua Trujillo /AtlanticWire.com (Dorli Rainey peppersprayed in face photo.) News Videos are self-attributed to the various news sources as evidenced in their respective videos. Karl Denninger video attributed to Karl Denninger/Market Ticker.
Kim vs JPM Chase - MI Supreme Court
Neil Garfield wrote yesterday: "They ASSUME that the Chase-Wamu merger transferred the loans only because, as I see it, nobody read the merger agreement. The receiver, as I pointed out in prior posts, acting on behalf of the FDIC, the trustee in WAMU bankruptcy, Chase and WAMU executives were sort of playing fast and loose with the rules.
It turns out that Chase never paid for anything. While it could be argued that they assumed the liability on billions of dollars in deposits, they also got the money that was on deposit. The agreement says the consideration is zero in no uncertain language. In fact, later on in the agreement and then again outside the agreement, they slipped in a provision wherein Chase was putting up $1.9 billion, but getting more than $2 billion back out of a tax refund owed to WAMU, so they had negative consideration and there is no recital of any net loss they were taking when they assumed the deposits of WAMU.
It also turns out that, straight from the receiver’s lips, if you are looking for an assignment, you won’t find one because there isn’t one. And the merger and assumption agreement specifically does NOT include the bogus mortgage loans and other liabilities (put back) in the securitization scheme which is most of all loans originated by WAMU. Chase didn’t want to buy the loans because they correctly perceived that the liabilities on those loans and the liabilities to alleged REMIC structures that never received an interest in the loans, and the liabilities to insures, counterparties on credit default swaps and to the Federal government and Federal Reserve might vastly exceed the nominal value of mortgages originated by WAMU. Then there was also the liability for predatory or fraudulent loan practices. Altogether, Chase didn’t want to be saying it owned ALL the loans. It just wanted to be able to say it some of the time when they had an uncontested foreclosure and they could get a free house.
So Chase got an affidavit from the receiver that said that Chase owned the loans by operation of law because of the merger. That affidavit has been used hundreds if not thousands of times in foreclosures where Chase perceived the risk to be low. Thus in uncontested cases, Chase alleged it owned the loans even if they were “securitized” and got away with it because, well, there was nobody to say otherwise."
As described above, Jolley‘s opposition included a declaration from Thorne, who had been a ―senior construction loan consultant with WaMu until July of 2006, having been in charge of construction lending in 38 states since May 2005. He was an ―asset manager for the FDIC‖ at the time he signed the declaration (October 2011), and was ―intimately familiar with the procedures for taking over a failed bank.‖ And he testified: ―Pursuant to the public part of the agreement with the FDIC, of which were approximately 36 pages, the balance of the contract and the complete agreement with the FDIC and Chase bank is 118 pages long which has not been made public. I am familiar with this agreement, I read it.‖ Though somewhat ungrammatical, the declaration fairly clearly recites the existence of a nonpublic agreement (or portion of an agreement) that could affect the outcome of this case. In short, Thorne testified that the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase was not the full agreement entered between Chase and the FDIC, but rather a longer version exists, the terms of which are different from the version of which the court below took judicial notice.
Thorne also made certain representations about the content of the missing pages, claiming the FDIC guaranteed 80 percent of any failed WaMu loans, while Chase assumed only 20 percent of potential losses on the loans by receiving an 80 percent discount on WaMu‘s assets. In his deposition Thorne not only referred to the P&A Agreement being 118 pages long, but also testified that it obligated Chase ―to work directly with the customers to do as much as possible to modify any loans . . . so that no foreclosures are made and borrowers are kept in their homes.‖ The missing part of the document ―spells out an agreement between the purchasing institution and the FDIC as to how they are to handle the customers upon the purchase of the bank; i.e., how the foreclosures are to be handled, work out agreements that they‘re supposed to make. . . . They just can‘t go in and just start foreclosing on everybody that‘s not paying.
Chase filed 62 objections to Jolley‘s evidence, including 33 objections to particular aspects of Thorne‘s declaration and seven objections to particular statements in his deposition. We are concerned primarily with Objections 5 and 60, objecting to Thorne‘s statements that a 118-page purchase and assumption agreement exists, objections based on the best evidence rule, lack of foundation, and lack of competency.11
As noted, the trial court did not rule on these, or any other, evidentiary objections, and Jolley preliminarily contends that the objections cannot be maintained here. He is wrong, as specifically held in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534, a case involving objections made in a summary judgment proceeding. The Supreme Court held that if the objections were not ruled upon in the trial court, the objections are presumed overruled and are preserved for appeal. We thus turn to the merits of Chase‘s objections, and find there is none.
Chase questions the competency of Thorne‘s declaration because he is not a lawyer, was not employed at WaMu at the time of the P&A Agreement, and was never employed by Chase. This, the argument runs, fails to establish personal knowledge or expertise sufficient to opine about the contents of the purported nonpublic agreement. Chase also points out that while his declaration says Thorne was an independent contractor at the FDIC at the time he signed the declaration, it fails to show he worked there at the time of the WaMu receivership.
But that is no basis for rejecting Thorne‘s testimony on the narrow point that a 118-page agreement exists, one that he had personally read. We view his testimony on this point as that of a percipient witness, not an expert.
We may agree with Chase for purposes of argument that Thorne‘s statements about the contents of the longer agreement were not admissible. But we need not credit 18
those statements in order to conclude that a factual issue has been raised. The judgment in this case rests squarely on the terms of a much shorter, disputed version of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase. This was wrong. Since Jolley has presented evidence that a longer agreement exists, the court below resolved a disputed issue of fact by resting its decision on the terms of the shorter agreement. Put otherwise, the court did not view the evidence favorably to Jolley. (See Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145-1146 [existence of a written contract could not be judicially noticed where the opposing party claimed that an oral contract governed the relationship].)
It may be true that in some extreme circumstances ―a trial court may weigh the credibility of a declaration submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion and grant the motion ‗where the declaration is facially so incredible as a matter of law that the moving party otherwise would be entitled to summary judgment.‘ (People v. Schlimbach (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1142, fn. 9, quoting Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 342, 359–360.) This is not such a case.
Thorne‘s declaration certainly raises significant issues vis a vis Chase and the FDIC, with testimony that is hardly run of the mill. But that testimony is not so incredible that it could be ignored or rejected as untruthful on summary judgment, especially given the FDIC‘s response here, which not only did not deny the existence of the longer agreement, but suggested there were documents to be produced if there were a confidentiality agreement.
3. Summary Adjudication Was Improperly Granted On The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, And Eighth Causes Of Action
A. The First And Second Causes Of Action, For Misrepresentation
The conclusion that Chase was not liable for WaMu‘s conduct presupposes acceptance of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase as the full and complete contract governing its assumption of liabilities. Since, as discussed above, the Agreement was not properly utilized here, on that basis alone the summary adjudication of first and second causes of action was improper. In addition to the alleged misrepresentations by WaMu, Jolley alleges misstatements by Chase after the receivership, which would render summary adjudication improper for an additional reason if there are triable issues of material fact with respect to such misrepresentations. We find such issues here.
The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation; (b) knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud, i.e., induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) damage. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93; see also, Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) ―The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit [citation], does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true.‖ (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1255.)
In, or around 2005, JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) entered “negotiations” with Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) to purchase the bank and its various subsidiaries. Years later, substantial information regarding this questionable business deal between the OTS, FDIC, and JPMC, was provided in great detail in one particular lawsuit (WaMu Bondholders vs. JPMC and the FDIC(1) (as specifically referred to as the "Texas Complaint" or "Texas Action.") In 2005, Steve Rotella became the new COO of WaMu. Rotella, a senior long term executive from JPMC, went to WaMu with other senior level executives, (including John Berens,) to learn the "WaMu way." This team was sent to provide pre-sale information to JPMC regarding the “potential purchase” of WaMu. Jamie Dimon admits that he had long coveted WaMu's retail banking foot print, especially on the West Coast and Southeast of the United States. Moreover, JPMC was also interested in WaMu's expansive lending operations. WaMu was to become the largest bank failure ever. It was later alleged in April 2008, at a WaMu shareholder meeting, that Steve Rotella was blamed for the company’s troubles.
According to the Misery Index blog, 10/17/08, “At a stockholders meeting in April, 2008, a man who identified himself as a WaMu employee and shareholder laid the blame for the company's troubles squarely on Stephen Rotella, president and chief operating officer since 2005.”
The general allegations are that a number of other JPMC transplants, who followed Rotella and Berens in the subsequent years, “ran WaMu off the cliff.” WAS THIS DELIBERATE or ACCIDENTAL - as one could follow the money many years later?
The National WaMu Homeowners Support Group (NWHSG) www.nationalwamuhomeownerssupportgroup.com believes upon over 3 years of research with hundreds of allegedly defrauded WaMu homeowners, JPMC executives (turned WaMu executives) perhaps intentionally created a fraudulent scheme within WaMu to utilize "lax and irresponsible" underwriting(2) to built a vast profit center from the mortgage loan business. In this alleged scheme, JPMC and its related companies, could later control the sale of potentially 100,000's of WaMu’s foreclosed homes. The NWHSG also discovered that WaMu/JPMC ex-employees(?) had established Home Sales, Inc. “related” companies around the country, between the years of 2005-2006. Home Sales Inc. of Delaware, is a “related” company to Chase Home Finance “companies,” yet, another subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. Homesales Inc. of Delaware would later prove to be a specially chosen REO Disposition Company of WaMu's successfully foreclosed homes. The peculiar massive number of foreclosed homes would later be found to be the result, in many instances, of fraudulently underwritten home loans, unfair and deceptive loan servicing tactics, and questionable legal and property transfer strategies.
Our NATIONAL WAMU HOMEOWNERS SUPPORT GROUP.COM (NWHSG.com) research and other investigations confirm that 50-80% of loans of certain WaMu loan production offices were fraudulently underwritten - by WaMu's very own employees.(3) (That’s MORTGAGE FRAUD – A FELONY.)
Additionally, WaMu, between 2005 – 2008, underwent a minimum of 12 "internal re-organizations" in less than 3 years (as described in a audio taped interview by a WaMu mid/upper level executive whistle blower.) What kind of “leadership” would reorganize more than a dozen times in a 3 year (or so) time period if NOT to destroy, (or confuse,) the company? During these same years, we are informed by the whistle blower, that many of the better WaMu employees who cared about the long term success of WaMu, were replaced by JPMC transplants, mainly mid-level to upper level management types.) These ex-JPMC employees infiltrated WaMu at a rapid rate between 2005 - 2007. The “holy grail” of WaMu during these years, was to make as many loans as possible, at the highest profit margins, selling highly complex and inappropriate loan products, regardless of the homeowners’ ablility to repay the debt in the future.(4) Thusly, the alleged “originate to foreclose” business model was born.
On September 25, 2008, it is well documented that the OTS and the FDIC arranged a highly peculiar sale of WaMu, and "certain assets" to JPMC, for less than a 1/3 of a penny on the dollar (OTS fact sheet).(5) (Actually, we think JPMC got WaMu for FREE after Accounting write-offs, tax breaks, BAIL-OUTS, and other immediately realized windfall profits.) The financial markets journalists all raised a collective eyebrow about the timing and nature of this staggering, questionable deal.(6) A well organized group of WaMu shareholders also weighed heavily on the side of conspiracy.(7) The NWHSG maintains that JPMC is NOT the "successor of interest" of all, or at least virtually 99%(?) of WaMu's home loans from 2002 - 2007. We believe they only acquired “certain assets” via the FDIC receivership.(8) Additionally, the Delaware WaMu Bankruptcy Court has not yet been able to conclusively determine which assets JPMC owns as late of 2011, several years after the coup d’etat. (9)
WaMu originated/re-financed approximately (estimate) over 1 Million loans during that same time period. Upon further research, the NWHSG found evidence of 100’s of securitized trusts, private placements, and covered bond deals of WaMu mortgages that directly evidences the SALE of over a million WaMu loans between 2001 - 2007.(10) (11)
IF WaMu (hypothetically) SOLD over 1 million loans in those same years, than HOW CAN JPMC CLAIM to be the "successor in interest" or "holder," otherwise known as - THE OWNER of the SAME LOANS? Can there only be ONE "holder of due course?" The “successor of interest” language from JP Morgan Chase in 10,000’s(?) (or more?) of the WAMU foreclosures is “DISINGENOUS”, at best. Maybe even – “FRAUDULENT?”
LEGALLY, CAN THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE IDENTIFIABLE AND FACTUALLY PROVABLE “OWNER” OF ANY OF THE WaMu HOME LOANS!?"
We know that JPMC, through its Purchase and Assumption Agreement(12), FDIC granted JPMC certain assets. These assets have NEVER been published anywhere, INCLUDING ANY READILY IDENTIFIABLE COURT CASE IN AMERICA. It is also true that the Bankruptcy Examiner never stated any evidence of ownership of any the WaMu loans and that the FDIC has NOT shared ALL the related information.(13) The FDIC routinely hides any evidence of WHAT JPMC actually did purchase for less than a ½ penny on the dollar (or even for free?), in court cases throughout America. (14)
The evidence and facts are mounting that the FDIC has NO CLUE WHAT JPMORGAN CHASE ACQUIRED. WaMu Homeowners, Shareholders, and (certificate/bondholder) Investors are ALL asking the question … WHY EXACTLY IS THAT? Typically, in any bank receivership ALL ASSETS ARE DOCUMENTED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.
IF THE FDIC HAS NO CLUE AS TO EXACTLY WHICH “ASSETS” JPMORGAN CHASE ACQUIRED, THEN WHY DOES THE FDIC ALLOW JPMORGAN CHASE TO UTILIZE FDIC RESOURCES, DOCUMENTS, MONEY, AND LEGAL SUPPORT TO QUESTIONABLY (AND ILLEGALLY?) FORECLOSE ON WAMU HOMEOWNERS?(15)
THESE WAMU HOMEOWNERS’ LOANS WERE PROVABLY AND INARGUABLY LONG SINCE SOLD TO THE TRUE “INVESTORS”(16) – (WITHIN SECURITIZED TRUSTS, OFF-SHORE AND/OR PRIVATE LABEL INVESTMENT VEHICLES, AND COVERED BOND MARKETS)(17) - LONG BEFORE WAMU’s RECEIVERSHIP AND QUESTIONABLE TAKE-OVER. (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
In retrospect, If JPMorgan Chase had NO FUTURE, PRE-MEDIATED intent of ever taking over WaMu, then WHY did their related executives open up REO disposition offices in the major “boom States” across the country – as far back as 2005 and 2006?
The Homesales, Inc. of Delaware company, is headquartered in Iselin, New Jersey. Homesales, Inc., has an executive named Renee Johnson. Renee Johnson was a long time Washington Mutual "National Manager for Strategic Operations/REO." (23)
John Berens was an even more senior executive with Washington Mutual. Remember, Berens came down to WaMu (in 2005 with Steve Rotella, and a few others) from JPMorgan Chase, to become Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing – 24 years management with JPMorgan Chase (24)
WaMu operated its massive loan origination campaign, especially in key “boom” States. (25) Ironically, or not, Homesales Inc., set up shop in many of the very same States as WaMu’s expansion plan – again, in 2005 and 2006. All these companies are much like “cousins” in that the executives and managers all worked together in one capacity or another and in other various roles surrounding default, servicing and REO disposition. Furthermore, WaMu must have been JPMorgan Chases’ best, most profitable company for wholesale funding and lending to WaMu during it’s “boom,” and long before. (26) WaMU most likely owed JPMorgan Chase, and other major banks, BILLIONS of dollars by September 25, 2008. JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon also knew intimate, confidential details about WaMu's precarious financial situation from his ex-JPMC contacts, his position as CEO of JPMC, and his seat on The Federal Reserve. Jamie Dimon most likey saw an opportunity as there is always great profit in disasters…. for certain people and companies with inside information.
Obviously. People like John Berens and Renee Johnson go way back to the other companies such as WaMu or JPMC, but eventually, they wind up at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware (27) (28) (29) (30) Lauren V. Harris is another such executive with Homesales, Inc… She has also involved as an executive with California Reconveyance Corporation, and Chase Venture Holdings. (31)
So these are the people who work, or worked for WaMu, JPMorgan Chase, Chase Home Finance, Homesales, Inc., etc... (32) (33) It would be amazing to get to know these people and learn how they view “just doing their jobs?” Do they know that the REO sale may be fraudulent by clouded title and unlawful foreclosure? Do they know that the REO sale may have been assisted by fraudulent documents and faulty loan servicing? Or, if the questionable loan servicing was part of securities fraud (reps and warranties in the PSA)?
Or, if the securities fraud may have been aided and abetted with illegal underwriting and appraisal fraud by an un-holy number of WaMu (and affiliate) employees who inarguably and provably committed willful and intentional mortgage fraud upon a massive number of unsuspecting WaMu Homeowners? These homeowners were sold on the dream of homeownership, the American Dream?
One could only wonder, if we ever met by chance, if once they found out that 5 years later after imminent default, how families lives would be changed forever. Could one even wonder if they would ever begin to realize and experience the pain and agony of sleepless nights, isolation, emotional devestation, of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, of tremendous loss of money, income and ruined credit? These are exactly the symptoms collectively suffered by perhaps 100,000’s of defrauded Wamu Homeowner victims – cheated Americans. What about the MILLIONS of all the victims of 1000’s of other unscrupulous lenders? Would the bankers even care?
*This compilation is dedicated to the hundreds of WaMu homeowners across America who have shared their case information, hopes and fears, throughout the last 3 years of our groups’ inception.
*(Citations/Sources are listed below further down the page)
- Rob Harrington* / Co-Founder of the NWHSG –
ABOUT ROB HARRINGTON:
*My provable EVIDENCE of WaMu’s Mortgage Fraud by court ordered DISCOVERY in Niceville, Fl, USA:
DISCLAIMER/DISCLOSURE: I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY NOR LICENSED PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR! NO information that I share should be construed as legal advice. Always consult with a qualified foreclosure defense attorney, in your jurisdiction, regarding your foreclosure.
UPDATE: 2/20/12 - HOWEVER, 23 EX-WAMU EXECS NAMED IN FEDERAL SUIT:
23 ex-WaMu employees named in federal suit
By Drew DeSilver Seattle Times business reporter
WaMu-related defendants in JPMorgan suit
THESE FORMER WaMu units and employees are among the defendants in the federal government's mortgage-securities lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase:
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.
WaMu Capital Corp.
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Long Beach Securities Corp.
Richard Careaga: First vice president, WaMu Acceptance
David Beck: President and director, WaMu Acceptance
Diane Novak: Director, WaMu Acceptance
Thomas Green: Chief financial officer, WaMu Acceptance
Rolland Jurgens: Controller, WaMu Acceptance and Long Beach Securities
Thomas G. Lehmann: President and director, WaMu Acceptance; first vice president, director and senior counsel, WaMu Securities
Stephen Fortunato: Chief financial officer, WaMu Acceptance and Long Beach Securities
Donald Wilhelm: Controller, WaMu Acceptance
Michael J. Kula: Senior vice president, chief financial officer and director, WaMu Securities
Craig S. Davis: Home Loans group president, Washington Mutual Inc.; president and director, Long Beach Securities; director, WaMu Securities
Marc K. Malone: First vice president and controller, WaMu Securities
Michael L. Parker: President and director, WaMu Securities
Megan M. Davidson: Senior vice president and director, WaMu Securities
David H. Zielke: First vice president and assistant general counsel, WaMu Bank
Thomas W. Casey: Chief financial officer, Washington Mutual Inc.; director, Long Beach Securities
John F. Robinson: Director, Long Beach Securities
Keith Johnson: President and director, Long Beach Securities
Suzanne Krahling: Chief financial officer and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities
Larry Breitbarth: Controller and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities
Marangal I. Domingo: Chief executive officer and director, Long Beach Securities; director, WaMu Securities
Troy A. Gotschall: Chief operations officer and executive vice president, Long Beach Securities
Art Den Heyer: Controller and assistant vice president, Long Beach Securities
Stephen Lobo: Treasurer and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency lawsuit against JPMorgan and others
Twenty-three former Washington Mutual employees and several of the defunct thrift's subsidiaries have been sued by the federal government as part of its mortgage-securities lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase.The suit, filed last week by the agency that now controls Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accuses those individuals of signing off on documents containing false or misleading information that were used to sell billions of dollars' worth of mortgage-backed securities.
The former WaMu and Long Beach officials named in the suit were, in most cases, midlevel executives. The only senior executives included are Thomas Casey, former chief financial officer, and Craig Davis, former head of the Home Loans group.
None of the defendants has formally responded to the suit yet.
The suit claims that Fannie and Freddie relied on the prospectuses, registration statements and other documents filed by WaMu and Long Beach for each of the 35 separate issues of securities they bought during the boom.
But, according to the suit, those documents contained "materially false or misleading statements and omissions" and "falsely represented that the underlying mortgage loans complied with certain underwriting guidelines and standards, including representations that significantly overstated the ability of borrowers to repay their mortgage loans."
... And just who is JP MorganChase?
(and maybe even some of their ex-WaMu employees and executives?)
(Their Wiki page stated the following)
(2) Ontario Teachers Pension Fund (class action) vs WaMu (regarding WaMu’s systemic fraudulent lending and appraisals process.) http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00067_data/ClassActionCplt-8.05.08#http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00067_data/ClassActionCplt-8.05.08
(3)Senate Subcommittee Report : Senator Levin - April 2010 http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf
(4) Senate Subcommittee Report : Senator Levin - April 2010 http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf (pg. 164)
The Levin-Coburn memorandum contained joint findings of fact regarding the role of
federal regulators in the Washington Mutual case history. Those findings of fact, which this
Report reaffirms, are as follows.
1. Largest U.S. Bank Failure. From 2003 to 2008, OTS repeatedly identified
significant problems with Washington Mutual’s lending practices, risk management,
and asset quality, but failed to force adequate corrective action, resulting in the largest
bank failure in U.S. history.
2. Shoddy Lending and Securitization Practices. OTS allowed Washington Mutual
and its affiliate Long Beach Mortgage Company to engage year after year in shoddy
lending and securitization practices, failing to take enforcement action to stop its
origination and sale of loans with fraudulent borrower information, appraisal
problems, errors, and notoriously high rates of delinquency and loss.
3. Unsafe Option ARM Loans. OTS allowed Washington Mutual to originate
hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages,
knowing that the bank used unsafe and unsound teaser rates, qualified borrowers
using unrealistically low loan payments, permitted borrowers to make minimum
payments resulting in negatively amortizing loans (i.e., loans with increasing
principal), relied on rising house prices and refinancing to avoid payment shock and
loan defaults, and had no realistic data to calculate loan losses in markets with flat or
declining house prices.
4. Short Term Profits Over Long Term Fundamentals. OTS abdicated its
responsibility to ensure the long term safety and soundness of Washington Mutual by
concluding that short term profits obtained by the bank precluded enforcement action
to stop the bank’s use of shoddy lending and securitization practices and unsafe and
5. Impeding FDIC Oversight. OTS impeded FDIC oversight of Washington Mutual
by blocking its access to bank data, refusing to allow it to participate in bank
examinations, rejecting requests to review bank loan files, and resisting the FDIC
recommendations for stronger enforcement action.
6. FDIC Shortfalls. The FDIC, the backup regulator of Washington Mutual, was
unable to conduct the analysis it wanted to evaluate the risk posed by the bank to the
Deposit Insurance Fund, did not prevail against unreasonable actions taken by OTS to
limit its examination authority, and did not initiate its own enforcement action against
the bank in light of ongoing opposition by the primary federal bank regulators to
FDIC enforcement authority.
7. Recommendations Over Enforceable Requirements. Federal bank regulators
undermined efforts to end unsafe and unsound mortgage practices at U.S. banks by
issuing guidance instead of enforceable regulations limiting those practices, failing to
prohibit many high risk mortgage practices, and failing to set clear deadlines for bank
8. Failure to Recognize Systemic Risk. OTS and the FDIC allowed Washington
Mutual and Long Beach to reduce their own risk by selling hundreds of billions of
dollars of high risk mortgage backed securities that polluted the financial system with
poorly performing loans, undermined investor confidence in the secondary mortgage
market, and contributed to massive credit rating downgrades, investor losses,
disrupted markets, and the U.S. financial crisis.
9. Ineffective and Demoralized Regulatory Culture. The Washington Mutual case
history exposes the regulatory culture at OTS in which bank examiners are frustrated
and demoralized by their inability to stop unsafe and unsound practices, in which
their supervisors are reluctant to use formal enforcement actions even after years of
serious bank deficiencies, and in which regulators treat the banks they oversee as
constituents rather than arms-length regulated entities.
WaMu’s own employees were also responsible for the fraud:
UNKNOWN WAMU EMPLOYEE
At a stockholders meeting in April, 2008, a man who identified himself as a WaMu employee and shareholder laid the blame for the company's troubles squarely on Stephen Rotella, president and chief operating officer since 2005.
The man, whose name could not be made out clearly, said that under Rotella's leadership, WaMu loan consultants were paid more for writing subprime mortgages and so-called "option ARMs" with ultra-low teaser rates than for writing safer, fixed-rate loans.
"This man [Rotella] has driven the company to the edge of bankruptcy and he should be fired, and his bonuses should be taken back from him," the man said.
(5) OTS fact sheet http://files.ots.treas.gov/730021.pdf
(6) The Market Oracle http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article13894.html
(7) The Ghost of WaMu (WAMU Shareholder Resources website) http://wamu-shareholders-resources.com/resources/resources.html (also referenced
(8) Deutsche Bank Trust 1 and 2 Vs. FDIC and JPMC - Deposition by Duetsche Bank VP Renaldo Reyes http://www.scribd.com/doc/40932626/Deposition-Ronaldo-Reyes-of-Deutsche-Bank-2010-03-30
(9) Delaware WaMu Federal Bankruptcy Case status as of 2011 http://news.yahoo.com/judge-orders-broad-mediation-wamu-bankruptcy-151635497.html
(10) Senate Subcommittee Report by Senator Levin - April 2010
1/12/07 3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE1 U.S. SEC # 1385019
4/5/07 3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE2 U.S. SEC # 1389138
4/26/07 3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE3 U.S. SEC # 1397612
6/7/07 3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE4 U.S. SEC # 1401898
1/26/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR1 U.S. SEC # 1350323
8/21/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1370359
8/22/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1370360
9/25/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1374624
9/25/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1374625
10/23/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1374626
10/24/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR15 U.S. SEC # 1374627
11/17/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1379744
11/20/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR17 U.S. SEC # 1379745
12/19/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1383018
12/20/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1383019
2/3/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1350324
2/10/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR3 U.S. SEC # 1352798
3/31/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1355536
4/27/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR5 U.S. SEC # 1360258
6/2/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1364489
6/9/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1364476
6/30/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1367734
7/13/06 5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1367735
1/19/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY1 U.S. SEC # 1385021
2/14/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY2 U.S. SEC # 1389140
2/23/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY3 U.S. SEC # 1389141
3/23/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY4 U.S. SEC # 1392110
4/24/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY5 U.S. SEC # 1396434
5/22/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY6 U.S. SEC # 1400091
6/22/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY7 U.S. SEC # 1402110
1/24/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA1 U.S. SEC # 1385020
2/21/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA2 U.S. SEC # 1389139
3/24/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA3 U.S. SEC # 1392111
4/25/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA4 U.S. SEC # 1396435
5/23/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA5 U.S. SEC # 1400092
6/25/07 3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA6 U.S. SEC # 1402111
2/28/05 11/13/07WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp U.S. SEC # 1317069
2/11/00 11/9/07Wamu Partners II LP U.S. SEC # 1105038
1/14/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR1 U.S. SEC # 1314534
7/25/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1334142
8/24/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1337031
8/25/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1337123
10/24/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1342264
10/25/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1342368
11/21/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR15 U.S. SEC # 1345039
11/22/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1345116
12/19/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR17 U.S. SEC # 1347345
12/7/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1346065
12/14/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1346793
1/24/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1315296
2/22/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR3 U.S. SEC # 1318666
3/22/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1321432
4/22/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR5 U.S. SEC # 1324712
4/26/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1325096
6/22/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1331029
7/14/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1333176
7/20/05 3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1333701
8/25/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Ser 2003-S8 U.S. SEC # 1261237
2/24/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1220366
12/19/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thr Certs Ser 2003-Ar12 U.S. SEC # 1274023
7/23/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cer Ser 2003-Ar8 U.S. SEC # 1256337
8/23/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert 2002-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1182560
1/24/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S1 U.S. SEC # 1165932
10/28/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S7 U.S. SEC # 1201847
3/25/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2002-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1169893
10/27/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Ser 2003-S12 U.S. SEC # 1268291
11/9/01 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1162063
8/27/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1183265
9/20/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar12 U.S. SEC # 1191294
9/24/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar13 U.S. SEC # 1192220
9/23/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar14 U.S. SEC # 1191853
10/23/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar15 U.S. SEC # 1200829
10/24/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar16 U.S. SEC # 1201113
10/23/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar17 U.S. SEC # 1200828
2/26/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S2 U.S. SEC # 1168244
5/24/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S3 U.S. SEC # 1174299
9/24/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S6 U.S. SEC # 1192222
1/27/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1216057
3/20/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1223995
4/23/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1228782
5/21/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar6 U.S. SEC # 1234822
3/25/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 U.S. SEC # 1224460
4/23/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S3 U.S. SEC # 1228787
5/22/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S4 U.S. SEC # 1235349
7/22/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S7 U.S. SEC # 1255906
2/11/04 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1279818
7/23/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1298239
8/23/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1301259
10/25/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1306918
11/22/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1309383
12/17/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1311881
4/28/04 3/30/05WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1288748
4/26/04 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004 Ar-3 U.S. SEC # 1288639
5/21/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR4 [ formerly WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2004-CB1 ] U.S. SEC # 1291435
5/21/04 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1291434
5/26/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1291950
6/23/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1295182
6/24/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1295374
7/22/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1298122
5/24/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 U.S. SEC # 1291463
6/22/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB2 U.S. SEC # 1294965
8/23/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB3 U.S. SEC # 1301258
10/25/04 5/27/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB4 U.S. SEC # 1306922
4/29/04 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Rs2 U.S. SEC # 1288883
5/25/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-S2 U.S. SEC # 1291737
6/23/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-S3 U.S. SEC # 1295156
12/20/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2002-Ar19 U.S. SEC # 1211522
2/24/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2003-S1 U.S. SEC # 1220308
12/19/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2002-S8 U.S. SEC # 1211244
9/22/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1264256
9/22/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S10 U.S. SEC # 1264257
10/23/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S11 U.S. SEC # 1268053
9/22/03 3/30/05 Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S9 U.S. SEC # 1264258
5/22/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2003-S5 U.S. SEC # 1235345
2/23/04 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2004-S1 U.S. SEC # 1281095
11/25/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms8 U.S. SEC # 1207425
11/25/02 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms9 U.S. SEC # 1207426
2/24/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1220259
11/22/02 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Cer Se 02 Ar18 U.S. SEC # 1207209
6/21/02 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 02 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1176128
6/23/03 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 03 S6 U.S. SEC # 1245821
7/26/02 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002-Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1178854
7/26/02 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002 S5 U.S. SEC # 1178842
8/22/03 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1261111
11/21/03 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 S13 U.S. SEC # 1271056
6/23/03 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mor Pas Th Ce Se 03 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1245823
10/27/03 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Series 2003-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1268283
2/25/02 3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Wamu Mor Pa Th Ce Se 2002 Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1168200
8/22/01 6/24/04Wamu Mor Pass Thru Cert Ser 2001-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1157920
10/9/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1160537
11/13/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1162155
10/25/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2001-S10 U.S. SEC # 1161529
11/28/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-S11 U.S. SEC # 1162828
2/22/02 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1168097
4/27/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-5 U.S. SEC # 1139304
7/27/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-S8 U.S. SEC # 1145954
12/13/01 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificate Series 2001-Ar6 U.S. SEC # 1163589
4/23/02 6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certs Series 2002-Ars U.S. SEC # 1171948
5/24/02 3/31/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S4 U.S. SEC # 1174300
6/27/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1249359
12/7/01CSFB Mor Sec Corp Wamu Mor Bk Pa Thr Cer Ser 2001-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1163340
5/13/99 11/13/00Wamu Partners U.S. SEC # 1056574
5/21/04 3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 [ now WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-AR4 ] U.S. SEC # 1291435
3/25/03 3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Passs Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 [ now Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series
2003-S2 ] U.S. SEC # 1224460
(12)FDIC and JPMorgan Chase (WaMu) Purchase and Assumption Agreement- Sept. 25, 2008 http://www.scribd.com/doc/51435495/Washington-Mutual-JPMorgan-Chase-Purchase-Assumption-Agreement
(13) WaMu BK Examiner’s Report http://www.mckennalong.com/assets/attachments/WAMU%20Final%20Report%20of%20Examiner%20DI%205735.pdf
JPMorgan Chase didn't acquire any of Washington Mutual Bank's equity obligations (though JPMorgan Chase planned to issue $8 billion in common stock to recapitalize the bank). As a result of the seizure, WaMu's stockholders were nearly wiped out. Its stock price dropped to $0.16 a share, far from $45 a share in 2007. In their Chapter 11 filing, WaMu listed assets of $33 Billion and Debt of $8 Billion. (ref. Appendix A). The filing also indicates that enough funds are available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
Within days of the seizure, a hedge fund adviser and investment strategist, Mike Stathis of AVA Investment Analytics issued a formal complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission, demonstrating evidence of insider trading. The complaint also alleged that Washington Mutual was not insolvent, and several Wall Street firms and hedge funds had conspired to short the stock. He also stated that he spoke with a reporter from the Associated Press who told him that he was contacted by a Washington Mutual executive hours before the seizure, telling the reporter that it would happen for “political reasons.” In later criticisms, Stathis discussed that the neither the FDIC nor OTS ever disclosed any evidence of Washington Mutual's insolvency. Stathis stated that within a few weeks of submitting his complaint, he was visited by federal agents who held him in an interrogation room for questioning. As a result of this, Stathis stated that he felt bullied and did not release the SEC compliant into the public domain until a year later.
Currently, shareholders are fighting what they consider the illegal seizure of Washington Mutual through such websites as WaMuCoup.com and WaMuEquity.org, claiming that the OTS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and seized the bank for political reasons or for the benefit of JPMorgan Chase, which acquired a large network of branches at what they claim to be an unfairly low price. Shareholders claim that as of the date of the takeover, the bank had enough liquidity to meet all its obligations and was in compliance with the business plan negotiated with the OTS 2 weeks earlier and that the holding company's board and management was kept completely in the dark about the government's negotiations with Chase, hampering the bank's ability to sell itself on its own. Chief executive Alan H. Fishman was flying from New York to Seattle on the day the bank was closed, and eventually received a $7.5 million sign-on bonus and cash severance of $11.6 million (which he declined) after being CEO for 17 days. Senator Maria Cantwell has demanded an explanation from the government and threatened to open an investigation and Washington Mutual's former shareholders have threatened a lawsuit demanding compensation for the lost value of their shares.”
(15) FDIC has to face $10 billion WaMu-related lawsuit http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/23/us-fdic-deutschebank-lawsuit-idUSTRE77M8H820110823
(16) Deutsche Bank Trust 1 and 2 Vs. JPMC and FDIC http://www.scribd.com/doc/46442715/Deutsche-Bank-v-FDIC-Chase-JP-Morgan-WAMU
(17) After WaMu securitization failed: WaMu covered bonds and “pledged loans” deals during 2007 onward. http://victoryoverchase.blogspot.com/2012/01/what-about-wamu-pledged-loans-federal.html
(19) http://4closurefraud.org/2011/02/16/allstate-vs-jpmorgan-chase-wamu-et-al-jpmorganwamu-lied-about-virtually-everything-when-selling-mortgages/ from: http://www.zerohedge.com/article/how-allstate-used-sampling-confirm-jpmorganwamu-lied-about-virtually-everything-when-selling
(20) (21) http://4closurefraud.org/2010/08/17/washington-mutual-jpmorgan-chase-fdic-deal-not-finalized-so-how-can-jpmorgan-foreclose-on-wamu-loans/ from: http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2010/08/wamu_sale_hasnt_closed_document_suggests.html
(22) WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC - Free Writing Prospectus –
WaMU SELLS loans after they make them. WaMu is already paid!
http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage (pg 41)
(23) WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC Free Writing Prospectus – (Renee Johnson/Washington Mutual National Manager – Strategic Operations/REO) http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage (pg 38) J
(24) WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC Free Writing Prospectus -
John Berens/Washington Mutual Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing
– 24 years management with JPMorgan Chase (Pg. 8) http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage
(25) WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC Free Writing Prospectus -
(Washington Mutual targeted key markets: Arizona, Texas, Washington, Florida, New York,
New Jersey , etc.) Notice Mississippi, who has some of the most stringent lending and consumer protection lawsin the country, was totally by-passed by WaMu’s corporate expansion strategy.)
(26)Certain litigation information regarding WaMu’s and JPMorgan Chases long-term, ongoing, and mutual ventures dating back to even 2000, back to the early Chase Manhatten days. http://wmish.com/docs/gib/3.28/WAMUQ-2sub%20parent.pdf
(30) http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/3596568-1.html (ex-JPMC) Berens and Rotella - “WaMu’s back!”
(31) Lauren V. Harris: is also involved as an executive with California Reconveyance Corporation, Homesales, Inc., and Chase Venture Holdings. http://www.corporationwiki.com/New-Jersey/Iselin/lauren-v-harris-P7563048.aspx
Homesales Inc, Statewide corporate “offices” examples:
File Number: F-1263454-0
Corp. Name: HOMESALES, INC.
Agent Status: APPOINTED 02/14/2006
Agent Last Updated: 06/10/2006
7301 BAYMEADOWS WAY
Date of Taking Office: 05/01/2010
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
LAUREN V HARRIS
194 WOOD AVE 2ND FL
Date of Taking Office: 09/18/2006
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
7301 BAYMEADOWS WAY
Date of Taking Office: 05/01/2010
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
MARK W DAVIS
8333 RIDGEPOINT DRIVE
Date of Taking Office: 08/13/2007
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
3415 VISION DR
COLUMBUS, OH 43219
Foreign Profit Corporation
HOMESALES, INC. OF DELAWARE
Cross Reference Name
3415 VISION DR
194 WOOD AVE S
Registered Agent Name & Address
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
Name & Address
SHEPHERD, LISA A
BERENS, JOHN J
DAVIS, MARK W
HARRIS, LAUREN V
SHEPHERD, LISA A
Officers at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Treasurer at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Treasurer at California Reconveyance Company
Hide other companies
Director at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Secretary at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Hide other company
Manager at Chase Home Finance LLC
Director at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Fort Washington, PA
Director and President at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Show 6 More Connections...
Show Fewer Connections...
OTHER INTERESTING WAMU/JPMORGAN/FDIC INFORMATIONAL LINKS:
WIKIPEDIA – HISTORY OF WAMU: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Mutual
(pg 13 of 37 is the exhibit - go to # 8 question)
8. With regard to No. 53, you indicated that there was never a draft or final schedule of assets prepared in conjunction with JPMC's acquisition of assets of WMB.
You objected to the request as written ("identify in detail all assets") as either being too vague or too burdensome, given the size of this acquisition. I suggested that, at least as an initial compromise, we would be willing to agree to see a list of assets at the level of detail in which they are maintained in JPMC's internal accounting systems. You agreed to investigate this possibility and get back to me.
http://wmish.com/docs/gor/Brief.pdf (Pg. 20)
(pg 13 of 37 is the exhibit - go to # 8 question)
8. With regard to No. 53, you indicated that there was
never a draft or final schedule of assets prepared in
conjunction with JPMC's acquisition of assets of WMB.
You objected to the request as written ("identify in detail
all assets") as either being too vague or too burdensome,
given the size of this acquisition. I suggested that, at least
as an initial compromise, we would be willing to agree to
see a list of assets at the level of detail in which they are
maintained in JPMC's internal accounting systems. You
agreed to investigate this possibility and get back to me.
[Referenced from this email to Brian Glueckstein/JPMChase]
Edgar G. Sargent
From: Edgar G, Sargent
Sent: Wednesday, June 09,201012:40 PM
To: 'Glueckstein, Brian 0.'; Friedman, Stacey
Cc: Gregory Taylor (Ashby & Geddes)
Subject: RE: JPMC Requests
I still don't get it, but I guess we can discuss on the
call. My apologies if we made an incorrect
representation to the Court and if it seems material,
we will correct it. Is the distinction between an
investigation into JPMC (didn't happen) and an
investigation into JPMC's conduct (may have
From: Glueckstein, Brian D. [email@example.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2010 12:37 PM
To: Edgar G. Sargent; Friedman, Stacey
Cc: Gregory Taylor (Ashby & Geddes)
Subject: RE: JPMC Requests
Thanks, Edgar. We look forward to hopefully wrapping this up today as well,
Let's discuss tl7 on our call.
Page 1 of7------------------------------------------------------------------------------
from one of my original WAMU partner’s posts, Jeff Brode in Colorado - He deserves a medal. http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/forum/topics/washington-mutual-info
(all my posts were dropped and deleted when I left the site.....) Thanks you Lisa and Micheal – you are heros.
from my original rant post on implode-o-meter in 2009 (this was the beginning for my founding of the National WAMU Homeowners Support Group... After talking to FDIC attorney and JPMC senior counsel, I smelled a “dead rat”... turned into a (sick?) “hobby,” and here we are today... (over 100 links attached to 30 something pages of rants...) Enjoy! Join implode-o-meter. It is the ORIGINAL source of all things mortgage evil, by and for industry insiders, good and evil. Thank you Aaron Krowne. WE are still free.
Court cases and cornucopia of Chase (and others) litigation with homeowners :
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/08/13/fraud-on-the-court-wamu-chase-and-fishman-shapiro-dismissed-with-prejudice/ Many thanks, Mr D., you are one of the most awesome, unselfish people I met to date.
Neal Garfield is one of our grandfathers. He deserves our respect and admiration
Brenda Reed (NWHSG) should be CA’s next AG. God bless you Brenda!
Attorney Doug Gillies (NWHSG) first attorney to crack the successor in interest code. Thanks Doug. The crowd went wild…
Margaret Carswell, you never failed. Thank you!
Matt Weidner should really be running for FL AG. Matt hung it way out there. Thank you, Matt.
Yves Smith is one of the most intelligent bloggers out there. Thanks Yves.
I. FDIC RECEIVER HAS NO LIABILITY TO DBNTC
UNDER THEGOVERNING AGREEMENTS. ..........................23
My name is John Korman. I, as a paralegal who lives in Florida investigated Mortgage Loans for an Attorney who defends clients against foreclosure. The job I did was research the Corporate / Trust Documents [law of the case] filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in reference to the target loan and create an Affidavit based on my finding. Almost every Mortgage loan investigated which was produced by a major Banking Institution between the years 2000 – 2008 was securitized. Securitization is the act of producing an investment vehicle of Mortgage-Backed Securities (“MBS”) using the Borrower’s Mortgage NOTE as the under-lying corpus, as collateral.
In each and every securitized loan produced by these Banking Institutions, file with the Securities and Exchange Commission certain documents which are mandated, include but is not limited to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Prospectus, Indenture, 10-K [yearly report], 10-Q [quarterly report], 8-K [current report] Form 15-D and the Servicing Agreements] (herein after referred to as “Documents”), agreed to by the Party’s.
Reading these Documents, in each investigation to date, the common mandated procedure is as follows; first we have the Lender. Shortly after the Mortgage
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NOTE documents have been executed [or before the NOTE is executed] the Lender sells [or has already sold] its right, title and interest in this Mortgage NOTE to a third party, an arms length transaction [true sale] to a party known as the Seller. Within thirty  days or less the Seller will sell its right title and interest to this Mortgage NOTE to another party known as the Purchaser, also identified as the Depositor. The Depositor agrees to “trade” with a named Trust-Entity, it’s Mortgage NOTE for a predetermined amount of Mortgage-Backed Securities [less commission], these Certificates are then sold to investors.
Now a really interesting thing happens once the Mortgage NOTE is acquired by this named Trust Entity, witnessed through the use of specialty licensed software which permits investors [or licensed users] access to any “named Trust-Entity”. I can see each Mortgage Loan held by this named Trust-Entity, and I can see its currant status. I can see if the named Trust-Entity is in possession of the Mortgage NOTE documents. I can see if a Mortgage NOTE is thirty (30) days late, sixty (60) days late, ninety (90) days late, or if it is in foreclosure. I can also see how many “tranches” have been created within this named Trust-Entity. The analogy to describe what a tranche is [in my minds eye] would be similar to, you giving me one apple, I return this one apple to you as apple juice [different form], and however I manage to create from this one apple, ten additional artificial apples out of thin air and transform them into apple juice. Now this named Trust-Entity has the authority and ability to sell [juice from ten artificial apples] Mortgage-Backed securities in multiples of the underlying collateral by creating multiple tranches within the said named Trust Entity. Within these multiple tranches I find the same Mortgage NOTE to exist, at full face value. The last investigation which I just completed within this past week the named Trust Entity held twenty one tranches and the target Mortgage NOTE appeared in each one of those tranches. This one Mortgage NOTE now has the potential of generating twenty one times its face value of this Mortgage NOTE, in Mortgage-Backed Securities sold to investors. Based on the foregoing if a Trust sells these Mortgage-Backed Securities to investors and receives only ten times the face value of the original under-lying Mortgage NOTE [Security] has the named Trust Entity been damaged by the Mortgagor not making the promised monthly payments under the Mortgage NOTE agreement? In other words, if Sam goes to the Bank and borrows a sum of money but Sally pays off the debt can the Bank still claim to be a damaged party because Sam did not make the payments as promised?
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In the event whereby the Lender knows fore-hand this loan [Mortgage NOTE] will be sold out-right, securitized once executed, the Borrower is actually entering into an undisclosed investment contract, not a loan, per-say. In the not so distant past and throughout our history, prior to securitization, the Maker of the Mortgage NOTE Holds a possessory right to said Mortgage NOTE. Once the debt was discharged the Bank which held this Mortgage NOTE as a “Special Deposit” returned it to the Borrower. Today, with the advent of securitization these so-called loans [Special Deposits] are truly investment contracts [Mortgage NOTE sold out-right to generate profit] and the Borrower is an undisclosed investor with possessory rights to the profits generated from said Mortgage NOTE. Because this undisclosed investor [Borrower] is unaware of the moneys due it abandons the right to receive said funds when Borrower / Maker fail to make a claim to said funds within three years. To prove my point the Attorney General needs to request the Servicer, or the Trustee to produce a copy of the 1099-OID Form which was filed with the Internal Revenue Service, and the 1099-A including the 1099-B. These three Forms are filed with the Internal Revenue Service by either the Servicer or the Trustee and will prove the aforementioned allegation, that it is the Borrower that created, and is entitled to the “O”riginal “F’ssue “Discount, but the Borrower has abandoned these funds [1099-A] which is now claimed by the Servicer, or the Trustee [1099-B]. In other words, these aforementioned Forms will identify the Bank as the Debtor. The profit made from the invested Mortgage NOTE belongs to the Maker. We live in a wonderful place, if it wasn’t for the deceit.
Many of today’s so-called Lenders only lent their name to the Mortgage loan transaction. In other words, the Lender did not lend you their money, an undisclosed third party provided the funds for the Borrower making it appear like the Lender / Bank / Broker provided the funds. A group of investors, or a single investor creates what is commonly known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPY”) wired the money to the Lender just prior to Closing. The Lender / Bank now acting in the capacity of a Nominal Lender used this SPY money to transact the Closing. Once the Closing was completed the Nominal Lender was paid in full plus a commission, then the Nominal Lender put its name on the Mortgage NOTE. Within twenty-four (24) hours from Closing the Nominal Lender was required to physically conveyed the Mortgage NOTE to the true Lender / Investor. Thereafter this Nominal Lender takes on a new role as the Servicer of the debt, or it may employ a subServicer. The Borrower makes the monthly payments to the Servicer who s/he believes is the Lender, who forwards the payment [less its fee] to the true Lender / Investor[s]. The Homeowner was
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tricked into thinking he was a Borrower of a Loan, when in fact was a Seller of a Mortgage NOTE into an Investment Trust [SPV]. This Investment Trust has no right to a Mortgage which is used to facilitate the purchase a NOTE, fraudulently procured under the guise of a “Loan”, when in fact it was not a Loan but rather the “Purchase / Sale of a Mortgage Note” facilitating the foundation of these Mortgage-Backed Securities; the true nature of this Transaction was not disclosed to the Borrower either before or at Closing; and this Nominal Lender was paid in full plus a commission for loan it did not fund. Question; can a Nominal Lender that did not fund the transaction [Loan], putting its name on a Mortgage NOTE pretending to be the True-Lender, tricking a Homeowner into signing over a Mortgage NOTE in order to secure an Investment Security, thereafter assign a Beneficial Right to a third party, a right which it never Held from the beginning?
A reading of the Corporate / Trust Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission two constants are apparent; the Original Lender after selling its right, title and interest to said Mortgage NOTE becomes the Servicer of this debt; and
the “conveyance” of the Mortgage NOTE, Documents [law of the case] mandate the delivery of the Original Mortgage NOTE, endorsed in blank … without recourse … with ALL prior and intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the Originator [Lender] to the “person” so endorsing to the Trustee. In every investigation that I have personally conducted find there are four parties to the initial transaction, if we exclude the Borrower. The “Originator / Lender,” who sells its right, title and interest to said Mortgage NOTE to the “Seller,” the Seller sells its rights, title and interest to the “Purchaser / Depositor,” who sells to the “Trustee in trust for the benefit of the Certificate-Holder[s].” Although the named Trust Entity Documentation [law of this case] mandates this “chain of endorsements” I have yet to witness these endorsements on any Mortgage NOTE. Rather I witness an “Assignment” of the Mortgage that purports to convey the NOTE directly to the named Plaintiff. My understanding is a NOTE can not be assigned; it is endorsed from the present Holder / Owner of said NOTE and conveyed to the new Holder / Owner. Instead I am witnessing the Servicer [who was once the Lender] claiming to be the Plaintiff with all the rights title and interest as an Owner / Holder of a Mortgage NOTE, after selling its right title and interest to that same Mortgage NOTE to a third party, at an arms length transaction, viewed as a true sale. The Documents [law of this case] mandate it to be a true sale.
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I witness assignments [and or endorsements] being filed with the Courts assigning [endorsing] the right title and interest of the Originator / Lender directly to the Plaintiff, passing-over the Seller, Purchaser and the Trustee, when the Plaintiff is a named Banking Institution. The named Banking Institution would need to acquire this said Mortgage NOTE from the Trustee in order to foreclose, [not from the Lender] thus the Trustee’s endorsement would be expected on the NOTE, from it to the named Plaintiff, in a proper chain of endorsement. Instead I witness over and over again where an assignment of the Mortgage will go directly from the source [Lender] to the Plaintiff, as there are no prior and intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the Originator [Lender] to the “person” so endorsing the NOTE to the Trustee.
If the Trustee is the named Plaintiff acting for a named Trust-Entity would still require the endorsement from the Depositor / Purchaser to the named Trustee in trust for the Certificate-Holder. In my opinion, [non-attorney] this is why there was a rash of “Lost NOTE” claims in the past; the endorsements are missing, however re-establishing a NOTE cures that problem; however re-establishing a NOTE you never Owned, Held or possessed is a criminal act, in my opinion. Not only do I believe this act is a Fraud upon the Court but it is also using the legal system to facilitate a counterfeited financial instrument. The Homeowner who loses their home to foreclosure [95% are uncontested] with the use of a re-established NOTE faces the added threat that the true Owner / Holder may appear at some future date requiring the Homeowner to pay this same NOTE a second time, unless the Order from the Court provides the Defendant protection against such an occurrence. However when a Homeowner does not defend their case, lack of funds, or whatever, this protection [should the Real-Party-In-Interest appear at some future date and demand payment for the Original Mortgage NOTE] against paying twice, is often missing from the Final Order for Foreclosure, because the Homeowner lacked the legal capacity to request this protection be included in the Order from the Court, and the Plaintiff will not do the right thing, voluntarily, by including this protection, exparte.
In the event the Plaintiff does possess and produces the Original NOTE bearing the once wet ink signatures of the Borrower[s], it [NOTE] must contain the endorsements of all the aforementioned parties, otherwise there is a clear break in the Chain of Title. The Chain of Title in every securitized document I have personally reviewed requires an endorsement from the Originator / Lender to the Seller, from Seller to Purchaser and from the Purchaser to the Trustee in trust for the benefit of the Certificate Holder [s], this is in accord with each one
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of the documents I have reviewed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
These investigations that I have personally conducted disclose that most Trustees over-see dormant, dissolved or unregistered named Trust-Entities. Every named Trust Entity that I personally have investigated filed a Form 15-D with the Securities and Exchange Commission, notifying all parties of its Termination of Registration and suspension of its Duty to File Reports under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq., 78a et seq.). The Trustee foreclosing on a Homeowner [after filing a Form 15-D] is doing so on behalf of a named Trust-Entity contrary to the INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940, see Section 7, under TRANSACTIONS BY UNREGISTERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES.
What is really transpiring with these Mortgage loans is [in my minds eye] the Lender is selling the Borrower an automobile that the Lender knows has faulty brakes, and then said Lender takes out an insurance policy on that automobile. Once the automobile is totaled in a crash, the Lender collects on the insurance and still holds the borrower liable to pay the out-standing balance due on the automobile. Look no further than the foreclosure rates here in Florida or your home State, and then look at the record profits being generated by the Banks. How do you think this feat is being accomplished? Are foreclosures a negative force on the economy, because it does not seem to be negatively impacting the major banking institutions.
Brings me to my final observation, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), which acts as the purported Mortgagee of record [which we know is not true; as MERS did not loan any money and the Borrowers] do not owe any money to MERS]. MERS usually acts in the capacity as nominee for the Mortgage NOTE Owner / Holder; however, according to the procedural manual produced by MERS, it may only act in such a capacity [nominee] for and on behalf of another MERS’ Member. To the best of my knowledge none of these securitized named Trust Entities are MERS Members, thus bifurcating the Mortgage and NOTE, destroying the security and rendering the Mortgage a nullity.
When you get right down to it I think we would all agree, the bottom line is, the Creditor is the party with the skin in the game, they are the Certificate Holder[s], they are true investors], Hard-Money-Lender[s]. All Certificate Holders are customers of Cede & Co., being the nominee of the Depository
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Trust Company (“DTC”), a subsidiary of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. The Entities that purchase these Trust Certificates must purchase them from Cede & Co., or from one of its authorized agents. Seems to imitate the MERS model in so far as Cede & Co. appears to be the central recordation hub were investors trade positions by electronic registration. These named Trust Entity’s Certificates are almost always Held in the “street name” of Cede & Co.
Within the past month I was engaged to conduct research / investigation into a Mortgage Note foreclosure, Plaintiff is JPMorgan Chase, the Original Lender was Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”). Within this Complaint JPMorgan Chase avers it is the Mortgage NOTE Owner and Holder by virtue of a Purchase and Assumption Agreement facilitated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) after it seized WaMu. Within this Complaint filed by JPMorgan Chase is attached as prima fascia evidence this aforementioned Purchase and Assumption Agreement between JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC which read, [paraphrasing] JPMorgan Chase purchased all of the assets of WaMu, as such is the Owner / Holder of the Mortgage NOTE being foreclosed on [presumptively giving JPMorgan Chase Standing]. However, reading the Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission WaMu sold this Mortgage NOTE out right to a third party [true sale] long before its seizure by the FDIC. The only nexus held by WaMu in reference to this Mortgage NOTE in question were its right to Service this debt. In the case styled UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, case number 09-CV-01656-RMC, Document 55, styled DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for the Trusts listed in Exhibits 1-A and 1-B, Plaintiff, vs. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for Washington Mutual Bank; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, National Association; and WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORPORATION, Defendants; JPMorgan Chase herein pleads, on page 33. of 39;
“Under the plain terms of that agreement, JPMC did not become WMB’s successor in interest. Since its closure, the FDIC as receiver has controlled WMB. While JPMC purchased all of the assets of WMB, it assumed only specified liabilities: those that had been reduced to a dollar amount on WMB’s ‘general ledger and subsidiary ledgers and supporting schedules which support the general ledger balances.’”
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I only know of this one case in particular whereby JPMorgan Chase is foreclosing on a property in which it holds no right title nor interest aside from its Servicing right[s] acquired under a Purchase and Assumption Agreement, still to be executed between it and the FDIC. However JPMorgan Chase is telling a Judge in New Jersey it Owns and Holds this particular Mortgage Note by virtue of the aforementioned Purchase and Assumption Agreement acquired from the FDIC. Then in this case, [as sited above] in order to avoid / evade liability now pleads it”… did not become WMB.’s successor in interest.” You’ all know the difference between “avoid” and “evade,” [twenty years]!
It is my sincere hope the Attorney General of Florida along with the Attorney General in the other forty-nine States investigate JPMorgan Chase’s claim as successor in interest to WaMu, wherein JPMorgan Chase claims to be a Plaintiff, as its foundation points to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement. Equity would call for an Estoppel of all foreclosure Actions in which JPMorgan Chase claims to be WaMu’s successor in interest.
In closing, these named Trust Entities by-and-large are missing a mountain of Mortgage NOTEs. I have not had the time to do a mean average [as some named Trust Entities hold literally a thousand Mortgage Loans and the calculations must be done manually] however the field marked “Doc” [abbreviation for Documents] either reads “Unknown” or “Limited” in over 50% of these Mortgage Loans [by observation] conservatively. The named Trustee of the named Trust Entity clearly did not do even a reasonable job in receiving the Mortgage NOTEs as mandated under these named Trust Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
/s/ John Korman
Thank you friend and fellow researcher, John Korman.
(John is not offering legal advice and is not an attorney. Ask your qualified attorney if he/she agrees with this article.)
More on securitization/trust failures:
Click here for a FREE Securitization Look-up ---> https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/
Fraudulent clouded titles** will create more lawsuits and uncertainty in our markets.
THANK YOU, ELLEN BROWN, J.D. (Ellen was one of the first to "get it.")
Thank you WAMU Shareholders/Ghost of WAMU for all of the following contributions to the internet:
THEY DID MOST OF THE HEAVY LIFTING. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION COLLECTION IS ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR EFFORTS. (Pages 27 – 37 below)
Blogging: John Hempton for the Bronte Capital Blog:
Do you or did you ever have friends in the FDIC? (05/27/09)
JP Morgan lied to regulators (05/10/09)
Mixed up policy responses and liquidity preference (04/22/09)
The seemingly criminal Sheila Bair (04/03/09)
Sheila Bair is either a criminal or a grotesquely incompetent stark raving idiot (03/28/09)
The bull in the china shop (12/05/08)
Why Sheila Bair must resign (11/23/08)
Citigroup, Wachovia, Sheila Bair and a post I didn't make... (11/14/08)
Who lied to who and who told who what (09/30/08)
Reckless Irresponsible Seizure (09/28/08)
Illiquidity and insolvency and the takeover of WaMu (09/26/08)
Is this one of the most extraordinary government actions ever? (09/26/08)
The FDIC and WaMu (09/24/08)
From Mike Stathis of AVA Investment Analytics:
The Biggest Banking Heist in World History: Washington Mutual (10/01/09) (also an SEC complaint )
WaMu Insider Trading and Naked Short Selling (10/19/09)
From PPY's Seeking Alpha Instablog:
FDIC: Time For Some Checks and Balances (04/18/09)
FDIC And Its Newest Victims: Small Business Owners, Farmers, And Community Banks (05/13/09)
FDIC: Reckless Actions Against Hard Working Americans (05/15/09)
FDIC - Contradictions And Lies (06/08/09)
Who Is Regulating FDIC? (06/22/09)
The Frugal Scotsman's Depression Gazette - Is the FDIC Inept, Panicked, or Corrupt? (04/26/09)
Felix Salmon's Reuters Blog:
Revisiting WaMu (05/26/09)
Bair’s chutzpah (11/14/09)
From Truth and Transparency's Seeking Alpha Instablog:
Why the FDIC’s Receivership and Fire-Sale of WaMu is a Mess (05/17/09)
Ballet among the Carcasses (10/30/09)
Troy Racki's Seeking Alpha Instablog:
Some first hand articles.
WAMU, JP Morgan Chase, and the FDIC - Who exactly is looking out for you? (09/25/08)
The Plunder of Washington Mutual (09/28/08)
WaMu'd - Washington Mutual Shareholders Get the Shaft (10/04/08)
"All Fall Down" - WaMu sues the FDIC (03/30/09)
'Bad Moon Rising' - WaMu Fights Back (05/10/09)
Videography - WaMu"Q'd" The Movie: Of, By, & For the People
WaMu"Q'd" - YouTube Channel.
WaMu Equity Organization - (wldgrdnr) Seeking to protect the value of our shares.
Washington Mutual Equity Group - (zardiw) A group of shareholders who have joined together to preserve equity value.
The WaMu Story - (started by wldgrdnr & zardiw, now run by zardiw), do not confuse with WaMued - The Story. http://www.wamu-shareholders-resources.com/
Squidoo: - WaMu Lens (zardiw)
Ghost of WaMu - (ghostofreagan) following WaMu through the courts. Excellent web site posting important documents from the court cases. Accesses PACER and has documents for the court case against the FDIC in US District court.
MadBlab.com - "Sites like these happen when shareholders get mad."
WaMu Sleuth (Job Thykkuttathil) - Supreme Court case to restore WaMu shareholders property rights under the 5th amendment of the US Constitution. There is a companion WaMu Sleuth Twitter page. The petition was denied. The website still follows WaMu.
Some of the news articles with a bit of the fallout from the WaMu seizure:
WaMu Seizure: The Ambush Angle (09/26/08)
Wachovia Suitors May Delay Bidding After Dimon's Deal for WaMu (09/27/08)
Did the FDIC Sabotage WaMu's Management and Erode Investor Confidence (09/28/08)
Washington Mutual Bond Holders Wiped Out (09/28/08)
Quit Ceding Power to Tyrants (10/02/08)
Putin: US image damaged forever over economy woes (10/09/08)
Financial Crisis Called Top Security Threat to U.S. (02/13/09)
Nationalizing the Banks Is a Horrendous Idea (02/19/09)
BankUnited Bidders Said to Seek Receivership Before Purchase (05/14/09), this story was removed from the internet within two weeks, but was cataloged in search engines, see screen capture 1 and screen capture 2. You may read the story at either the Yahoo Board post or the IHub board post.
BankUnited Sale May Signal FDIC Shift in Buyout Rules (Update3) (05/22/09)
The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution (pdf). ".... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Sheila Bair repeatedly said at the time of the WaMu seizure that the FDIC/OTS's early resolution preemptive seizure of WaMu was done to eliminate the risk that the taxpaying public would be required to indirectly pay the deposit insurance on WaMu's deposits, if and when the WaMu bank were to actually fail, as the FDIC did not have sufficient funds to make good on the value of the insured deposits itself. A failure of the WaMu bank would have required that the FDIC borrow the required funds from the US Treasury, and the US Treasury's funds come from the issuance of Treasury Bills and Bonds, backed by and paid off by, the taxpaying US public. Although the FDIC would eventually repay the loan with collected bank fees, the WaMu seizure was a seizure of shareholders property, and done to preclude the use of public funds, and thus a violation of the 5th amendment of the US Constitution. Ironically the WaMu seizure was done because the FDIC had first foiled and then fumbled WaMu's merger processes, on top of being so poorly funded they could have never made good on their insurances to begin with.
Where to view and download WaMu legal documents:
Kurtzman Carson Consultants KCC WaMu, use the menu in the left margin. This site has documents concerning only the bankruptcy.
Also for eight cents a page documents can be viewed from Pacer. Documents concerning any of the WaMu court cases are available from Pacer.
FBI probing bailout firms (09/24/08)
WaMu debt holders stake claim in bankruptcy court (10/03/08)
Cantwell seeks explanation of WaMu seizure (10/08/08)
Statement by United States Attorney Jeffrey C. Sullivan regarding Washington Mutual, their home page. (10/15/08)
Bank of Scotland, Bondholders Can Join WaMu Lawsuit (10/14/09)
Aspects of the Deal/Steal:
WaMu Says Dimon Took Illegal Windfall (04/29/09)
JPMorgan’s WaMu Windfall Turns Bad Loans Into Income (Update2) (05/26/09)
JPMorgan's $29 Billion WaMu Windfall Turns Up The Heat On Sheila Bair (05/26/09)
In this Oct 15th 2008 Bloomberg video clip, Charles Bobrinskoy, Vice Chairman at Ariel Investments, at 1:40 says that JPMorgan's “WaMu deal for $1.9 Billion could go down as one of the greatest acquisitions of all time”. Once again this shows that the OTS/FDIC did the wrong thing and preemptively seized and gave away our valuable company to protect themselves due to their own short term liquidity problem. This destroyed the shareholders wealth and the shareholders must be compensated.
Washington Mutual Inc. Bankruptcy Filing Info:
WaMu Inc US Bankruptcy Court petition (pdf) (09/26/08)
Washington Mutual Inc Files Chapter 11 (09/27/08)
WaMu holding company claims assets of $32B, debts of $8B (09/29/08)
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Filings for WaMu:
Last 20 Quarterly Reports
Last 10 Annual Reports
Statements of Changes
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
The US Treasury
The Federal Reserve:
Federal Funds (Federal Reserve Funds):
Federal Funds - Short-term transactions in immediately available funds between depository institutions and certain other institutions that maintain accounts with the Federal Reserve; usually not collateralized.
Fed Point Federal Funds
Wikipedia Federal Funds
FRB Discount Window.
FRBNY Discount Window.
FRBNY The Discount Window.
JP Morgan Chase, the auction winner, is a major shareholder of the Federal Reserve. So is Citigroup another auction participant. The CEO of JPMorgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, sits on the Board of Directors of the New York Federal Reserve, FRBNY Board of Directors.
The Federal Reserve, like the FDIC, likes to do its important work in total secrecy. Prior to the financial crisis the word "transparency" was sold to us as the key to a healthy financial system. Remember how transparent WaMu was, giving all of their financial data to the FDIC for a supposed effort to help with a merger. Well the FDIC stabbed them in the back on that, and the FED soon ran off with $700 billion dollars of taxpayer money. Once the looting of WaMu and America was accomplished the word "transparency" slipped down the memory hole.
Federal Reserve Seeks to Protect U.S. Bailout Secrets (01/11/10)
Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion (Update2) (12/12/08)
Federal Reserve Says Judge Erred in Requiring Bank Disclosure (11/07/09)
Federal Reserve Says Disclosing Loans Will Hurt Banks (08/27/09)
Audit the Federal Reserve: HR 1207 and S 604
As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn't Bother Barking (09/27/09)
The FDIC has wrongfully seized banks before, and has been taken to court, and found guilty.
U.S. Is Told To Return Big S.& L., the Federal Court decison pdf.link, and the Supreme Court decision pdf.link (1990).
First City Bancorp in Plan To Settle Suit With FDIC (12/18/1993)
Judge Hughes hammers the FDIC in the Hurwitz case (08/24/05)
FDIC Ordered to Pay Financier $72 Million a "corrupt agency with corrupt influences on it". (08/25/05)
Major Victory for MAXXAM in On-Going Lawsuit Against FDIC (04/04/08)
More FDIC in court:
Judge makes costly liability ruling against FDIC (09/15/02)
FDIC Facing Lawsuit For Improper Lending (07/20/08)
FDIC to pay $90 mln to settle Beal lawsuit (01/16/09)
The FDIC in error:
FDIC faulted in 4 bank failures in '08 (04/08/09)
WaMu’s liquidity problem is debatable. On Sept 11, 2008 WaMu announced it had $50 billion dollars in liquidity. On September 25th it was seized for a bank "run" totaling $16.9 billion. Was the seizure necessary when they still had $33 billion dollars in liquidity and the bailout meetings were already well underway? Wouldn’t WaMu have survived without a problem throughout the bailout meetings and after the bailout terms were known, been enough of a known quantity to complete a merger. The Federal Reserve has systems to keep banks with short term liquidity problems whole, they are called the Federal Funds and the Discount Window. Couldn't the FDIC make an announcement that it would not let depositors at WaMu lose funds while the bailout was being put together and implimented?
From the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website:
The Purchase Agreement (pdf)
Reports of Condition & Income and Thrift Financial Reports
Failed Bank List
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Service Center
The FDIC reserves were at the legal limit allowed and hence the FDIC did not collect premiums from the banks for the ten years from 1996-2006. This was when the economy was strong and few banks failed. Now as the economy weakens they have very quickly run out of money. In a move to avert their own liquidity problems the FDIC was desperate to have WaMu seized as fast as possible. A seizure protects the FDIC from exhausting its liquidity, and there was a slim chance that if things went horribly wrong for WaMu before it could merge itself, the FDIC would be put in the position of having to insure its depositors.
FDIC Cuts Commercial Bank Premiums (11/15/1995)
Deposit Plan Will Cost Banks More (10/02/08)
The FDIC reneged in advance on its duty to insure WaMu deposits claiming poverty, thus abetting a rush of withdrawals on large deposits. The FDIC can only be broke if the US Treasury shuts down.
FDIC Fails, then WaMu refuses to cash the check (07/17/08)
FDIC Insurance Fund it Doesn't Actually Exist (09/12/08)
Open Letter to Bloomberg News about FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (09/25/08)
Don't Worry About the FDIC (09/25/08)
FDIC approves higher insurance premiums for banks (10/07/08)
Is Your Money Really Safe with FDIC? (02/24/09)
FDIC: $19 billion now backs over $4.8 trillion (03/01/09)
The IndyMac fiasco: a three-day run of federal incompetence (07/06/08). This incredibly dogged FDIC job was directly responsible for the WaMu California mini-run, once the nation wide money market run set things off. See Deposit run at WaMu forced their hand, regulators say (09/25/08)
The Law that Sheila Bair used to justify the seizure of the WaMu Bank and forcing the parent company WaMu Inc. into bankruptcy is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). It was passed in the 102nd Congress. This is a link to the law, FDICIA 1991, scroll down to SEC. 141. LEAST-COST RESOLUTION. This is the section of the law she quoted for her choice of methodology. Sub section 4BIII says they have to retain the documentation for not less than five years. I did a FOIA request for these documents and received this partial reply WaMu Case Memorandum (pdf). Section 141/4GI says the least cost resolution should not be used if it will cause systemic risk, like triggering a recession. etc. SEC. 143. EARLY RESOLUTION is the part which allows them to do a preemptive seizure, as was done in WaMu's case.
Here is one of the FDIC's regulations, designed to enrich themselves, clearly violated with the WaMu auction.
FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts:(1); 1000 - Federal Deposit Insurance Act:(2); Use next page to get to this page:[1000-1200 (3)];
See under (13)(E)(i,ii,iii):
(13) ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.--
(E) DISPOSITION OF ASSETS.--In exercising any right, power, privilege, or authority as conservator or receiver in connection with any sale or disposition of assets of any insured depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed conservator or receiver, including any sale or disposition of assets acquired by the Corporation under section 13(d)(1), the Corporation shall conduct its operations in a manner which--
(i) maximizes the net present value return from the sale or disposition of such assets;
(ii) minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of cases;
(iii) ensures adequate competition and fair and consistent treatment of offerors;
From the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) website:
OTS Fact Sheet on WaMu (pdf)
Press Release on the Sale of WaMu
The OTS gave a news conference call upon the seizure of the WaMu Bank September 25, 2008. The call can be downloaded here OTS Press Call with a right click-save target as... It is a 4.28MB MPG3 audio file, about a two minute download over a high speed internet connection.
Grounds for the Appointment of the FDIC as Receiver for WaMu (pdf)
OTS Freedom of Information Act
More on Regulators:
Basel II in the United States: Progress Toward a Workable Framework (pdf) (05/14/2008)
Regulator Let IndyMac Bank Falsify Report (12/23/08)
Sheila Bair - World's Worst Regulator - to Stay at FDIC (01/11/09)
The Second Savings And Loan Scandal (01/29/09)
The Swensen Plan (02/25/09)
Regulators Avoided ‘Forceful Actions’ Before Crisis, GAO Says (03/18/09)
Sheila Bair's WaMu Seizure Blamed For Lack Of Bank Lending (04/22/09)
The Price of Honesty (04/28/09)
The Quiet Coup an excellent article from The Atlantic Magazine Online, May 2009 edition
Where were regulators when banks were failing? (06/22/09)
We Already Have A Systemic Risk Regulator, It's Called The Fed (06/24/09)
Is The FDIC Broke And Covering It Up? (08/02/2009)
Why No One Won a Pulitzer for Financial Reporting (Part 2 is WaMu specific) (08/05/09)
WaMu's demise was lesson in regulatory failure (09/18/09)
The fight for WaMu documents (12/11/09)
Riski: The Financial Market Regulatory Resource
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA):
Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending (09/30/1999)
Banks, Trade Groups Say that SEC Order Does Not Go Far Enough (07/22/08)
Bringing Down Bear Stearns from Vanity Fair August 2008 issue.
Short Stocks: Bets continue to build against some financials (09/10/08)
'Short sellers' boosted bets on Lehman, AIG, WaMu (09/24/08)
Naked short selling has been pointed to as one tool that has been used to takedown companies. There was a thirty day ban on naked short selling in 19 financial stocks issued on July 15th 2008 due to this problem. A thirty day ban on naked short selling for any and all stocks was issued on September 17th 2008 to combat the manipulation problem. Plus any short selling at all, naked or otherwise, was banned in 799+ financial stocks from September 19th through October 2nd 2008. Following is a bit of info on naked short selling.
Naked Shorting -- Why not just ignore the law? LINKS
The Deep Capture Blog
Here is a chart from Deep Capture showing how naked shorting exploded when WaMu hit the $15.00 area and helped take WaMu down to $5.00. The chart stops there, but the trends continued. The blue bars are Failure to Deliver (FTD) volume and the red line is the price. Washington Mutual: Price versus Failures-to-Deliver (09/26/08)
The Naked Short Selling That Toppled Wall Street (10/02/08)
A Shorts Story (01/23/09)
Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman (03/19/09)
The Dark Side of the Looking Glass The Corruption of Our Capital Markets - Slide Show Video Lecture on How Rogue Hedge Funds Are Killing Businesses for Profit. (with naked shorting) (79:44 with the end notes). In July 2009, too late for WaMu, the SEC began requiring clearing houses to buy shares on the open market to cover for failure to deliver shares. This presentation is about the old system which WaMu and so many others suffered under.
SEC Press Release Index for 2008. Of most interest are 2008-140, 143, 155, 204, and 211.
SEC Press Release Index for 2009. Of most interest are 2009-76, and especially 2009-172.
SEC Failure to Deliver Data.
SEC FOIA/PA Program.
Tax and Related Matters:
The bailout was made law Oct 3 2008, and is now known as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)
Complete text of the EESA (pdf)
Summery of the EESA (pdf)
further EESA (pdfs)
TARP expenditures as of February 20 2009, pdf.link.
FAS 157 is the mark to the market rule, that went into effect November 15, 2007. Banks in bank mergers have to value assets at the current market rate. This killed mergers in bad markets, when they arguably are needed most, as either the selling bank sells at market and takes a big loss on long term valuable assets, or the buying bank pays above market and must record big immediate losses by recording the assets at market. Even if they balance the losses between them, neither party wants to take the hit.
Investopedia FAS/FASB 157 and from the FASB, FAS/FASB 157
Why FAS 157 strikes dread into bankers (11/12/07)
A FAS 157 Primer (11/15/07)
FAS 157: The FASB's Prelude and Fugue on Fair Value of Liabilities (05/04/08)
Wall Street Says -2 + -2 = 4 as Liabilities Get New Bond Math (06/02/08)
WaMu stock down 22 percent over accounting rules (09/10/08)
Rule hobbling suitors batters WaMu stock (09/11/08)
Notice 2008-83: Application of Section 382(h) to Banks is the IRS ruling that removed the mark to the market rule for banks, on October 1st 2008. (10/20/08)
New Tax Rule Enabled Wachovia Deal (10/09/08)
Tax rule might have helped WaMu (10/17/08)
TPG Capital - the largest WaMu shareholder. Though WaMu was only five percent of their portfolio. Originally 822,857 WaMu common shares at $8.75 a share, and Series S and Series T Preferred Stock, for a total investment of two billion dollars (link- top of pg 13). The Series S and Series T Preferred Stock was automatically converted into 227.7 million shares of WaMu common stock on June 30, 2008. TPG reduced their position along the way. They say the seizure of WaMu caused them a loss of $1.3 billion dollars.
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
JPM WaMu Analyst Presentation (pdf)
JPM Chase conference call on the WaMu purchase, given 9:15pm EST Thurs. 09/25/08 - this link brings up an autoplay audio - Conference Call.
To download a copy of the conference call to play at your convenience, right click this link Conf Call and choose Save Target as.... It is a 20MB windows media audio file, about a five minute download over a high speed internet connection. If you just want the body of the call without the question and answer period use this link first half, if you just want the question and answer portion use this link Q&A.
JP Morgan Chase is the biggest player in the Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps market. They are also the most over leveraged in this area. It is important to note that the financial crisis was not caused by subprime loans, it was caused by side bets, CDO's or Credit Default Swaps, a derivative, contracted on packaged bundles of subprime mortgages. These contractual obligations can be leveraged and also written against each other, over and over, and their combined dollar values in the banks portfolios are immense. They were highly profitable in good times, but as subprime mortgages failed the defaults often cause the much larger amounts of all associated side bet contracts to fail as well, and these domino through the system. This is what caused the financial crisis, banks, investment banks and insurance companies being unable to make good on their credit default obligations. JPMorgan is the primary originator of this market and the biggest player in it. Lehman Bros and Bear Stearns were its primary competitors. AIG was also a big player, as were many hedge funds. WaMu did not deal in derivatives.
The JPM Derivatives Monster (09/07/01)
JPM Derivatives Monster Grows (01/04/02)
The JPMorgan Guide to Credit Derivatives (pdf)
More on Derivatives:
Why J.P. Morgan Chase has the market panicked (10/08/02)
US Bank Derivative Exposure - September 30, 2007 (Large)
US Bank Derivative Exposure - Q1 2008, (explained)
JPMorgan, Facing Federal Probe, Exits Municipal Swaps (09/04/08)
Did JPMorgan Almost Fail? (10/02/08)
Credit Derivatives Role in the Crash - The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room (10/15/2008)
JP Morgan ‘brought down’ Lehman Brothers (10/05/08)
What Barack Obama Needs to Know About Tim Geithner, the AIG Fiasco and Citigroup (11/24/08)
Rioting at the Gates of Thermopylae: The Fed & Central Banks Shudder (12/15/08)
JPMorgan Said to Reap $5 Billion Derivatives Profit (Update1) (03/03/09)
Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won (12/23/09)
Some tips to filing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests:
Making the FOIA Work for You
How to Make a FOIA Request
FOIA Letter Generator
How to file a FOIA request
Decoding the Lingo of the Financial Crisis
Law.com law dictionary
Documentaries on the financial crisis in general, not WaMu specific:
1. CNBC House of Cards The Definitive Look At The Origins Of Today's Global Economic Crisis (1:31:10).
2. PBS Inside the Meltdown Investigating how the economy went so bad so fast and what Bernanke and Paulson didn't see, couldn't stop and weren't able to fix (56:23).
3. Boom, Bust & BLAME The Inside Story of America's Economic Crisis. CNBC's special web series on the crisis, and includes short videos.
4. PBS Frontline: The Warning. Long before the meltdown, one woman tried to warn about a threat to the financial system (54:59). A documentary about how the unregulated derivatives market lead to the financial crisis. JPMC is the leading derivatives market participant. Sheila Bair advocated that hedge funds, many whom are major derivative players, not be regulated.
***NOTE: 2012 brings the homeowners,
investors, and shareholders ALL getting
involved with litigation. It is estimated that JP
Morgan Chase and the FDIC are embroiled in
over 10,000 lawsuits. WHY would there need
to be 10,000 plus lawsuits if potentially a
large number of people were not allegedly
harmed by the FDIC and JP Morgan Chase?
Links for self-research: HIRE A QUALIFIED, AFFORDABLE ATTORNEY!
FREE SECURITIZATION LOOK-UP TOOL (BPIA)
CLICK HERE for a FREE Securitization Look-up ----> https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/
- SECinfo: http://www.secinfo.com/
- Freddie Mac Loan Search: https://www.freddiemac.com/corporate
- Fannie Mae Loan Search: http://fanniemae.com/loanlookup/
- County Records searches: Call the local title company of the property and request the basic (free) look-up.
- State license searches: Google (by State) “Division of Banking & Insurance”
- - Alleged Robo-Signers:
Additional look-up links:
Fixed Rate & Balloon Calculators: http://tcalc.timevalue.com
Neg-Am, Option Arm, and More calculators: http://www.decisionaide.com/
MPCalculators/menus/MP calculators.asp Interest Rate histories: http://www.mortgage-x.com
I/O calculator: http://www.dinkytown.net/java/mortgageinterestonly.html
OCC-Office of the comptroller of the Currency: http://www.occ.treas.gov
FDIC- for TILA: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6500-1400.html
HUD-for RESPA: http://wwwhud.gov/offices/hsg/res/respa hm.cfm
Doc Magic – Calculating finance charges and APR: https://www.docmagic.com
State Case Laws: http://www.fairfightforyourhome.com/archives/1356
Report for UDAP for each state: http://www.scribd.com/doc/14473414/
50-state-report-on-unfair-and-deceptive-acts-and-practices HAMP Handbook: https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/index.jsp
HERE IS WHY WE NEED TO FORCE CHANGE IN AMERICA NOW!
The fall of America began in Floriduh.... Florida Fair Foreclosure Act of 2012- Fair to criminals?
The Florida Legislature will soon decide the fate of the overall general push by State Governments, The A.G.'s, the Federal Government, and the Bar Associations, to make "foreclosure" a State sponsored PROPERTY CONFISCATION effort. This is really no different than pre-war Germany "legalizing" the confiscation of Jewish property to ramp up some particular power agenda based on Corporatism and Fascism.In the 30’s, the Nazis offered people of the Jewish faith 10% of their proprty value. By the 40’s…. When our government steps in to finally confiscate millions of American properties for zero dollars, we will all know we have surpassed Nazi Germany in the total; suppression of our liberties and freedom.
The current Legislation floating around Tallahassee, like a whore soliciting herself on Monroe Street, highlights three of the following unconcionable and despicable aspects of "legalizing" fraud for the sake of Florida "commerce."
(from Chip Parker's blog:)
It obviously seems foreclosurefraud veils the actual root of the RICO conspiracy by downplaying the WIDESPREAD MORTGAGE FRAUD AND APPRAISAL FRAUD CREATED BY THE BANKS AND THEIR SUBCONTRACTOR/TRADING PARTNERS back in the early and middle parts of the 2000's. Nobody in Tallahassee wants to even think about, nor solve, that particular prickly and embarrassing issue.
Matt Weidner has set forth the call of all Floridians to take back their State government in his recent blog
If you don't understand what Fascism is, then learn about it now. Very soon it will be too late, (if it already isn't...) Many of the Jewish faith never made it out of Germany alive even though they had close to a decade to figure out which way the stench of an evil wind was blowing. Like wind, Fascism can change course and intensity without actually being seen or felt in real time.
For the last 40 years, unlike teaching fear and contempt regarding Communism, Fascism, in its many variant historical forms, was never taught very well to American school children.
Definition and history of FASCISM from Wikipedia:
(Wikipedia)  Under fascism, the profit motive continues to be the primary motivation of contributors to the economy. Along with support of private property and the profit motive, fascists also support the market economy.
Highly related to Fascism is Corporatism
(Wikipedia) Corporatism is related to the sociological concept of structural functionalism. Corporate social interaction is common within kinship groups such as families, clans and ethnicities. Aside from humans, certain animal species are known to exhibit strong corporate social organization, such as penguins.
Corporatist types of community and social interaction are common to many ideologies, including: absolutism, capitalism, conservatism, fascism, liberalism, progressivism, reactionism, socialism, and syndicalism.
How to identify Fascist characteristics:
Fourteen Defining Characteristics Of Fascism
By Dr. Lawrence Britt
Source Free Inquiry.co
Dr. Lawrence Britt has examined the fascist regimes of Hitler (Germany), Mussolini (Italy), Franco (Spain), Suharto (Indonesia) and several Latin American regimes. Britt found 14 defining characteristics common to each:
1. Powerful and Continuing Nationalism - Fascist regimes tend to make constant use of patriotic mottos, slogans, symbols, songs, and other paraphernalia. Flags are seen everywhere, as are flag symbols on clothing and in public displays.
2. Disdain for the Recognition of Human Rights - Because of fear of enemies and the need for security, the people in fascist regimes are persuaded that human rights can be ignored in certain cases because of "need." The people tend to look the other way or even approve of torture, summary executions, assassinations, long incarcerations of prisoners, etc.
3. Identification of Enemies/Scapegoats as a Unifying Cause - The people are rallied into a unifying patriotic frenzy over the need to eliminate a perceived common threat or foe: racial, ethnic or religious minorities; liberals; communists; socialists, terrorists, etc.
4. Supremacy of the Military - Even when there are widespread
domestic problems, the military is given a disproportionate amount of government funding, and the domestic agenda is neglected. Soldiers and military service are glamorized.
5. Rampant Sexism - The governments of fascist nations tend to be almost exclusively male-dominated. Under fascist regimes, traditional gender roles are made more rigid. Divorce, abortion and homosexuality are suppressed and the state is represented as the ultimate guardian of the family institution.
6. Controlled Mass Media - Sometimes to media is directly controlled by the government, but in other cases, the media is indirectly controlled by government regulation, or sympathetic media spokespeople and executives. Censorship, especially in war time, is very common.
7. Obsession with National Security - Fear is used as a motivational tool by the government over the masses.
8. Religion and Government are Intertwined - Governments in fascist nations tend to use the most common religion in the nation as a tool to manipulate public opinion. Religious rhetoric and terminology is common from government leaders, even when the major tenets of the religion are diametrically opposed to the government's policies or actions.
9. Corporate Power is Protected - The industrial and business aristocracy of a fascist nation often are the ones who put the government leaders into power, creating a mutually beneficial business/government relationship and power elite.
10. Labor Power is Suppressed - Because the organizing power of labor is the only real threat to a fascist government, labor unions are either eliminated entirely, or are severely suppressed.
11. Disdain for Intellectuals and the Arts - Fascist nations tend to promote and tolerate open hostility to higher education, and academia. It is not uncommon for professors and other academics to be censored or even arrested. Free expression in the arts and letters is openly attacked.
12. Obsession with Crime and Punishment - Under fascist regimes, the police are given almost limitless power to enforce laws. The people are often willing to overlook police abuses and even forego civil liberties in the name of patriotism. There is often a national police force with virtually unlimited power in fascist nations.
13. Rampant Cronyism and Corruption - Fascist regimes almost always are governed by groups of friends and associates who appoint each other to government positions and use governmental power and authority to protect their friends from accountability. It is not uncommon in fascist regimes for national resources and even treasures to be appropriated or even outright stolen by government leaders.
14. Fraudulent Elections - Sometimes elections in fascist nations are a complete sham. Other times elections are manipulated by smear campaigns against or even assassination of opposition candidates, use of legislation to control voting numbers or political district boundaries, and manipulation of the media. Fascist nations also typically use their judiciaries to manipulate or control elections.
(Do you finally get it?)
Government Set to Sell Foreclosures in Bulk- 1/9/12
From Chip Parker/Jacksonville Bankruptcy Attorney:
If the mortgage industry has its way, the passage of a new bill floating around Tallahassee will ensure that Floridians will be displaced from their homes without legal representation or due process. In typical Orwellian style, this bill is entitled the Fair Foreclosure Act – it’s anything but . . .
Florida often makes the national news when it comes to foreclosures, and it’s never positive. According to a recent 24/7 Wall Street study, three of the ten housing markets most likely to collapse in 2012 ar.... Naples, Miami and Ft. Lauderdale all make the top 10, and the rest of the Sunshine State isn’t far behind.
In its preamble, the FFA actually says, “Once suit has been filed, the public interest is served by moving foreclosure cases to final resolution expeditiously in order to get real property back into the stream of commerce.” Of course, it is this glut of foreclosed homes flooding the real estate market that has all but ensured its collapse. REO properties typically sell far below market value, and when so many REOs exist, it drives the overall market to new lows. The vicious cycle is complete as more homeowners suffer increased losses from a down market.
So the bill’s stated purpose is flawed right from the outset, but getting our homes back into the “stream of commerce” really isn’t the purpose of the Fair Foreclosure Act. Its sole design is to take Floridians’ property without due process or equal protection under the law.
Florida has a proud history of whoring for the mortgage industry, and while states across the country are fighting to restore honor and integrity to our judicial system, Florida has taken a different approach. In Florida, the Supreme Court and our elected state officials are doing what they can to ensure their benefactors . . . the banks . . . get what they want.
Remember Foreclosure Court? It unconstitutionally employed retired senior judges to act as mortgage mercenaries – ramrodding defective foreclosures through the judicial system despite national ridicule. I am actually shocked it fell victim to Governor Scott’s massive spending cuts. That must have been a mistake.
Then, with the addition of Pam Bondi as our new Attorney General, the mortgage industry took firm control of our prosecutors as well. Ms. Bondi all but killed any investigation into foreclosure fraud, and fired two assistant prosecutors who gained national attention for piecing together a massive conspiracy by the mortgage industry to defraud our state court judges in foreclosure cases.
BUT, these acts of treason pale in comparison to the Fair Foreclosure Act, which proposes to do the following:
July 4th, 2010 ---
Today, I will remember my father who passed away so recently. He was a retired officer of the United States Air Force. A fervent defender of the Constitution and of fact and law, and an avid student of History, this highly decorated, honest man devoted his entire life to preserving our noble freedoms.
Last Memorial day in Washington D.C., as my mother and I visited Arlington National Cemetary where he is to be buried with full military honors, 100,000′s of Vietnam veterans were also visting D.C. for “Rolling Thunder” to also pay their respects to fallen brothers and sisters of the Vietnam War. This was the same War my father earned a Bronze Star among many other decorations for valor and dedication while risking his own personal safety and life.
Mom and Dad - 2011
It was that Sunday I picked out a book in his vast historical library to begin a read for the long, sad trip home back to Florida. Florida is where I have been fighting fraud and for property rights for several long, frustrating years. The book I chose was written about the Vietnam War entitled “The War of the Innocents,” by Charles Bracelen Flood. Published in 1970, Mr Flood foresaw the main reason WHY the South Vietnamese and the U.S. would EVENTUALLY LOSE the war against the Communist Viet Cong. The ex-Army, Harvard graduate keenly observed that the poor Vietnamese peasant farmers were CONSTANTLY having their PROPERTIES SEIZED ILLEGALLY BY A CORRUPT GOVERNMENT AND THEIR CORRUPT, WEALTHY BUSINESS PARTNERS.
The constant harrassment, removal, and dislocation of the poor, peasant farmers and their families contributed greatly to the lack of support of their corrupt Saigon Government, and indeed the lack of responsibility of its own soldiers and citizens to fight effectively against the Communists.
In 2010, even an 8 year old being removed from their home due to a questionable foreclosure could draw the same conclusion regarding a corrupt system that aids and abets illegal and fraudulent harrassment, removal and dislocation of too many families who’s unalienable rights are being denied. Today, I will remember the millions of Americans who were defrauded by the Banks and are now being removed from their homes by the very governments who were supposed to protect them. Their protections are DENIED almost daily by the very consumer laws that are NOT being enforced nor upheld.
IF FACT AND LAW ARE NOT BEING UPHELD IN THE COUNTRY WHO HAS SHED THE MOST BLOOD FIGHTING COMMUNISM AND FASCISM IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND, WHAT DOES THAT REVEAL ABOUT THE NATURE OF THOSE WHO SWEAR A HOLY OATH TO DEFEND AND PRESERVE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER LAWS– AND DO NOT?
Tomorrow, I begin researching “Fraud on the Courts” on forged complaints and so-called “supporting” documents made by so-called “officers of the court” in yet another legal battle on a case already dismissed once before.
Today, on the morning of the 4th of July, I will miss my father terribly. Today, I weep in utter despair as I write this message to whoever cares to read it. I sincerely question that his whole life was dedicated to being deceived by a collosal lie?
On July 4th, 2010, this is NOT a happy day for me. Is this really Independence Day in foreclosureland?
Co-Founder / National WAMU Homeowners Support Group
“WaMu Screwed … The Wrong People.”
Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy:
A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)
PLEASE DISTRIBUTE AND SHARE THIS REPORT FREELY!
DISCLAIMER/DISCLOSURE: Rob Harrington is NOT an attorney, nor a licensed Private Investigator. I am currently a marketing director of a Private Investigative firm, BPIA, that specializes in analysis and reporting of alleged institutional mortgage fraud. However, NO information that I share should be construed as legal advice. Always consult with a qualified foreclosure defense attorney regarding your foreclosure. I have no liability to the readers or group members as to the outcome of their research or legal case. (I am only a ticked-off, entrepreneurial homeowner who stands for property rights, free speech, due process, justice, and fairness in the USA – You know, the stuff our country originally stood for...)Furthermore, I have NO investment position in JPMorgan Chase or any stocks or bonds and I do NOT offer investment advice...
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