National WAMU Homeowners Support Group.com

        “WaMu Screwed … The Wrong People.”

Read the official NWHSG Report located below,  and share with your qualified attorney:


 WAMU's Gory Autopsy: A Disturbing Crime Scene"

Welcome to the new official
National WAMU Homeowners Support Group.com website.
(The old website was stolen by a large corporation...?)

This resource is here for one purpose...to help you educate yourself (and your qualified attorney) about events and details surrounding what the United States Congressional Oversight Panel and other sources have exposed as potential "Mortgage Irregularities" in your WaMu loan origination/appraisal,  subsequent loan servicing, and foreclosure ... and how they potentially affect you and  your family. 

Do not deceive yourself.  No matter what your goal is, you are in a tug of war with companies of nearly unlimited resources that have demonstrated very little desire or proof of helping many WaMu homeowners. Their main desire is to protect themselves and their interests of "certain assets."  Is your home ONE OF THOSE "CERTAIN ASSETS" and what exactly is their PROOF of their claim? It is only through continual education, extreme organization, and intense participation that you have any hope of any personal satisfactory final outcome in your foreclosure.

For over 3 years now, we have been sharing the same message - 
Get educated, get organized and get involved!

Before you do anything, take the time and read the NWHSG report located below:
Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy: A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1) 

Welcome Home - again!

- Rob Harrington

Original founder of the National Wamu Homeowners Support Group

"If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or your arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen."
                                                                                                           -- Samuel Adams



Photograph, illustrations, and video attributions: All photographs and illustrations throughout this website are attributable to  http://4closurefraud.org/. Joshua Trujillo /AtlanticWire.com (Dorli Rainey peppersprayed in face photo.)  News Videos are self-attributed to the various news sources as evidenced in their respective videos. Karl Denninger video attributed to Karl Denninger/Market Ticker.


"Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof;  or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press;  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances."



- Rob Harrington  Co-Founder/NWHSG




*CONSUMER UPDATES NOTICE* (up-dated on 1/1/2013)
Apparently, if this post is true, a Judge in Pinellas County Florida disagrees with the assertions of some other Florida Homeowner Attorneys ... (from the article:) BREAKTHROUGH: FLORIDA CIRCUIT JUDGE COMPELS JPM TO PRODUCE SECURITIZATION DISCOVERY INCLUDING ALL INSURANCES ON LOAN AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GRANT OF AUTHORITY FROM FDIC TO JPM

June 13, 2013

Pinellas County (St. Petersburg) Florida Circuit Judge has overruled the majority of a Motion for Protective Order filed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. against the homeowner’s written discovery. The homeowner is represented by Jeff Barnes, Esq., who argued the matter in court and prepared the legal memoranda requested by the court following the hearing.After months of consideration following full briefing, the Court compelled JPM to produce the following documents, among others: all documents relating to the securitization including all PSAs, Master Purchasing agreements, Custodial agreements, Guarantee agreements, and Release of Document agreements; all policies of insurance including but not limited to private insurance, LPMI and NIM policies, mezzanine policies, ISDA policies and credit default swaps; all documents demonstrating any payments against the loan by any source whatsoever; documents as to suspense or unapplied transactions accounts (where banks park payments in order to reflect no payment on the loan, thereby creating a “default” situation on paper); all documents setting forth any assignment of the loan to any SIV, SPV, CDO, CMO, or credit default swap; all documents demonstrating any grant of authority of any kind to MERS; all documents evidencing any grant of authority from the FDIC to JPM relating to the loan and documents setting forth the transfer of the loan from a WaMu securitization to JPM; ---> http://foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=515




Good for our WAMU sister Liz Coursen! For more information about the mysterious JPMChase deal regarding WAMU, feel free to read "Why JPMorgan Chase is the unlikely owner of ANY WAMU home loans."



*CONSUMER UPDATES NOTICE* (up-dated on 6/30/2013)

"But here, a merger did not occur. In selling WaMu’s assets to defendant, the FDIC relied on a different statutory provision,12 USC 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II),


Kim vs JPM Chase - MI Supreme Court



Neil Garfield wrote yesterday: "They ASSUME that the Chase-Wamu merger transferred the loans only because, as I see it, nobody read the merger agreement. The receiver, as I pointed out in prior posts, acting on behalf of the FDIC, the trustee in WAMU bankruptcy, Chase and WAMU executives were sort of playing fast and loose with the rules.

It turns out that Chase never paid for anything. While it could be argued that they assumed the liability on billions of dollars in deposits, they also got the money that was on deposit. The agreement says the consideration is zero in no uncertain language. In fact, later on in the agreement and then again outside the agreement, they slipped in a provision wherein Chase was putting up $1.9 billion, but getting more than $2 billion back out of a tax refund owed to WAMU, so they had negative consideration and there is no recital of any net loss they were taking when they assumed the deposits of WAMU.

It also turns out that, straight from the receiver’s lips, if you are looking for an assignment, you won’t find one because there isn’t one. And the merger and assumption agreement specifically does NOT include the bogus mortgage loans and other liabilities (put back) in the securitization scheme which is most of all loans originated by WAMU. Chase didn’t want to buy the loans because they correctly perceived that the liabilities on those loans and the liabilities to alleged REMIC structures that never received an interest in the loans, and the liabilities to insures, counterparties on credit default swaps and to the Federal government and Federal Reserve might vastly exceed the nominal value of mortgages originated by WAMU. Then there was also the liability for predatory or fraudulent loan practices. Altogether, Chase didn’t want to be saying it owned ALL the loans. It just wanted to be able to say it some of the time when they had an uncontested foreclosure and they could get a free house.

So Chase got an affidavit from the receiver that said that Chase owned the loans by operation of law because of the merger. That affidavit has been used hundreds if not thousands of times in foreclosures where Chase perceived the risk to be low. Thus in uncontested cases, Chase alleged it owned the loans even if they were “securitized” and got away with it because, well, there was nobody to say otherwise."



OK, maybe 5 versions of the FDIC/Chase PAA - (not including the mysterious (Jolley Case) 118 page version...)




As described above, Jolley‘s opposition included a declaration from Thorne, who had been a ―senior construction loan consultant with WaMu until July of 2006, having been in charge of construction lending in 38 states since May 2005. He was an ―asset manager for the FDIC‖ at the time he signed the declaration (October 2011), and was ―intimately familiar with the procedures for taking over a failed bank.‖ And he testified: ―Pursuant to the public part of the agreement with the FDIC, of which were approximately 36 pages, the balance of the contract and the complete agreement with the FDIC and Chase bank is 118 pages long which has not been made public. I am familiar with this agreement, I read it.‖ Though somewhat ungrammatical, the declaration fairly clearly recites the existence of a nonpublic agreement (or portion of an agreement) that could affect the outcome of this case. In short, Thorne testified that the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase was not the full agreement entered between Chase and the FDIC, but rather a longer version exists, the terms of which are different from the version of which the court below took judicial notice.

Thorne also made certain representations about the content of the missing pages, claiming the FDIC guaranteed 80 percent of any failed WaMu loans, while Chase assumed only 20 percent of potential losses on the loans by receiving an 80 percent discount on WaMu‘s assets. In his deposition Thorne not only referred to the P&A Agreement being 118 pages long, but also testified that it obligated Chase ―to work directly with the customers to do as much as possible to modify any loans . . . so that no foreclosures are made and borrowers are kept in their homes.‖ The missing part of the document ―spells out an agreement between the purchasing institution and the FDIC as to how they are to handle the customers upon the purchase of the bank; i.e., how the foreclosures are to be handled, work out agreements that they‘re supposed to make. . . . They just can‘t go in and just start foreclosing on everybody that‘s not paying.

Chase filed 62 objections to Jolley‘s evidence, including 33 objections to particular aspects of Thorne‘s declaration and seven objections to particular statements in his deposition. We are concerned primarily with Objections 5 and 60, objecting to Thorne‘s statements that a 118-page purchase and assumption agreement exists, objections based on the best evidence rule, lack of foundation, and lack of competency.11

As noted, the trial court did not rule on these, or any other, evidentiary objections, and Jolley preliminarily contends that the objections cannot be maintained here. He is wrong, as specifically held in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534, a case involving objections made in a summary judgment proceeding. The Supreme Court held that if the objections were not ruled upon in the trial court, the objections are presumed overruled and are preserved for appeal. We thus turn to the merits of Chase‘s objections, and find there is none.

Chase questions the competency of Thorne‘s declaration because he is not a lawyer, was not employed at WaMu at the time of the P&A Agreement, and was never employed by Chase. This, the argument runs, fails to establish personal knowledge or expertise sufficient to opine about the contents of the purported nonpublic agreement. Chase also points out that while his declaration says Thorne was an independent contractor at the FDIC at the time he signed the declaration, it fails to show he worked there at the time of the WaMu receivership.

But that is no basis for rejecting Thorne‘s testimony on the narrow point that a 118-page agreement exists, one that he had personally read. We view his testimony on this point as that of a percipient witness, not an expert.

We may agree with Chase for purposes of argument that Thorne‘s statements about the contents of the longer agreement were not admissible. But we need not credit 18

those statements in order to conclude that a factual issue has been raised. The judgment in this case rests squarely on the terms of a much shorter, disputed version of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase. This was wrong. Since Jolley has presented evidence that a longer agreement exists, the court below resolved a disputed issue of fact by resting its decision on the terms of the shorter agreement. Put otherwise, the court did not view the evidence favorably to Jolley. (See Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145-1146 [existence of a written contract could not be judicially noticed where the opposing party claimed that an oral contract governed the relationship].)

It may be true that in some extreme circumstances ―a trial court may weigh the credibility of a declaration submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion and grant the motion ‗where the declaration is facially so incredible as a matter of law that the moving party otherwise would be entitled to summary judgment.‘ (People v. Schlimbach (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1142, fn. 9, quoting Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 342, 359–360.) This is not such a case.

Thorne‘s declaration certainly raises significant issues vis a vis Chase and the FDIC, with testimony that is hardly run of the mill. But that testimony is not so incredible that it could be ignored or rejected as untruthful on summary judgment, especially given the FDIC‘s response here, which not only did not deny the existence of the longer agreement, but suggested there were documents to be produced if there were a confidentiality agreement.

3. Summary Adjudication Was Improperly Granted On The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, And Eighth Causes Of Action

A. The First And Second Causes Of Action, For Misrepresentation

The conclusion that Chase was not liable for WaMu‘s conduct presupposes acceptance of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase as the full and complete contract governing its assumption of liabilities. Since, as discussed above, the Agreement was not properly utilized here, on that basis alone the summary adjudication of first and second causes of action was improper. In addition to the alleged misrepresentations by WaMu, Jolley alleges misstatements by Chase after the receivership, which would render summary adjudication improper for an additional reason if there are triable issues of material fact with respect to such misrepresentations. We find such issues here.



The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation; (b) knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud, i.e., induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) damage. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93; see also, Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) ―The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit [citation], does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true.‖ (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1255.)









JPM: The Washington Mutual Story

by Josh Rosner - March 13th, 2013, 8:00am




Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy:

A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)

In, or around 2005, JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) entered “negotiations” with Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) to purchase the bank and its various subsidiaries. Years later, substantial information regarding this questionable business deal between the OTS, FDIC, and JPMC, was provided in great detail in one particular lawsuit (WaMu Bondholders vs.  JPMC and the FDIC(1) (as specifically referred to as the "Texas Complaint" or "Texas Action.") In 2005, Steve Rotella became the new COO of WaMu. Rotella, a senior long term executive from JPMC, went to WaMu with other senior level executives, (including John Berens,) to learn the "WaMu way." This team was sent to provide pre-sale information to JPMC regarding the “potential purchase” of WaMu.  Jamie Dimon admits that he  had long coveted WaMu's retail banking foot print, especially on the West Coast and Southeast of the United States. Moreover, JPMC was also interested in WaMu's expansive lending operations. WaMu was to become the largest bank failure ever. It was later alleged in April 2008, at a WaMu shareholder meeting, that Steve Rotella was blamed for the company’s troubles.

According to the Misery Index blog, 10/17/08, “At a stockholders meeting in April, 2008, a man who    identified himself as a WaMu employee and shareholder laid the blame for the company's troubles squarely on Stephen Rotella, president and chief operating officer since 2005.”

The general allegations are that a number of other JPMC transplants, who followed Rotella and Berens in the subsequent years, “ran WaMu off the cliff.” WAS THIS DELIBERATE or ACCIDENTAL - as one could follow the money many years later? 

The National WaMu Homeowners Support Group  (NWHSG) www.nationalwamuhomeownerssupportgroup.com believes upon over 3 years of research with hundreds of allegedly defrauded WaMu homeowners, JPMC executives (turned WaMu executives) perhaps intentionally created a fraudulent scheme within WaMu to utilize "lax and irresponsible" underwriting(2) to built a vast profit center from the mortgage loan business.  In this alleged scheme, JPMC and its related companies, could later control the sale of potentially 100,000's of WaMu’s foreclosed homes. The NWHSG also discovered that WaMu/JPMC ex-employees(?) had established Home Sales, Inc. “related” companies around the country, between the years of 2005-2006.  Home Sales Inc. of Delaware, is a “related” company to Chase Home Finance “companies,” yet, another subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. Homesales Inc. of Delaware would later prove to be a specially chosen REO Disposition Company of WaMu's successfully foreclosed homes. The peculiar massive number of foreclosed homes would later be found to be the result, in many instances, of fraudulently underwritten home loans, unfair and deceptive loan servicing tactics, and questionable legal and property transfer strategies.

Our NATIONAL WAMU HOMEOWNERS SUPPORT GROUP.COM (NWHSG.com) research and other investigations confirm that 50-80% of loans of certain WaMu loan production offices were fraudulently underwritten - by WaMu's very own employees.(3)  (That’s MORTGAGE FRAUD – A FELONY.) 

Additionally, WaMu, between 2005 – 2008, underwent a minimum of 12 "internal re-organizations" in less than 3 years (as described in a audio taped interview by a WaMu mid/upper level executive whistle blower.)  What kind of “leadership” would reorganize more than a dozen times in a 3 year (or so) time period if NOT to destroy, (or confuse,) the company?  During these same years, we are informed by the whistle blower, that many of the better WaMu employees who cared about the long term success of WaMu, were replaced by JPMC transplants, mainly mid-level to upper level management types.) These ex-JPMC employees infiltrated WaMu at a rapid rate between 2005 - 2007.  The “holy grail” of WaMu during these years, was to make as many loans as possible, at the highest profit margins, selling highly complex and inappropriate loan products, regardless of the homeowners’ ablility to repay the debt in the future.(4)  Thusly, the alleged “originate to foreclose” business model was born.

On September 25, 2008, it is well documented that the OTS and the FDIC arranged a highly peculiar sale of WaMu, and "certain assets" to JPMC, for less than a 1/3 of a penny on the dollar (OTS fact sheet).(5)  (Actually, we think JPMC got WaMu for FREE after Accounting write-offs, tax breaks, BAIL-OUTS, and other immediately realized windfall profits.) The financial markets journalists all raised a collective eyebrow about the timing and nature of this staggering, questionable deal.(6) A well organized group of WaMu shareholders also weighed heavily on the side of conspiracy.(7) The NWHSG maintains that JPMC is NOT the "successor of interest" of all, or at least virtually 99%(?) of WaMu's home loans from 2002 - 2007. We believe they only acquired “certain assets” via the FDIC receivership.(8) Additionally, the Delaware WaMu Bankruptcy Court has not yet been able to conclusively determine which assets JPMC owns as late of 2011, several years after the coup d’etat. (9)

WaMu originated/re-financed approximately (estimate) over 1 Million loans during that same time period.  Upon further research, the NWHSG found evidence of 100’s of securitized trusts, private placements, and covered bond deals of WaMu mortgages that directly evidences the SALE of over a million WaMu loans between 2001 - 2007.(10)  (11)

IF WaMu (hypothetically) SOLD over 1 million loans in those same years, than HOW CAN JPMC CLAIM to be the "successor in interest" or "holder," otherwise known as - THE OWNER of the SAME LOANS? Can there only be ONE "holder of due course?"  The “successor of interest” language from JP Morgan Chase in 10,000’s(?) (or more?) of the WAMU foreclosures is “DISINGENOUS”, at best. Maybe even – “FRAUDULENT?”


We know that JPMC, through its Purchase and Assumption Agreement(12), FDIC granted JPMC certain assets. These assets have NEVER been published anywhere, INCLUDING ANY READILY IDENTIFIABLE COURT CASE IN AMERICA. It is also true that the Bankruptcy Examiner never stated any evidence of ownership of any the WaMu loans and that the FDIC has NOT shared ALL the related information.(13)   The FDIC routinely hides any evidence of WHAT JPMC actually did purchase for less than a ½ penny on the dollar (or even for free?), in court cases throughout America. (14)       

The evidence and facts are mounting that the FDIC has NO CLUE WHAT JPMORGAN CHASE ACQUIRED. WaMu Homeowners, Shareholders, and (certificate/bondholder) Investors  are ALL asking the question … WHY EXACTLY IS THAT? Typically, in any bank receivership ALL ASSETS ARE DOCUMENTED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.



In retrospect, If JPMorgan Chase had NO FUTURE, PRE-MEDIATED intent of ever taking over WaMu, then WHY did their related executives open up REO disposition offices in the major “boom States” across the country – as far back as 2005 and 2006?

The Homesales, Inc. of Delaware company, is headquartered in Iselin, New Jersey. Homesales, Inc., has an executive named Renee Johnson. Renee Johnson was a long time Washington Mutual "National Manager for Strategic Operations/REO." (23)

John Berens was an even more senior executive with Washington Mutual. Remember, Berens came down to WaMu (in 2005 with Steve Rotella, and a few others) from JPMorgan Chase, to become Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing24 years management with JPMorgan Chase (24)

WaMu operated its massive loan origination campaign, especially in key “boom” States. (25) Ironically, or not, Homesales Inc., set up shop in many of the very same States as WaMu’s expansion plan – again, in 2005 and 2006.  All these companies are much like “cousins” in that the executives and managers all worked together in one capacity or another and in other various roles surrounding default, servicing and REO disposition. Furthermore, WaMu must have been JPMorgan Chases’ best, most profitable company for wholesale funding and lending to WaMu during it’s “boom,” and long before. (26) WaMU most likely owed JPMorgan Chase, and other major banks, BILLIONS of dollars by September 25, 2008. JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon also knew intimate, confidential details about WaMu's precarious financial situation from his ex-JPMC contacts, his position as CEO of JPMC, and his seat on The Federal Reserve. Jamie Dimon most likey saw an opportunity as there is always great profit in disasters…. for certain people and companies with inside information. 

Obviously. People like John Berens and Renee Johnson go way back to the other companies such as WaMu or JPMC, but eventually, they wind up at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
(27) (28) (29)  (30)   Lauren V. Harris is another such executive with Homesales, Inc…  She has also involved as an executive with California Reconveyance Corporation, and Chase Venture Holdings. (31)      

So these are the people who work, or worked for WaMu, JPMorgan Chase, Chase Home Finance, Homesales, Inc., etc... (32) (33)    It would be amazing to get to know these people and learn how they view “just doing their jobs?” Do they know that the REO sale may be fraudulent by clouded title and unlawful foreclosure? Do they know that the REO sale may have been assisted by fraudulent documents and faulty loan servicing? Or, if the questionable loan servicing was part of securities fraud (reps and warranties in the PSA)?

Or, if the securities fraud may have been aided and abetted with illegal underwriting and appraisal fraud by an un-holy number of WaMu (and  affiliate) employees who inarguably and provably committed willful and intentional mortgage fraud upon a massive number of unsuspecting WaMu Homeowners? These homeowners were sold on the dream of homeownership,  the American Dream?

One could only wonder, if we ever met by chance, if once they found out that 5 years later after imminent default, how families lives would be changed forever. Could one even wonder if they would ever begin to realize and experience the pain and agony of sleepless nights, isolation, emotional devestation, of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, of tremendous loss of money, income and ruined credit? These are exactly the symptoms collectively suffered by perhaps 100,000’s of defrauded Wamu Homeowner victims – cheated Americans. What about the MILLIONS of all the victims of 1000’s of other unscrupulous lenders? Would the bankers even care?

*This compilation is dedicated to the hundreds of WaMu homeowners across America who have shared their case information, hopes and fears, throughout the last 3 years of our groups’ inception.

*(Citations/Sources are listed below further down the page)

- Rob Harrington* / Co-Founder of the NWHSG –



*My provable EVIDENCE of WaMu’s Mortgage Fraud by court ordered DISCOVERY in Niceville, Fl, USA:


Rob Harrington:
  BS in Criminology/FSU - 1984, entrepreneur, authored a consumer automotive buying guide (1992.) Past trainer and speaker, real estate investor, 2 current law-suits - 2 won and dismissed/reopened, including a quiet title action which was dismissed but will be re-opened soon. In 2009, co-founded a Florida loan auditing company working with foreclosure defense attorneys specializing in litigation against alleged origination and underwriting fraud. In 2011, joined ex-police officer and private investigator Bill Paatalo (BPIA) to become National Marketing Director. 2012, rejoined BPIA. Co-Founder of the National WAMU Homeowners Support Group in late 2008/early2009. 

DISCLAIMER/DISCLOSURE: I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY NOR LICENSED PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR! NO information that I share should be construed as legal advice. Always consult with a qualified foreclosure defense attorney, in your jurisdiction, regarding your foreclosure.

Contact Rob Harrington




U.S. Attorney's Office, Press Release :

 Due to the intense public interest in the failure of Washington Mutual, I want to assure our community that federal law enforcement is examining activities at the bank to determine if any federal laws were violated.  The FBI, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General (FDIC-OIG), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations (IRS-CI) have all provided investigators to our task force.  We are asking that anyone with information for the task force contact this number:  1-866-915-8299; or this email address:  fbise@leo.gov.

For more than 100 years Washington Mutual was a highly regarded financial institution headquartered in Seattle.  Given the significant losses to investors, employees, and our community, it is fully appropriate that we scrutinize the activities of the bank, it's leaders, and others to determine if any federal laws were violated.

Press contact:  Emily Langlie, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Attorney's Office, at (205) 553-4110.



Ex-Bank Executives Settle F.D.I.C. Lawsuit


“The deal is one of the larger amounts recovered in a financial crisis case, though only about $400,000 in total will be paid by the executives, according to a person briefed on the settlement but not authorized to discuss it. The F.D.I.C. initially sought $900 million in the case, which it filed in March.

Much of the settlement will come from insurance policies the company took out for the executives, who are also releasing Washington Mutual’s estate from some financial claims they have against it. The money in the settlement will be distributed among Washington Mutual’s creditors. It will not benefit the F.D.I.C. fund because the fund did not lose money when Washington Mutual foundered and was sold in part to JPMorgan Chase & Company, according to F.D.I.C. officials.  <snip>

The executives will neither admit nor deny wrongdoing in the settlement, according to another person briefed on it but not authorized to discuss it. The government has faced recent criticism over its willingness to settle cases without extracting admissions of guilt. In November, a federal judge in New York denounced that practice when he refused to approve a settlement between Citigroup and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Justice Department has already closed its criminal investigation into officials at Washington Mutual, saying last summer that its investigators had “concluded that the evidence does not meet the exacting standards for criminal charges in connection with the bank’s failure.”  After Washington Mutual collapsed, Mr. Schneider stayed on as a mortgage servicing executive at JPMorgan. Mr. Rotella, who joined the company in 2005 to try to turn it around, is now a consultant.


(Why pay a “ticket” if you are NOT GUILTY?)

$400,000 fine down from $900,000,0000 from the FDIC?

23 ex-WaMu employees named in federal suit

By Drew DeSilver Seattle Times business reporter

 WaMu-related defendants in JPMorgan suit

 THESE FORMER WaMu units and employees are among the defendants in the federal government's mortgage-securities lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase:


 WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.

 WaMu Capital Corp.

 Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.

 Long Beach Securities Corp.


 Richard Careaga: First vice president, WaMu Acceptance

 David Beck: President and director, WaMu Acceptance

 Diane Novak: Director, WaMu Acceptance

 Thomas Green: Chief financial officer, WaMu Acceptance

 Rolland Jurgens: Controller, WaMu Acceptance and Long Beach Securities

 Thomas G. Lehmann: President and director, WaMu Acceptance; first vice president, director and senior counsel, WaMu Securities

 Stephen Fortunato: Chief financial officer, WaMu Acceptance and Long Beach Securities

 Donald Wilhelm: Controller, WaMu Acceptance

 Michael J. Kula: Senior vice president, chief financial officer and director, WaMu Securities

 Craig S. Davis: Home Loans group president, Washington Mutual Inc.; president and director, Long Beach Securities; director, WaMu Securities

 Marc K. Malone: First vice president and controller, WaMu Securities

 Michael L. Parker: President and director, WaMu Securities

 Megan M. Davidson: Senior vice president and director, WaMu Securities

 David H. Zielke: First vice president and assistant general counsel, WaMu Bank

 Thomas W. Casey: Chief financial officer, Washington Mutual Inc.; director, Long Beach Securities

 John F. Robinson: Director, Long Beach Securities

 Keith Johnson: President and director, Long Beach Securities

 Suzanne Krahling: Chief financial officer and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities

 Larry Breitbarth: Controller and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities

 Marangal I. Domingo: Chief executive officer and director, Long Beach Securities; director, WaMu Securities

 Troy A. Gotschall: Chief operations officer and executive vice president, Long Beach Securities

 Art Den Heyer: Controller and assistant vice president, Long Beach Securities

 Stephen Lobo: Treasurer and senior vice president, Long Beach Securities

 Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency lawsuit against JPMorgan and others


Twenty-three former Washington Mutual employees and several of the defunct thrift's subsidiaries have been sued by the federal government as part of its mortgage-securities lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase.

 The suit, filed last week by the agency that now controls Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accuses those individuals of signing off on documents containing false or misleading information that were used to sell billions of dollars' worth of mortgage-backed securities.


The former WaMu and Long Beach officials named in the suit were, in most cases, midlevel executives. The only senior executives included are Thomas Casey, former chief financial officer, and Craig
Davis, former head of the Home Loans group.

None of the defendants has formally responded to the suit yet.

The suit claims that Fannie and Freddie relied on the prospectuses, registration statements and other documents filed by WaMu and Long Beach for each of the 35 separate issues of securities they bought during the boom.

But, according to the suit, those documents contained "materially false or misleading statements and omissions" and "falsely represented that the underlying mortgage loans complied with certain underwriting guidelines and standards, including representations that significantly overstated the ability of borrowers to repay their mortgage loans."

... And just who is JP MorganChase?
(and maybe even some of their ex-WaMu employees and executives?)

(Their Wiki page stated the following)

Conflicts of interest on investment research:  

In December 2002, Chase paid fines totaling $80 million, with the amount split between the states and the federal government. The fines were part of a settlement involving charges that ten banks, including Chase, deceived investors with biased research. The total settlement with the ten banks was $1.4 billion. The settlement required that the banks separate investment banking from research, and ban any allocation of IPO shares.[46]

Enron:   Chase paid out over $2 billion in fines and legal settlements for their role in financing Enron Corporation, which collapsed amid a financial scandal in 2001. In 2003, Chase paid $160 million in fines and penalties to settle claims by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Manhattan district attorney’s office. In 2005, Chase paid $2.2 billion to settle a lawsuit filed by investors in Enron.[47]

WorldCom  JPMorgan Chase, which helped underwrite $15.4 billion of WorldCom's bonds, agreed in March 2005 to pay $2 billion; that was 46 percent, or $630 million, more than it would have paid had it accepted an investor offer in May 2004 of $1.37 billion. J.P. Morgan was the last big lender to settle. Its payment is the second largest in the case, exceeded only by the $2.6 billion accord reached in 2004 by Citigroup.[48] In March 2005, 16 of WorldCom's 17 former underwriters reached settlements with the investors.[49][50]

Jefferson County, Alabama:  In November 2009, JPMorgan Chase & Co. agreed to a $722 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to end a probe into sales of *derivatives that helped push Alabama’s most populous county to the brink of bankruptcy. The settlement came a week after Birmingham, Alabama Mayor Larry Langford was convicted on 60 counts of bribery, money laundering, and tax evasion related to bond swaps for Jefferson County, Alabama. The SEC alleged that J.P. Morgan, which had been chosen by the county commissioners to underwrite the floating-rate sewer bond deals and provide interest-rate swaps, had made undisclosed payments to close friends of the commissioners in exchange for the deal. J.P. Morgan then allegedly made up for the costs by charging higher interest rates on the swaps.[51]

Financial Services Authority:  In June 2010, J.P. Morgan Securities was fined 33.32 million pounds sterling ($49.12 million) by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) for failing to protect billions of dollars of client money over almost seven years. The firm had erroneously failed to properly segregate client funds from corporate funds following the merger of Chase and J.P. Morgan, resulting in a violation of FSA regulations but no losses to clients. J.P. Morgan Securities reported the incident to the FSA, corrected the errors, and cooperated in the ensuing investigation, resulting in the fine being reduced 30% from an original amount of £47.6 million.[52]

Mortgage overcharge of active military personnel:  In January 2011, JPMorgan Chase admitted that it wrongly overcharged several thousand military families for their mortgages, including active duty personnel in Afghanistan. The bank also admitted it improperly foreclosed on more than a dozen military families; both actions were in clear violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act which automatically lowers mortgage rates to 6 percent, and bars foreclosure proceedings of active duty personnel. The overcharges may have never come to light were it not for legal action taken by Marine Capt. Jonathan Rowles, a fighter pilot. Both Capt. Rowles and his spouse Julia accused Chase of violating the law and harassing the couple for nonpayment. An official stated that the situation was "grim", and Chase initially stated it would be refunding up to $2,000,000 to those who were overcharged, and that families improperly foreclosed on have gotten or will get their homes back.[53] Chase has acknowledged that as many as 6,000 active duty military personnel were illegally overcharged, and more than 18 military families homes were wrongly foreclosed. In April, Chase agreed to pay a total of $27 million in compensation to settle the class-action suit.[54] At the company's 2011 shareholders' meeting, Dimon apologized for the error and said the bank would forgive the loans of any active-duty personnel whose property had been foreclosed. In June 2011, lending chief Dave Lowman was forced out over the scandal.

Also watch this ABC News Video: (If JP Morgan Chase will abuse US servicepeople, imagine how they treat other US citizens.)


… And other source material (just a few) about this wonderful “corporate citizen”: Break the law, just pay a fine. Nobody ever goes to jail? Why not?

Trading with the enemy?

“J.P. Morgan Chase is the latest bank to settle with Treasury over sanctions issues
, though the focus has previously been on foreign financial institutions. Barclays PLC agreed to pay $298 million last year, admitting to processing payments to the U.S. from clients in Cuba, Sudan and other places under U.S. sanctions. Lloyds Banking Group PLC agreed to pay a $350 million settlement, and Credit Suisse Group AG paid $536 million in 2009.

OFAC, however, noted that J.P. Morgan Chase’s fine was “mitigated” based on its “substantial cooperation, including conducting an historical transaction review at OFAC’s request, and entering into tolling agreements with OFAC.”


“Two separate lawsuits are accusing JPMorgan Chase and HSBC Holdings with manipulating silver prices.

Investors filed lawsuits late Wednesday in Manhattan alleging the two firms amassed large short positions in silver futures and caused prices to go down.”




Law Professor Levitin's recent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee:

 (pg. 5 onward)

A number of events over the past several months have roiled the mortgage world, raising questions about:

(1) Whether there is widespread fraud in the foreclosure process;

(2) Securitization chain of title, namely whether the transfer of mortgages in the securitization process was defective, rendering mortgage-backed securities into non-mortgagebacked securities;

(3) Whether the use of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) creates legal defects in either the secured status of a mortgage loan or in mortgage assignments;

(4) Whether mortgage servicers’ have defaulted on their servicing contracts by charging predatory fees to borrowers that are ultimately paid by investors;

(5) Whether investors will be able to “putback” to banks securitized mortgages on the basis of breaches of representations and warranties about the quality of the mortgages.

These issues are seemingly disparate and unconnected, other than that they all involve mortgages. They are, however, connected by two common threads: the necessity of proving standing in order to maintain a foreclosure action and the severe conflicts of interests between mortgage servicers and MBS investors.

It is axiomatic that in order to bring a suit, like a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must have legal standing, meaning it must have a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. In the case of a mortgage foreclosure, only the mortgagee has such an interest and thus standing. Many of the issues relating to foreclosure fraud by mortgage servicers, ranging from more minor procedural defects up to outright counterfeiting relate to the need to show standing. Thus problems like false affidavits of indebtedness, false lost note affidavits, and false lost summons affidavits, as well as backdated mortgage assignments, and wholly counterfeited notes, mortgages, and assignments all relate to the evidentiary need to show that the entity bringing the foreclosure action has standing to foreclose.

Concerns about securitization chain of title also go to the standing question; if the mortgages were not properly transferred in the securitization process (including through the use of MERS to record the mortgages), then the party bringing the foreclosure does not in fact own the mortgage and therefore lacks standing to foreclose.


If the mortgage was not properly transferred, there are profound implications too for investors, as the mortgage-backed securities they believed they had purchased would, in fact be non-mortgage-backed securities, which


would almost assuredly lead investors to demand that their investment contracts be rescinded, thereby exacerbating the scale of mortgage putback claims. Putback claims underscore the myriad conflicts of interest between mortgage servicers and investors. Mortgage servicers are responsible for prosecuting on behalf of MBS investors, violations of representations and warranties in securitization deals. Mortgage servicers are loathe to bring such actions, however, not least because they would often be bringing them against their own affiliates. Servicers’ failure to honor their contractual duty to protect investors’ interest is but one of numerous problems with servicer conflicts of interest, including the levying of junk fees in foreclosures that are ultimately paid by investors and servicing first lien loans while directly owning junior liens.

Many of the problems in the mortgage securitization market (and thus this testimony) are highly technical, but they are extremely serious. At best they present problems of fraud on the court and questionable title to property. At worst, they represent a systemic risk of liabilities in the trillions of dollars, greatly exceeding the capital of the US’s major financial institutions.

While understanding the securitization market’s problems involves following a good deal of technical issues, it is critical to understand from the get-go that securitization is all about technicalities.

Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance, and if securitization is to work it must adhere to its proper, prescribed form punctiliously. The rules of the game with securitization, as with real property law and secured credit are, and always have been, that dotting “i’s” and crossing “t’s” matter, in part to ensure the fairness of the system and avoid confusions about conflicting claims to property. Close enough doesn’t do it in securitization; if you don’t do it right, you cannot ensure that securitized assets are bankruptcy remote and thus you cannot get the ratings and opinion letters necessary for securitization to work. Thus, it is important not to dismiss securitization problems as merely “technical;” these issues are no more technicalities than the borrower’s signature on a mortgage. Cutting corners may improve securitization’s economic efficiency, but it undermines its legal viability.


and supporting link http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/01/17/43098.htm

Chase Accused of Brazen Bankruptcy Fraud

 LOS ANGELES (CN) - JPMorgan Chase routinely fabricated documents to deceive bankruptcy judges, going so far as to Photoshop documents to "create the illusion" of standing "in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases," according to a federal class action.
Lead plaintiff Ernest Michael Bakenie claims that Chase's "pattern and practice of playing 'hide-and-seek' with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players" bore rich fruit: that Chase secured motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim in 95 percent of its cases.
"Through the use of fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer deeds of trust, notes and the rights to all monies due under the terms of tens of thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes (the 'MLNs'); Chase has demonstrated a pattern and practice of playing 'hide-and-seek' with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players," the complaint states.
"Chase intentionally conceals the identity of the true parties in interest entitled to enforce the tens of tens of thousands of residential non-negotiable promissory notes (the 'MLNs') for its own financial benefit, at the expense of the class and to the detriment of the integrity of the bankruptcy system."
Bakenie says Chase used a network of attorneys to file more than 7,000 motions for relief from automatic stay in bankruptcy cases in the Central District of California, "wherein they falsely claim to be the party entitled to monies due under the terms of MLNs."

THEN CONSIDER WAMU SOLD 77 BILLION DOLLARS IN HOME LOANS between 2000 - 2007, to RMBS trusts, WAMU was no longer the OWNER... merely a servicer for only certain trusts.

http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/09-01656/09-01656-0032.pdf   (pg 7 of 148)


27. Securitization is a common financing tool used to pool and convert financial assets such as residential mortgages into financial instruments that can be sold in the capital markets. Between 2000 and 2007, WaMu securitized approximately $77 billion in principal amount of subprime home mortgage loans.

28. Although the exact structures of RMBS transactions are varied and can be fairly complex, the structure of the Primary Trusts, as well as most RMBS transactions, involves the following parties:

a. Depositor and Seller: The depositor is the entity that acquires the pool of mortgage loans and deposits the loans in a trust formed by the depositor pursuant to the governing documents for the transaction. The depositor assigns the legal and beneficial interest in the mortgage loans, including related collateral, to the trust. In many RMBS transactions, the depositor purchases the mortgage loans from another entity, referred to as the seller, and deposits the pool of loans into the trust. As set forth in Exhibit 1-A, with respect to the Primary Trusts, WaMu served as the Depositor and/or Seller for 97 of the 99 Primary Trusts. Through a series of assignments and other agreements, WaMu indirectly undertook responsibilities substantially similar to those of a Depositor or Seller for the remaining two Primary Trusts. See Exhibit 1-A, n.1.

Case 1:09-cv-01656-RMC Document 32 Filed 09/08/10 Page 7 of 44


b. The Trust: The trust purchases the mortgage loans from the depositor and issues RMBS, which represent specific interests in and entitlements to the cash flows derived from the trust’s assets (i.e., the mortgage loans). The governing documents forming the trust typically appoint an independent trustee and specify the trustee’s rights, responsibilities and powers in respect of the RMBS transaction.

 c. Investors: By purchasing RMBS, investors acquire the right to receive monies from the cash flows of the underlying mortgage loans held as trust assets or collateral by the trust (in the form of borrower payments of principal and interest and proceeds from the liquidation of loan collateral). Those cash flows are applied to payment of the RMBS pursuant to a contractually specified distribution plan and schedule.

d. Servicer: The servicer is the day-to-day administrator of the mortgage loan assets held by the trust. Under the governing documents forming the trust, the servicer is required to administer the mortgage loans in the best interests of RMBS investors. The servicer’s responsibilities include collecting payments due from the borrowers, remitting those payments to the trust for ultimate payment to the investors, and furnishing the trustee or a securities administrator with performance data regarding the mortgage loans in the pool. The servicer-generated data is used to calculate the distribution of funds and report pool performance to investors. The servicer also conducts all remedial activity on behalf of the trust when borrowers default on their loans. Such remedial servicing activity requires the servicer to review relevant loan files, act as the trust’s sole source of contact with the borrower, and inquire into the status of the borrower and the mortgage loan collateral. As set forth in Exhibit 1-A, WaMu is the
Case 1:09-cv-01656-RMC Document 32 Filed 09/08/10 Page 8 of 44

Servicer or Master Servicer for the mortgage loans included in the Primary Trusts, in addition to serving as the Depositor and Seller as set forth above.

 B. WaMu’s Contractual Obligations

 (1) The Governing Documents for the Trusts

29. The duties and responsibilities of the various parties to an RMBS transaction are set forth in the governing securitization documents. These documents generally include a mortgage loan purchase agreement (“MLPA”) and a pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA The MLPA and PSA provide for the sale of the mortgage loans and contain representations, warranties and covenants made by the seller and/or depositor concerning the nature, characteristics, history and quality of the mortgage loans and mortgage loan files sold to, and deposited in, the trusts. These documents also provide for the establishment and administration of the trust, including setting forth the responsibilities and duties of the depositor, trustee, seller, and servicer with respect to the trust. 

UPDATE 3/31/12 - The veil of foreclosure fraud now exposed within securitization - STANDING MATTERS! 
Standing is a requirement grounded in Article III of the United States Constitution, and a defect in standing cannot be waived by the parties. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (US.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939,954 (9th Cir. 2011). A litigant must have both constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Constitutional standing requires the plaintiff to “show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will redress.”
(read here)



The Williamses (Leigafoalii Tafue Williams and Papu Christopher Williams), who were represented by Honolulu attorney, James J. Bickerton (Jim), of Bickerton Lee Dang & Sullivan, filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), in which they argue, among other things, that Plaintiff has no standing to foreclose because it has not established that it was validly assigned the Mortgage and Note.

The Court noted that: “Because the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish its standing to bring this action, the court need not reach the Williamses’ other arguments for dismissal.”

Honorable Judge J. Michael Seabright gets it! And his ORDER was detailed. In the Discussion, Judge Seabright notes an argument that homeowners have being trying to persuade the courts (especially at the lower state levels) to grasp: STANDING and JURISDICTION.

Standing is a requirement grounded in Article III of the United States Constitution, and a defect in standing cannot be waived by the parties. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (US.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939,954 (9th Cir. 2011). A litigant must have both constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Constitutional standing requires the plaintiff to “show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will redress.” Id. at 12. In comparison, “prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” Id. (citation and quotation signals omitted); see also Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).”

Judge's ORDER HERE - http://deadlyclear.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/williamses-order1.pdf

(GAME OVER, S.O.B.'s!)





Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy:
A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)


WaMu Bondholders vs.  JPMC and the FDIC (as specifically referred to in the "Texas Complaint" or "Texas Action.")  http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229090501000000000002.pdf  (thank you Greer, Herz, & Adams, llp) and specifically to Rotella http://miseryindex2008.blogspot.com/2008/10/you-can-afford-loan-but-you-can-still.html

  Ontario Teachers Pension Fund  (class action) vs WaMu   (regarding WaMu’s systemic fraudulent lending and appraisals process.) http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00067_data/ClassActionCplt-8.05.08#http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00067_data/ClassActionCplt-8.05.08

Senate Subcommittee Report : Senator Levin - April 2010 http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf

Senate Subcommittee Report : Senator Levin - April 2010  http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf  (pg. 164)

The Levin-Coburn memorandum contained joint findings of fact regarding the role of

federal regulators in the Washington Mutual case history. Those findings of fact, which this

Report reaffirms, are as follows.

1. Largest U.S. Bank Failure. From 2003 to 2008, OTS repeatedly identified

significant problems with Washington Mutual’s lending practices, risk management,

and asset quality, but failed to force adequate corrective action, resulting in the largest

bank failure in U.S. history.

2. Shoddy Lending and Securitization Practices. OTS allowed Washington Mutual

and its affiliate Long Beach Mortgage Company to engage year after year in shoddy

lending and securitization practices, failing to take enforcement action to stop its

origination and sale of loans with fraudulent borrower information, appraisal

problems, errors, and notoriously high rates of delinquency and loss.

3. Unsafe Option ARM Loans. OTS allowed Washington Mutual to originate

hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages,

knowing that the bank used unsafe and unsound teaser rates, qualified borrowers

using unrealistically low loan payments, permitted borrowers to make minimum

payments resulting in negatively amortizing loans (i.e., loans with increasing

principal), relied on rising house prices and refinancing to avoid payment shock and

loan defaults, and had no realistic data to calculate loan losses in markets with flat or

declining house prices.

4. Short Term Profits Over Long Term Fundamentals. OTS abdicated its

responsibility to ensure the long term safety and soundness of Washington Mutual by

concluding that short term profits obtained by the bank precluded enforcement action

to stop the bank’s use of shoddy lending and securitization practices and unsafe and

unsound loans.

5. Impeding FDIC Oversight. OTS impeded FDIC oversight of Washington Mutual

by blocking its access to bank data, refusing to allow it to participate in bank

examinations, rejecting requests to review bank loan files, and resisting the FDIC

recommendations for stronger enforcement action.

6. FDIC Shortfalls. The FDIC, the backup regulator of Washington Mutual, was

unable to conduct the analysis it wanted to evaluate the risk posed by the bank to the

Deposit Insurance Fund, did not prevail against unreasonable actions taken by OTS to

limit its examination authority, and did not initiate its own enforcement action against

the bank in light of ongoing opposition by the primary federal bank regulators to

FDIC enforcement authority.

7. Recommendations Over Enforceable Requirements. Federal bank regulators

undermined efforts to end unsafe and unsound mortgage practices at U.S. banks by

issuing guidance instead of enforceable regulations limiting those practices, failing to


prohibit many high risk mortgage practices, and failing to set clear deadlines for bank


8. Failure to Recognize Systemic Risk. OTS and the FDIC allowed Washington

Mutual and Long Beach to reduce their own risk by selling hundreds of billions of

dollars of high risk mortgage backed securities that polluted the financial system with

poorly performing loans, undermined investor confidence in the secondary mortgage

market, and contributed to massive credit rating downgrades, investor losses,

disrupted markets, and the U.S. financial crisis.

9. Ineffective and Demoralized Regulatory Culture. The Washington Mutual case

history exposes the regulatory culture at OTS in which bank examiners are frustrated

and demoralized by their inability to stop unsafe and unsound practices, in which

their supervisors are reluctant to use formal enforcement actions even after years of

serious bank deficiencies, and in which regulators treat the banks they oversee as

constituents rather than arms-length regulated entities.

WaMu’s own employees were also responsible for the fraud:













At a stockholders meeting in April, 2008, a man who identified himself as a WaMu employee and shareholder laid the blame for the company's troubles squarely on Stephen Rotella, president and chief operating officer since 2005.

The man, whose name could not be made out clearly, said that under Rotella's leadership, WaMu loan consultants were paid more for writing subprime mortgages and so-called "option ARMs" with ultra-low teaser rates than for writing safer, fixed-rate loans.

"This man [Rotella] has driven the company to the edge of bankruptcy and he should be fired, and his bonuses should be taken back from him," the man said.

    (5) OTS fact sheet  http://files.ots.treas.gov/730021.pdf

The Market Oracle http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article13894.html

The Ghost of WaMu (WAMU Shareholder Resources website)  http://wamu-shareholders-resources.com/resources/resources.html  (also referenced

Deutsche Bank Trust 1 and 2 Vs. FDIC and JPMC - Deposition by Duetsche Bank VP Renaldo Reyes  http://www.scribd.com/doc/40932626/Deposition-Ronaldo-Reyes-of-Deutsche-Bank-2010-03-30

    (9) Delaware WaMu Federal Bankruptcy Case status as of 2011 http://news.yahoo.com/judge-orders-broad-mediation-wamu-bankruptcy-151635497.html 

    (10) Senate Subcommittee Report by Senator Levin - April 2010

   (11) WAMU SEC Filings 2001 – 2007 : (assumes 5000(?) loans per trust) (from Livinglies)

(copy, paste and search these two links:)

and also read:  http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/finding-wamu-securitizations


1/12/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE1 U.S. SEC # 1385019

4/5/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE2 U.S. SEC # 1389138

4/26/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE3 U.S. SEC # 1397612

6/7/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE4 U.S. SEC # 1401898

1/26/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR1 U.S. SEC # 1350323

8/21/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1370359

8/22/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1370360

9/25/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1374624

9/25/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1374625

10/23/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1374626

10/24/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR15 U.S. SEC # 1374627

11/17/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1379744

11/20/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR17 U.S. SEC # 1379745

12/19/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1383018

12/20/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1383019

2/3/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1350324

2/10/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR3 U.S. SEC # 1352798

3/31/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1355536

4/27/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR5 U.S. SEC # 1360258

6/2/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1364489

6/9/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1364476

6/30/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1367734

7/13/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1367735

1/19/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY1 U.S. SEC # 1385021

2/14/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY2 U.S. SEC # 1389140

2/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY3 U.S. SEC # 1389141

3/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY4 U.S. SEC # 1392110

4/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY5 U.S. SEC # 1396434

5/22/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY6 U.S. SEC # 1400091

6/22/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY7 U.S. SEC # 1402110

1/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA1 U.S. SEC # 1385020

2/21/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA2 U.S. SEC # 1389139

3/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA3 U.S. SEC # 1392111

4/25/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA4 U.S. SEC # 1396435

5/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA5 U.S. SEC # 1400092

6/25/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA6 U.S. SEC # 1402111

2/28/05  11/13/07WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp U.S. SEC # 1317069

2/11/00  11/9/07Wamu Partners II LP U.S. SEC # 1105038

1/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR1 U.S. SEC # 1314534

7/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1334142

8/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1337031

8/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1337123

10/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1342264

10/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1342368

11/21/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR15 U.S. SEC # 1345039

11/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1345116

12/19/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR17 U.S. SEC # 1347345

12/7/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1346065

12/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1346793

1/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1315296

2/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR3 U.S. SEC # 1318666

3/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1321432

4/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR5 U.S. SEC # 1324712

4/26/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1325096

6/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1331029

7/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1333176

7/20/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1333701

8/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Ser 2003-S8 U.S. SEC # 1261237

2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1220366

12/19/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thr Certs Ser 2003-Ar12 U.S. SEC # 1274023

7/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cer Ser 2003-Ar8 U.S. SEC # 1256337

8/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert 2002-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1182560

1/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S1 U.S. SEC # 1165932

10/28/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S7 U.S. SEC # 1201847

3/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2002-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1169893

10/27/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Ser 2003-S12 U.S. SEC # 1268291

11/9/01  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1162063

8/27/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1183265

9/20/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar12 U.S. SEC # 1191294

9/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar13 U.S. SEC # 1192220

9/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar14 U.S. SEC # 1191853

10/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar15 U.S. SEC # 1200829

10/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar16 U.S. SEC # 1201113

10/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar17 U.S. SEC # 1200828

2/26/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S2 U.S. SEC # 1168244

5/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S3 U.S. SEC # 1174299

9/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S6 U.S. SEC # 1192222

1/27/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1216057

3/20/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1223995

4/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1228782

5/21/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar6 U.S. SEC # 1234822

3/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 U.S. SEC # 1224460

4/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S3 U.S. SEC # 1228787

5/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S4 U.S. SEC # 1235349

7/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S7 U.S. SEC # 1255906

2/11/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1279818

7/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1298239

8/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1301259

10/25/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1306918

11/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1309383

12/17/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1311881

4/28/04  3/30/05WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1288748

4/26/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004 Ar-3 U.S. SEC # 1288639

5/21/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR4 [ formerly WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

Series 2004-CB1 ] U.S. SEC # 1291435

5/21/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1291434

5/26/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1291950

6/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1295182

6/24/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1295374

7/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1298122

5/24/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 U.S. SEC # 1291463

6/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB2 U.S. SEC # 1294965

8/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB3 U.S. SEC # 1301258

10/25/04  5/27/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB4 U.S. SEC # 1306922

4/29/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Rs2 U.S. SEC # 1288883

5/25/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-S2 U.S. SEC # 1291737

6/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-S3 U.S. SEC # 1295156

12/20/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2002-Ar19 U.S. SEC # 1211522

2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2003-S1 U.S. SEC # 1220308

12/19/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2002-S8 U.S. SEC # 1211244

9/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1264256

9/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S10 U.S. SEC # 1264257

10/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S11 U.S. SEC # 1268053

9/22/03  3/30/05 Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S9 U.S. SEC # 1264258

5/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2003-S5 U.S. SEC # 1235345

2/23/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2004-S1 U.S. SEC # 1281095

11/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms8 U.S. SEC # 1207425

11/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms9 U.S. SEC # 1207426

2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1220259

11/22/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Cer Se 02 Ar18 U.S. SEC # 1207209

6/21/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 02 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1176128

6/23/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 03 S6 U.S. SEC # 1245821

7/26/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002-Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1178854

7/26/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002 S5 U.S. SEC # 1178842

8/22/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1261111

11/21/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 S13 U.S. SEC # 1271056

6/23/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mor Pas Th Ce Se 03 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1245823

10/27/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Series 2003-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1268283

2/25/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Wamu Mor Pa Th Ce Se 2002 Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1168200

8/22/01  6/24/04Wamu Mor Pass Thru Cert Ser 2001-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1157920

10/9/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1160537

11/13/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1162155

10/25/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2001-S10 U.S. SEC # 1161529

11/28/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-S11 U.S. SEC # 1162828

2/22/02  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1168097

4/27/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-5 U.S. SEC # 1139304

7/27/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-S8 U.S. SEC # 1145954

12/13/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificate Series 2001-Ar6 U.S. SEC # 1163589

4/23/02  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certs Series 2002-Ars U.S. SEC # 1171948

5/24/02  3/31/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S4 U.S. SEC # 1174300

6/27/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1249359

12/7/01CSFB Mor Sec Corp Wamu Mor Bk Pa Thr Cer Ser 2001-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1163340

5/13/99  11/13/00Wamu Partners U.S. SEC # 1056574

5/21/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 [ now WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series

 2004-AR4 ] U.S. SEC # 1291435

3/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Passs Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 [ now Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series

     2003-S2 ] U.S. SEC # 1224460


  Besides the provable securities trust evidence, after WaMu’s securization sales efforts failed, WaMu allegedly utilized covered bonds and “pledged loans” transactions around 2007 onward. (Thank you Brenda and Jim.)



   (12)FDIC and JPMorgan Chase (WaMu) Purchase and Assumption Agreement- Sept. 25, 2008    http://www.scribd.com/doc/51435495/Washington-Mutual-JPMorgan-Chase-Purchase-Assumption-Agreement

WaMu BK Examiner’s Report http://www.mckennalong.com/assets/attachments/WAMU%20Final%20Report%20of%20Examiner%20DI%205735.pdf

JPMorgan Chase didn't acquire any of Washington Mutual Bank's equity obligations (though JPMorgan Chase planned to issue $8 billion in common stock to recapitalize the bank). As a result of the seizure, WaMu's stockholders were nearly wiped out. Its stock price dropped to $0.16 a share, far from $45 a share in 2007.[29] In their Chapter 11 filing, WaMu listed assets of $33 Billion and Debt of $8 Billion. (ref. Appendix A). The filing also indicates that enough funds are available for distribution to unsecured creditors.

Within days of the seizure, a hedge fund adviser and investment strategist, Mike Stathis of AVA Investment Analytics issued a formal complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission, demonstrating evidence of insider trading. The complaint also alleged that Washington Mutual was not insolvent, and several Wall Street firms and hedge funds had conspired to short the stock. He also stated that he spoke with a reporter from the Associated Press who told him that he was contacted by a Washington Mutual executive hours before the seizure, telling the reporter that it would happen for “political reasons.” In later criticisms, Stathis discussed that the neither the FDIC nor OTS ever disclosed any evidence of Washington Mutual's insolvency.[32] Stathis stated that within a few weeks of submitting his complaint, he was visited by federal agents who held him in an interrogation room for questioning. As a result of this, Stathis stated that he felt bullied and did not release the SEC compliant into the public domain until a year later.[33][34]

Currently, shareholders are fighting what they consider the illegal seizure of Washington Mutual through such websites as WaMuCoup.com and WaMuEquity.org, claiming that the OTS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and seized the bank for political reasons or for the benefit of JPMorgan Chase, which acquired a large network of branches at what they claim to be an unfairly low price. Shareholders claim that as of the date of the takeover, the bank had enough liquidity to meet all its obligations and was in compliance with the business plan negotiated with the OTS 2 weeks earlier[35] and that the holding company's board and management was kept completely in the dark about the government's negotiations with Chase, hampering the bank's ability to sell itself on its own. Chief executive Alan H. Fishman was flying from New York to Seattle on the day the bank was closed, and eventually received a $7.5 million sign-on bonus and cash severance of $11.6 million (which he declined) after being CEO for 17 days.[36] Senator Maria Cantwell has demanded an explanation from the government and threatened to open an investigation[37] and Washington Mutual's former shareholders have threatened a lawsuit demanding compensation for the lost value of their shares.[35]

        (15) FDIC has to face $10 billion WaMu-related lawsuit  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/23/us-fdic-deutschebank-lawsuit-idUSTRE77M8H820110823

Deutsche Bank Trust 1 and 2 Vs. JPMC and FDIC  http://www.scribd.com/doc/46442715/Deutsche-Bank-v-FDIC-Chase-JP-Morgan-WAMU 

After WaMu securitization failed: WaMu covered bonds and “pledged loans” deals during 2007 onward. http://victoryoverchase.blogspot.com/2012/01/what-about-wamu-pledged-loans-federal.html





http://4closurefraud.org/2011/02/16/allstate-vs-jpmorgan-chase-wamu-et-al-jpmorganwamu-lied-about-virtually-everything-when-selling-mortgages/  from:  http://www.zerohedge.com/article/how-allstate-used-sampling-confirm-jpmorganwamu-lied-about-virtually-everything-when-selling

(21)  http://4closurefraud.org/2010/08/17/washington-mutual-jpmorgan-chase-fdic-deal-not-finalized-so-how-can-jpmorgan-foreclose-on-wamu-loans/  from:  http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2010/08/wamu_sale_hasnt_closed_document_suggests.html

 WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC - Free Writing Prospectus –
WaMU SELLS loans
after they make them. WaMu is already paid!
http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage  (pg 41)  

WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC Free Writing Prospectus –
  (Renee Johnson/Washington Mutual National Manager – Strategic Operations/REO)   http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage  (pg 38) 

WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC
Free Writing Prospectus - 

John Berens/Washington Mutual Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing

24 years management with JPMorgan Chase (Pg. 8) http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage     

WAMU/ Long Beach Mortgage 2006 SEC    Free Writing Prospectus - 

(Washington Mutual targeted key markets: Arizona, Texas, Washington, Florida, New York,

 New Jersey , etc.) Notice Mississippi, who has some of the most stringent lending and consumer protection lawsin the country, was totally by-passed by WaMu’s corporate expansion strategy.)

   http://www.secinfo.com/d16VAy.vx6.htm#1stPage  (pg 11)

Certain litigation information regarding WaMu’s and JPMorgan Chases long-term, ongoing, and mutual ventures dating back to even 2000, back to the early Chase Manhatten days.  http://wmish.com/docs/gib/3.28/WAMUQ-2sub%20parent.pdf




§              John Barren

§                                      Treasurer

§              John J Berens

§                                      Director

§              Lauren V Harris

§                                      Secretary

§              Kim D Greaves

§                                      Director (inactive)

§              Mark W Davis

§                                      Director

§              Bryan B Bolton

§                                      Director (inactive)

§              Renee T Johnson

§                                      President (inactive)

§              James A Miller

§                                      President (inactive)

§              John V Robinson

§                                      Treasurer (inactive)

§              Lisa A Shepherd

§                                      Director

§                                      President



http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/3596568-1.html (ex-JPMC) Berens and Rotella  - “WaMu’s back!”

Lauren V. Harris: is also involved as an executive with California Reconveyance Corporation, Homesales, Inc., and Chase Venture Holdings. http://www.corporationwiki.com/New-Jersey/Iselin/lauren-v-harris-P7563048.aspx


§              California Reconveyance Company

§              Chase Ventures Holdings, Inc.

§              Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

§              Desmond Smith

§              Susan Barber

§              John Barren

§              John Barren

§              John J Berens

§              James C Berry

§              Mark W Davis

§              Bryan B Bolton

§              Curt Brouwer

§              Sally Durdan

§              Lisa J Fitzgerald

§              Kim D Greaves

§              Anthony J Horan

§              Renee T Johnson

§              Sandra E Karwhite

§              Catharine E Killien

§              William A Longbrake

§              Colleen A Meade

§              James A Miller

§              Chad Prelog

§              Elizabeth A Proctor

§              Michael A Reynoldson

§              John V Robinson

§              Lisa A Shepherd

§              Ann Thorn

Homesales Inc, Statewide corporate “offices” examples:
circa 2006 

   (32)  Arizona:  http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/cgiip.exe/WService=wsbroker1/names-detail.p?name-id=F12634540&type=CORPORATION 

File Number: F-1263454-0




Agent Status: APPOINTED 02/14/2006



Agent Last Updated: 06/10/2006



Officer Information


Date of Taking Office: 05/01/2010
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
ISELIN,NJ  08830
Date of Taking Office: 09/18/2006
Last Updated: 03/29/2011


Director Information

Date of Taking Office: 05/01/2010
Last Updated: 03/29/2011
IRVING,TX  75063-5812
Date of Taking Office: 08/13/2007
Last Updated: 03/29/2011


Domestic Address






COLUMBUS,  OH  43219







Foreign Profit Corporation


Cross Reference Name


Filing Information

Document Number


FEI/EIN Number


Date Filed







Principal Address


Mailing Address


Changed 02/12/2009

Registered Agent Name & Address


Officer/Director Detail

Name & Address

Title D


Title D


Title D


Title S


Title T


Title P




Officers at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware
Click on to the left of the name to see the Connection Visualizer.

John Barren

Treasurer at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

Treasurer at California Reconveyance Company
CFO at Chase Mortgage Company
Vice President and Secretary at Chase Mortgage Company-West
at Chase Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
Director at J.P. Morgan Chase Custody Services, Inc.

- View 5 other companies

Hide other companies

Columbus, OH


John J Berens

Director at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

Jacksonville, FL


Lauren V Harris

Secretary at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

Secretary at California Reconveyance Company
Secretary at Chase Ventures Holdings, Inc.

- View 2 other company

Hide other company

Iselin, NJ


Kim D Greaves

Manager at Chase Home Finance LLC

Columbus, OH


Mark W Davis

Director at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

Irving, TX


Bryan B Bolton


Phoenix, AZ


Renee T Johnson


Jacksonville, FL


James A Miller

at Chase Home Finance LLC

Arlington, TX


John V Robinson


Fort Washington, PA


Lisa A Shepherd

Director and President at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware

Jacksonville, FL

Show 6 More Connections...

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WIKIPEDIA – HISTORY OF WAMU: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Mutual





(pg 13 of 37 is the exhibit - go to # 8 question) 
8. With regard to No. 53, you indicated that there was never a draft or final schedule of assets prepared in conjunction with JPMC's acquisition of assets of WMB. 
You objected to the request as written ("identify in detail all assets") as either being too vague or too burdensome, given the size of this acquisition. I suggested that, at least as an initial compromise, we would be willing to agree to see a list of assets at the level of detail in which they are maintained in JPMC's internal accounting systems. You agreed to investigate this possibility and get back to me. 

http://wmish.com/docs/gor/Brief.pdf   (Pg. 20)


(pg 13 of 37 is the exhibit - go to # 8 question) 
8. With regard to No. 53, you indicated that there was 
never a draft or final schedule of assets prepared in 
conjunction with JPMC's acquisition of assets of WMB. 
You objected to the request as written ("identify in detail 
all assets") as either being too vague or too burdensome, 
given the size of this acquisition. I suggested that, at least 
as an initial compromise, we would be willing to agree to 
see a list of assets at the level of detail in which they are 
maintained in JPMC's internal accounting systems. You 
agreed to investigate this possibility and get back to me. 
[Referenced from this email to Brian Glueckstein/JPMChase] 
Sargent Declaration 
Exhibit 2 
Edgar G. Sargent 
From: Edgar G, Sargent 
Sent: Wednesday, June 09,201012:40 PM 
To: 'Glueckstein, Brian 0.'; Friedman, Stacey 
Cc: Gregory Taylor (Ashby & Geddes) 
Subject: RE: JPMC Requests 
I still don't get it, but I guess we can discuss on the 
call. My apologies if we made an incorrect 
representation to the Court and if it seems material, 
we will correct it. Is the distinction between an 
investigation into JPMC (didn't happen) and an 
investigation into JPMC's conduct (may have 
From: Glueckstein, Brian D. [gluecksb@sullcrom.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2010 12:37 PM 
To: Edgar G. Sargent; Friedman, Stacey 
Cc: Gregory Taylor (Ashby & Geddes) 
Subject: RE: JPMC Requests 
Thanks, Edgar. We look forward to hopefully wrapping this up today as well, 
Let's discuss tl7 on our call. 
Page 1 of7 

RECENT POST - BOMBSHELL CASE: (posted 1/27/12)








from one of my original WAMU partner’s posts, Jeff Brode in Colorado -  He deserves a medal. http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/forum/topics/washington-mutual-info

 (all my posts were dropped and deleted when I left the site.....) Thanks you Lisa and Micheal – you are heros.

from my original rant post on implode-o-meter in 2009 (this was the beginning for my founding of the National WAMU Homeowners Support Group... After talking to FDIC attorney and JPMC senior counsel, I smelled a “dead rat”... turned into a (sick?) “hobby,” and here we are today... (over 100 links attached to 30 something pages of rants...) Enjoy! Join implode-o-meter. It is the ORIGINAL source of all things mortgage evil, by and for industry insiders, good and evil. Thank you Aaron Krowne. WE are still free.



Court cases and cornucopia of Chase (and others) litigation with homeowners :

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/08/13/fraud-on-the-court-wamu-chase-and-fishman-shapiro-dismissed-with-prejudice/   Many thanks, Mr D., you are one of the most awesome, unselfish people I met to date.


Neal Garfield is one of our grandfathers. He deserves our respect and admiration



Brenda Reed (NWHSG) should be CA’s next AG. God bless you Brenda!


Attorney Doug Gillies (NWHSG) first attorney to crack the successor in interest code. Thanks Doug. The crowd went wild…


Margaret Carswell,  you never failed. Thank you!








Matt Weidner should really be running for FL AG.  Matt hung it way out there. Thank you, Matt. 












Yves Smith is one of the most intelligent bloggers out there. Thanks Yves.

















ARGUMENT ..................................................................................23


   UNDER THEGOVERNING AGREEMENTS. ..........................23















My name is John Korman. I, as a paralegal who lives in Florida investigated Mortgage Loans for an Attorney who defends clients against foreclosure. The job I did was research the Corporate / Trust Documents [law of the case] filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in reference to the target loan and create an Affidavit based on my finding. Almost every Mortgage loan investigated which was produced by a major Banking Institution between the years 2000 – 2008 was securitized. Securitization is the act of producing an investment vehicle of Mortgage-Backed Securities (“MBS”) using the Borrower’s Mortgage NOTE as the under-lying corpus, as collateral.
In each and every securitized loan produced by these Banking Institutions, file with the Securities and Exchange Commission certain documents which are mandated, include but is not limited to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Prospectus, Indenture, 10-K [yearly report], 10-Q [quarterly report], 8-K [current report] Form 15-D and the Servicing Agreements] (herein after referred to as “Documents”), agreed to by the Party’s.
Reading these Documents, in each investigation to date, the common mandated procedure is as follows; first we have the Lender. Shortly after the Mortgage
2 of 9
NOTE documents have been executed [or before the NOTE is executed] the Lender sells [or has already sold] its right, title and interest in this Mortgage NOTE to a third party, an arms length transaction [true sale] to a party known as the Seller. Within thirty [30] days or less the Seller will sell its right title and interest to this Mortgage NOTE to another party known as the Purchaser, also identified as the Depositor. The Depositor agrees to “trade” with a named Trust-Entity, it’s Mortgage NOTE for a predetermined amount of Mortgage-Backed Securities [less commission], these Certificates are then sold to investors.
Now a really interesting thing happens once the Mortgage NOTE is acquired by this named Trust Entity, witnessed through the use of specialty licensed software which permits investors [or licensed users] access to any “named Trust-Entity”. I can see each Mortgage Loan held by this named Trust-Entity, and I can see its currant status. I can see if the named Trust-Entity is in possession of the Mortgage NOTE documents. I can see if a Mortgage NOTE is thirty (30) days late, sixty (60) days late, ninety (90) days late, or if it is in foreclosure. I can also see how many “tranches” have been created within this named Trust-Entity. The analogy to describe what a tranche is [in my minds eye] would be similar to, you giving me one apple, I return this one apple to you as apple juice [different form], and however I manage to create from this one apple, ten additional artificial apples out of thin air and transform them into apple juice. Now this named Trust-Entity has the authority and ability to sell [juice from ten artificial apples] Mortgage-Backed securities in multiples of the underlying collateral by creating multiple tranches within the said named Trust Entity. Within these multiple tranches I find the same Mortgage NOTE to exist, at full face value. The last investigation which I just completed within this past week the named Trust Entity held twenty one tranches and the target Mortgage NOTE appeared in each one of those tranches. This one Mortgage NOTE now has the potential of generating twenty one times its face value of this Mortgage NOTE, in Mortgage-Backed Securities sold to investors. Based on the foregoing if a Trust sells these Mortgage-Backed Securities to investors and receives only ten times the face value of the original under-lying Mortgage NOTE [Security] has the named Trust Entity been damaged by the Mortgagor not making the promised monthly payments under the Mortgage NOTE agreement? In other words, if Sam goes to the Bank and borrows a sum of money but Sally pays off the debt can the Bank still claim to be a damaged party because Sam did not make the payments as promised?
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In the event whereby the Lender knows fore-hand this loan [Mortgage NOTE] will be sold out-right, securitized once executed, the Borrower is actually entering into an undisclosed investment contract, not a loan, per-say. In the not so distant past and throughout our history, prior to securitization, the Maker of the Mortgage NOTE Holds a possessory right to said Mortgage NOTE. Once the debt was discharged the Bank which held this Mortgage NOTE as a “Special Deposit” returned it to the Borrower. Today, with the advent of securitization these so-called loans [Special Deposits] are truly investment contracts [Mortgage NOTE sold out-right to generate profit] and the Borrower is an undisclosed investor with possessory rights to the profits generated from said Mortgage NOTE. Because this undisclosed investor [Borrower] is unaware of the moneys due it abandons the right to receive said funds when Borrower / Maker fail to make a claim to said funds within three years. To prove my point the Attorney General needs to request the Servicer, or the Trustee to produce a copy of the 1099-OID Form which was filed with the Internal Revenue Service, and the 1099-A including the 1099-B. These three Forms are filed with the Internal Revenue Service by either the Servicer or the Trustee and will prove the aforementioned allegation, that it is the Borrower that created, and is entitled to the “O”riginal “F’ssue “Discount, but the Borrower has abandoned these funds [1099-A] which is now claimed by the Servicer, or the Trustee [1099-B]. In other words, these aforementioned Forms will identify the Bank as the Debtor. The profit made from the invested Mortgage NOTE belongs to the Maker. We live in a wonderful place, if it wasn’t for the deceit.
Many of today’s so-called Lenders only lent their name to the Mortgage loan transaction. In other words, the Lender did not lend you their money, an undisclosed third party provided the funds for the Borrower making it appear like the Lender / Bank / Broker provided the funds. A group of investors, or a single investor creates what is commonly known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPY”) wired the money to the Lender just prior to Closing. The Lender / Bank now acting in the capacity of a Nominal Lender used this SPY money to transact the Closing. Once the Closing was completed the Nominal Lender was paid in full plus a commission, then the Nominal Lender put its name on the Mortgage NOTE. Within twenty-four (24) hours from Closing the Nominal Lender was required to physically conveyed the Mortgage NOTE to the true Lender / Investor. Thereafter this Nominal Lender takes on a new role as the Servicer of the debt, or it may employ a subServicer. The Borrower makes the monthly payments to the Servicer who s/he believes is the Lender, who forwards the payment [less its fee] to the true Lender / Investor[s]. The Homeowner was
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tricked into thinking he was a Borrower of a Loan, when in fact was a Seller of a Mortgage NOTE into an Investment Trust [SPV]. This Investment Trust has no right to a Mortgage which is used to facilitate the purchase a NOTE, fraudulently procured under the guise of a “Loan”, when in fact it was not a Loan but rather the “Purchase / Sale of a Mortgage Note” facilitating the foundation of these Mortgage-Backed Securities; the true nature of this Transaction was not disclosed to the Borrower either before or at Closing; and this Nominal Lender was paid in full plus a commission for loan it did not fund. Question; can a Nominal Lender that did not fund the transaction [Loan], putting its name on a Mortgage NOTE pretending to be the True-Lender, tricking a Homeowner into signing over a Mortgage NOTE in order to secure an Investment Security, thereafter assign a Beneficial Right to a third party, a right which it never Held from the beginning?

A reading of the Corporate / Trust Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission two constants are apparent; the Original Lender after selling its right, title and interest to said Mortgage NOTE becomes the Servicer of this debt; and
the “conveyance” of the Mortgage NOTE, Documents [law of the case] mandate the delivery of the Original Mortgage NOTE, endorsed in blank … without recourse … with ALL prior and intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the Originator [Lender] to the “person” so endorsing to the Trustee. In every investigation that I have personally conducted find there are four parties to the initial transaction, if we exclude the Borrower. The “Originator / Lender,” who sells its right, title and interest to said Mortgage NOTE to the “Seller,” the Seller sells its rights, title and interest to the “Purchaser / Depositor,” who sells to the “Trustee in trust for the benefit of the Certificate-Holder[s].” Although the named Trust Entity Documentation [law of this case] mandates this “chain of endorsements” I have yet to witness these endorsements on any Mortgage NOTE. Rather I witness an “Assignment” of the Mortgage that purports to convey the NOTE directly to the named Plaintiff. My understanding is a NOTE can not be assigned; it is endorsed from the present Holder / Owner of said NOTE and conveyed to the new Holder / Owner. Instead I am witnessing the Servicer [who was once the Lender] claiming to be the Plaintiff with all the rights title and interest as an Owner / Holder of a Mortgage NOTE, after selling its right title and interest to that same Mortgage NOTE to a third party, at an arms length transaction, viewed as a true sale. The Documents [law of this case] mandate it to be a true sale.
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I witness assignments [and or endorsements] being filed with the Courts assigning [endorsing] the right title and interest of the Originator / Lender directly to the Plaintiff, passing-over the Seller, Purchaser and the Trustee, when the Plaintiff is a named Banking Institution. The named Banking Institution would need to acquire this said Mortgage NOTE from the Trustee in order to foreclose, [not from the Lender] thus the Trustee’s endorsement would be expected on the NOTE, from it to the named Plaintiff, in a proper chain of endorsement. Instead I witness over and over again where an assignment of the Mortgage will go directly from the source [Lender] to the Plaintiff, as there are no prior and intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the Originator [Lender] to the “person” so endorsing the NOTE to the Trustee.
If the Trustee is the named Plaintiff acting for a named Trust-Entity would still require the endorsement from the Depositor / Purchaser to the named Trustee in trust for the Certificate-Holder. In my opinion, [non-attorney] this is why there was a rash of “Lost NOTE” claims in the past; the endorsements are missing, however re-establishing a NOTE cures that problem; however re-establishing a NOTE you never Owned, Held or possessed is a criminal act, in my opinion. Not only do I believe this act is a Fraud upon the Court but it is also using the legal system to facilitate a counterfeited financial instrument. The Homeowner who loses their home to foreclosure [95% are uncontested] with the use of a re-established NOTE faces the added threat that the true Owner / Holder may appear at some future date requiring the Homeowner to pay this same NOTE a second time, unless the Order from the Court provides the Defendant protection against such an occurrence. However when a Homeowner does not defend their case, lack of funds, or whatever, this protection [should the Real-Party-In-Interest appear at some future date and demand payment for the Original Mortgage NOTE] against paying twice, is often missing from the Final Order for Foreclosure, because the Homeowner lacked the legal capacity to request this protection be included in the Order from the Court, and the Plaintiff will not do the right thing, voluntarily, by including this protection, exparte.
In the event the Plaintiff does possess and produces the Original NOTE bearing the once wet ink signatures of the Borrower[s], it [NOTE] must contain the endorsements of all the aforementioned parties, otherwise there is a clear break in the Chain of Title. The Chain of Title in every securitized document I have personally reviewed requires an endorsement from the Originator / Lender to the Seller, from Seller to Purchaser and from the Purchaser to the Trustee in trust for the benefit of the Certificate Holder [s], this is in accord with each one
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of the documents I have reviewed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These investigations that I have personally conducted disclose that most Trustees over-see dormant, dissolved or unregistered named Trust-Entities. Every named Trust Entity that I personally have investigated filed a Form 15-D with the Securities and Exchange Commission, notifying all parties of its Termination of Registration and suspension of its Duty to File Reports under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq., 78a et seq.). The Trustee foreclosing on a Homeowner [after filing a Form 15-D] is doing so on behalf of a named Trust-Entity contrary to the INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940, see Section 7, under TRANSACTIONS BY UNREGISTERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES.
What is really transpiring with these Mortgage loans is [in my minds eye] the Lender is selling the Borrower an automobile that the Lender knows has faulty brakes, and then said Lender takes out an insurance policy on that automobile. Once the automobile is totaled in a crash, the Lender collects on the insurance and still holds the borrower liable to pay the out-standing balance due on the automobile.
Look no further than the foreclosure rates here in Florida or your home State, and then look at the record profits being generated by the Banks. How do you think this feat is being accomplished? Are foreclosures a negative force on the economy, because it does not seem to be negatively impacting the major banking institutions.
Brings me to my final observation, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), which acts as the purported Mortgagee of record [which we know is not true; as MERS did not loan any money and the Borrowers] do not owe any money to MERS]. MERS usually acts in the capacity as nominee for the Mortgage NOTE Owner / Holder; however, according to the procedural manual produced by MERS, it may only act in such a capacity [nominee] for and on behalf of another MERS’ Member. To the best of my knowledge none of these securitized named Trust Entities are MERS Members, thus bifurcating the Mortgage and NOTE, destroying the security and rendering the Mortgage a nullity.
When you get right down to it I think we would all agree, the bottom line is, the Creditor is the party with the skin in the game, they are the Certificate Holder[s], they are true investors], Hard-Money-Lender[s]. All Certificate Holders are customers of Cede & Co., being the nominee of the Depository
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Trust Company (“DTC”), a subsidiary of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. The Entities that purchase these Trust Certificates must purchase them from Cede & Co., or from one of its authorized agents. Seems to imitate the MERS model in so far as Cede & Co. appears to be the central recordation hub were investors trade positions by electronic registration. These named Trust Entity’s Certificates are almost always Held in the “street name” of Cede & Co.
Within the past month I was engaged to conduct research / investigation into a Mortgage Note foreclosure, Plaintiff is JPMorgan Chase, the Original Lender was Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”). Within this Complaint JPMorgan Chase avers it is the Mortgage NOTE Owner and Holder by virtue of a Purchase and Assumption Agreement facilitated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) after it seized WaMu. Within this Complaint filed by JPMorgan Chase is attached as prima fascia evidence this aforementioned Purchase and Assumption Agreement between JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC which read, [paraphrasing] JPMorgan Chase purchased all of the assets of WaMu, as such is the Owner / Holder of the Mortgage NOTE being foreclosed on [presumptively giving JPMorgan Chase Standing]. However, reading the Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission WaMu sold this Mortgage NOTE out right to a third party [true sale] long before its seizure by the FDIC. The only nexus held by WaMu in reference to this Mortgage NOTE in question were its right to Service this debt. In the case styled UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, case number 09-CV-01656-RMC, Document 55, styled DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for the Trusts listed in Exhibits 1-A and 1-B, Plaintiff, vs. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver for Washington Mutual Bank; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, National Association; and WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORPORATION, Defendants; JPMorgan Chase herein pleads, on page 33. of 39;
“Under the plain terms of that agreement, JPMC did not become WMB’s successor in interest. Since its closure, the FDIC as receiver has controlled WMB. While JPMC purchased all of the assets of WMB, it assumed only specified liabilities: those that had been reduced to a dollar amount on WMB’s ‘general ledger and subsidiary ledgers and supporting schedules which support the general ledger balances.’”

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I only know of this one case in particular whereby JPMorgan Chase is foreclosing on a property in which it holds no right title nor interest aside from its Servicing right[s] acquired under a Purchase and Assumption Agreement, still to be executed between it and the FDIC. However JPMorgan Chase is telling a Judge in New Jersey it Owns and Holds this particular Mortgage Note by virtue of the aforementioned Purchase and Assumption Agreement acquired from the FDIC. Then in this case, [as sited above] in order to avoid / evade liability now pleads it”… did not become WMB.’s successor in interest.” You’ all know the difference between “avoid” and “evade,” [twenty years]!
It is my sincere hope the Attorney General of Florida along with the Attorney General in the other forty-nine States investigate JPMorgan Chase’s claim as successor in interest to WaMu, wherein JPMorgan Chase claims to be a Plaintiff, as its foundation points to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement. Equity would call for an Estoppel of all foreclosure Actions in which JPMorgan Chase claims to be WaMu’s successor in interest.
In closing, these named Trust Entities by-and-large are missing a mountain of Mortgage NOTEs. I have not had the time to do a mean average [as some named Trust Entities hold literally a thousand Mortgage Loans and the calculations must be done manually] however the field marked “Doc” [abbreviation for Documents] either reads “Unknown” or “Limited” in over 50% of these Mortgage Loans [by observation] conservatively. The named Trustee of the named Trust Entity clearly did not do even a reasonable job in receiving the Mortgage NOTEs as mandated under these named Trust Documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
/s/ John Korman                         

Thank you friend and fellow researcher, John Korman.
(John is not offering legal advice and is not an attorney. Ask your qualified attorney if he/she agrees with this article.)

More on securitization/trust failures:






Click here for a FREE Securitization Look-up ---> https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/free-securitization-check-courtesyrob-harrington/

Fraudulent clouded titles** will create more lawsuits and uncertainty in our markets.



Thank you Dave. You are our country’s foremost expert on this subject.


THANK YOU, ELLEN BROWN, J.D. (Ellen was one of the first to "get it.")


Thank you WAMU Shareholders/Ghost of WAMU for all of the following contributions to the internet:


Thank you!


Blogging: John Hempton for the Bronte Capital Blog:
Do you or did you ever have friends in the FDIC? (05/27/09)
JP Morgan lied to regulators (05/10/09)
Mixed up policy responses and liquidity preference (04/22/09)
The seemingly criminal Sheila Bair (04/03/09)
Sheila Bair is either a criminal or a grotesquely incompetent stark raving idiot (03/28/09)
The bull in the china shop (12/05/08)

Why Sheila Bair must resign (11/23/08)
Citigroup, Wachovia, Sheila Bair and a post I didn't make... (11/14/08)
Who lied to who and who told who what (09/30/08)
Reckless Irresponsible Seizure (09/28/08)
Illiquidity and insolvency and the takeover of WaMu (09/26/08)
Is this one of the most extraordinary government actions ever? (09/26/08)
The FDIC and WaMu (09/24/08)

From Mike Stathis of AVA Investment Analytics:
The Biggest Banking Heist in World History: Washington Mutual (10/01/09)
(also an SEC complaint )
WaMu Insider Trading and Naked Short Selling (10/19/09)

From PPY's Seeking Alpha Instablog:
FDIC: Time For Some Checks and Balances (04/18/09)
FDIC And Its Newest Victims: Small Business Owners, Farmers, And Community Banks (05/13/09)
FDIC: Reckless Actions Against Hard Working Americans (05/15/09)
FDIC - Contradictions And Lies (06/08/09)
Who Is Regulating FDIC? (06/22/09)

The Frugal Scotsman's Depression Gazette - Is the FDIC Inept, Panicked, or Corrupt? (04/26/09)

Felix Salmon's Reuters Blog:
Revisiting WaMu (05/26/09)
Bair’s chutzpah (11/14/09)
From Truth and Transparency's Seeking Alpha Instablog:
Why the FDIC’s Receivership and Fire-Sale of WaMu is a Mess (05/17/09)
Ballet among the Carcasses (10/30/09)

Troy Racki's Seeking Alpha Instablog:

Some first hand articles.
WAMU, JP Morgan Chase, and the FDIC - Who exactly is looking out for you? (09/25/08)
The Plunder of Washington Mutual (09/28/08)
WaMu'd - Washington Mutual Shareholders Get the Shaft (10/04/08)
"All Fall Down" - WaMu sues the FDIC (03/30/09)
'Bad Moon Rising' - WaMu Fights Back (05/10/09)

Videography - WaMu"Q'd" The Movie: Of, By, & For the People
WaMu"Q'd" - YouTube Channel.

WaMu Equity Organization - (wldgrdnr) Seeking to protect the value of our shares.
Washington Mutual Equity Group - (zardiw) A group of shareholders who have joined together to preserve equity value.
The WaMu Story - (started by wldgrdnr & zardiw, now run by zardiw), do not confuse with WaMued - The Story. http://www.wamu-shareholders-resources.com/

Squidoo: - WaMu Lens (zardiw)
Ghost of WaMu - (ghostofreagan) following WaMu through the courts. Excellent web site posting important documents from the court cases. Accesses PACER and has documents for the court case against the FDIC in US District court.
MadBlab.com - "Sites like these happen when shareholders get mad."
WaMu Sleuth (Job Thykkuttathil) - Supreme Court case to restore WaMu shareholders property rights under the 5th amendment of the US Constitution. There is a companion WaMu Sleuth Twitter page. The petition was denied. The website still follows WaMu.

Some of the news articles with a bit of the fallout from the WaMu seizure:
WaMu Seizure: The Ambush Angle (09/26/08)
Wachovia Suitors May Delay Bidding After Dimon's Deal for WaMu (09/27/08)
Did the FDIC Sabotage WaMu's Management and Erode Investor Confidence (09/28/08)
Washington Mutual Bond Holders Wiped Out (09/28/08)
Quit Ceding Power to Tyrants (10/02/08)
Putin: US image damaged forever over economy woes (10/09/08)
Financial Crisis Called Top Security Threat to U.S. (02/13/09)
Nationalizing the Banks Is a Horrendous Idea (02/19/09)
BankUnited Bidders Said to Seek Receivership Before Purchase (05/14/09),
this story was removed from the internet within two weeks, but was cataloged in search engines, see screen capture 1 and screen capture 2. You may read the story at either the Yahoo Board post or the IHub board post.
BankUnited Sale May Signal FDIC Shift in Buyout Rules (Update3) (05/22/09)

The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution (pdf). ".... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Sheila Bair repeatedly said at the time of the WaMu seizure that the FDIC/OTS's early resolution preemptive seizure of WaMu was done to eliminate the risk that the taxpaying public would be required to indirectly pay the deposit insurance on WaMu's deposits, if and when the WaMu bank were to actually fail, as the FDIC did not have sufficient funds to make good on the value of the insured deposits itself. A failure of the WaMu bank would have required that the FDIC borrow the required funds from the US Treasury, and the US Treasury's funds come from the issuance of Treasury Bills and Bonds, backed by and paid off by, the taxpaying US public. Although the FDIC would eventually repay the loan with collected bank fees, the WaMu seizure was a seizure of shareholders property, and done to preclude the use of public funds, and thus a violation of the 5th amendment of the US Constitution. Ironically the WaMu seizure was done because the FDIC had first foiled and then fumbled WaMu's merger processes, on top of being so poorly funded they could have never made good on their insurances to begin with.

Where to view and download WaMu legal documents:
Kurtzman Carson Consultants KCC WaMu, use the menu in the left margin. This site has documents concerning only the bankruptcy.
Also for eight cents a page documents can be viewed from Pacer. Documents concerning any of the WaMu court cases are available from Pacer.

FBI probing bailout firms (09/24/08)
WaMu debt holders stake claim in bankruptcy court (10/03/08)
Cantwell seeks explanation of WaMu seizure (10/08/08)
Statement by United States Attorney Jeffrey C. Sullivan regarding Washington Mutual, their home page. (10/15/08)
Bank of Scotland, Bondholders Can Join WaMu Lawsuit (10/14/09)

Aspects of the Deal/Steal:
WaMu Says Dimon Took Illegal Windfall (04/29/09)
JPMorgan’s WaMu Windfall Turns Bad Loans Into Income (Update2) (05/26/09)
JPMorgan's $29 Billion WaMu Windfall Turns Up The Heat On Sheila Bair (05/26/09)
In this Oct 15th 2008 Bloomberg video clip, Charles Bobrinskoy, Vice Chairman at Ariel Investments, at 1:40 says that JPMorgan's “WaMu deal for $1.9 Billion could go down as one of the greatest acquisitions of all time”. Once again this shows that the OTS/FDIC did the wrong thing and preemptively seized and gave away our valuable company to protect themselves due to their own short term liquidity problem. This destroyed the shareholders wealth and the shareholders must be compensated.
Bloomberg Video

Washington Mutual Inc. Bankruptcy Filing Info:
WaMu Inc US Bankruptcy Court petition (pdf) (09/26/08)
Washington Mutual Inc Files Chapter 11 (09/27/08)
WaMu holding company claims assets of $32B, debts of $8B (09/29/08)

Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Filings for WaMu:
Last 20 Quarterly Reports
Last 10 Annual Reports
Statements of Changes

The Regulators:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
The US Treasury

The Federal Reserve:
Federal Funds (Federal Reserve Funds):
Federal Funds - Short-term transactions in immediately available funds between depository institutions and certain other institutions that maintain accounts with the Federal Reserve; usually not collateralized.
Fed Point Federal Funds
Wikipedia Federal Funds
FRB Discount Window.
FRBNY Discount Window.
FRBNY The Discount Window.
JP Morgan Chase, the auction winner, is a major shareholder of the Federal Reserve. So is Citigroup another auction participant. The CEO of JPMorgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, sits on the Board of Directors of the New York Federal Reserve, FRBNY Board of Directors.
The Federal Reserve, like the FDIC, likes to do its important work in total secrecy. Prior to the financial crisis the word "transparency" was sold to us as the key to a healthy financial system. Remember how transparent WaMu was, giving all of their financial data to the FDIC for a supposed effort to help with a merger. Well the FDIC stabbed them in the back on that, and the FED soon ran off with $700 billion dollars of taxpayer money. Once the looting of WaMu and America was accomplished the word "transparency" slipped down the memory hole.
Federal Reserve Seeks to Protect U.S. Bailout Secrets (01/11/10)
Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion (Update2) (12/12/08)
Federal Reserve Says Judge Erred in Requiring Bank Disclosure (11/07/09)
Federal Reserve Says Disclosing Loans Will Hurt Banks (08/27/09)
Audit the Federal Reserve: HR 1207 and S 604
As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn't Bother Barking (09/27/09)

The FDIC has wrongfully seized banks before, and has been taken to court, and found guilty.

U.S. Is Told To Return Big S.& L., the Federal Court decison pdf.link, and the Supreme Court decision pdf.link (1990).
First City Bancorp in Plan To Settle Suit With FDIC (12/18/1993)
Judge Hughes hammers the FDIC in the Hurwitz case (08/24/05)
FDIC Ordered to Pay Financier $72 Million a "corrupt agency with corrupt influences on it". (08/25/05)
Major Victory for MAXXAM in On-Going Lawsuit Against FDIC (04/04/08)
More FDIC in court:
Judge makes costly liability ruling against FDIC (09/15/02)
FDIC Facing Lawsuit For Improper Lending (07/20/08)
FDIC to pay $90 mln to settle Beal lawsuit (01/16/09)
The FDIC in error:
FDIC faulted in 4 bank failures in '08 (04/08/09)

WaMu’s liquidity problem is debatable. On Sept 11, 2008 WaMu announced it had $50 billion dollars in liquidity. On September 25th it was seized for a bank "run" totaling $16.9 billion. Was the seizure necessary when they still had $33 billion dollars in liquidity and the bailout meetings were already well underway? Wouldn’t WaMu have survived without a problem throughout the bailout meetings and after the bailout terms were known, been enough of a known quantity to complete a merger. The Federal Reserve has systems to keep banks with short term liquidity problems whole, they are called the Federal Funds and the Discount Window. Couldn't the FDIC make an announcement that it would not let depositors at WaMu lose funds while the bailout was being put together and implimented?

From the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website:
The Purchase Agreement (pdf)
Reports of Condition & Income and Thrift Financial Reports
Failed Bank List
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Service Center

The FDIC reserves were at the legal limit allowed and hence the FDIC did not collect premiums from the banks for the ten years from 1996-2006. This was when the economy was strong and few banks failed. Now as the economy weakens they have very quickly run out of money. In a move to avert their own liquidity problems the FDIC was desperate to have WaMu seized as fast as possible. A seizure protects the FDIC from exhausting its liquidity, and there was a slim chance that if things went horribly wrong for WaMu before it could merge itself, the FDIC would be put in the position of having to insure its depositors.
FDIC Cuts Commercial Bank Premiums (11/15/1995)
Deposit Plan Will Cost Banks More (10/02/08)

The FDIC reneged in advance on its duty to insure WaMu deposits claiming poverty, thus abetting a rush of withdrawals on large deposits. The FDIC can only be broke if the US Treasury shuts down.
FDIC Fails, then WaMu refuses to cash the check (07/17/08)
FDIC Insurance Fund it Doesn't Actually Exist (09/12/08)
Open Letter to Bloomberg News about FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (09/25/08)
Don't Worry About the FDIC (09/25/08)
FDIC approves higher insurance premiums for banks (10/07/08)
Is Your Money Really Safe with FDIC? (02/24/09)
FDIC: $19 billion now backs over $4.8 trillion (03/01/09)
The IndyMac fiasco: a three-day run of federal incompetence (07/06/08). This incredibly dogged FDIC job was directly responsible for the WaMu California mini-run, once the nation wide money market run set things off. See Deposit run at WaMu forced their hand, regulators say (09/25/08)

The Law that Sheila Bair used to justify the seizure of the WaMu Bank and forcing the parent company WaMu Inc. into bankruptcy is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). It was passed in the 102nd Congress. This is a link to the law, FDICIA 1991, scroll down to SEC. 141. LEAST-COST RESOLUTION. This is the section of the law she quoted for her choice of methodology. Sub section 4BIII says they have to retain the documentation for not less than five years. I did a FOIA request for these documents and received this partial reply WaMu Case Memorandum (pdf). Section 141/4GI says the least cost resolution should not be used if it will cause systemic risk, like triggering a recession. etc. SEC. 143. EARLY RESOLUTION is the part which allows them to do a preemptive seizure, as was done in WaMu's case.

Here is one of the FDIC's regulations, designed to enrich themselves, clearly violated with the WaMu auction.
FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts:(1); 1000 - Federal Deposit Insurance Act:(2); Use next page to get to this page:[1000-1200 (3)];
See under (13)(E)(i,ii,iii):
   (E) DISPOSITION OF ASSETS.--In exercising any right, power, privilege, or authority as conservator or receiver in connection with any sale or disposition of assets of any insured depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed conservator or receiver, including any sale or disposition of assets acquired by the Corporation under section 13(d)(1), the Corporation shall conduct its operations in a manner which--
    (i) maximizes the net present value return from the sale or disposition of such assets;
    (ii) minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of cases;
    (iii) ensures adequate competition and fair and consistent treatment of offerors;

The OTS:
From the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) website:

OTS Fact Sheet on WaMu (pdf)
Press Release on the Sale of WaMu
The OTS gave a news conference call upon the seizure of the WaMu Bank September 25, 2008. The call can be downloaded here OTS Press Call with a right click-save target as... It is a 4.28MB MPG3 audio file, about a two minute download over a high speed internet connection.
Grounds for the Appointment of the FDIC as Receiver for WaMu (pdf)
OTS Freedom of Information Act

More on Regulators:
Glass-Steagall Act
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Basel II
Basel II in the United States: Progress Toward a Workable Framework (pdf) (05/14/2008)
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
Regulator Let IndyMac Bank Falsify Report (12/23/08)
Sheila Bair - World's Worst Regulator - to Stay at FDIC (01/11/09)
The Second Savings And Loan Scandal (01/29/09)
The Swensen Plan (02/25/09)
Regulators Avoided ‘Forceful Actions’ Before Crisis, GAO Says (03/18/09)
Sheila Bair's WaMu Seizure Blamed For Lack Of Bank Lending (04/22/09)
The Price of Honesty (04/28/09)
The Quiet Coup an excellent article from The Atlantic Magazine Online, May 2009 edition
Where were regulators when banks were failing? (06/22/09)
We Already Have A Systemic Risk Regulator, It's Called The Fed (06/24/09)
Is The FDIC Broke And Covering It Up? (08/02/2009)
Why No One Won a Pulitzer for Financial Reporting (Part 2 is WaMu specific) (08/05/09)
WaMu's demise was lesson in regulatory failure (09/18/09)
The fight for WaMu documents (12/11/09)
Riski: The Financial Market Regulatory Resource

Community Reinvestment Act (CRA):
Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending (09/30/1999)

The SEC:
Banks, Trade Groups Say that SEC Order Does Not Go Far Enough (07/22/08)
Bringing Down Bear Stearns from Vanity Fair August 2008 issue.
Short Stocks: Bets continue to build against some financials (09/10/08)
'Short sellers' boosted bets on Lehman, AIG, WaMu (09/24/08)
Naked short selling has been pointed to as one tool that has been used to takedown companies. There was a thirty day ban on naked short selling in 19 financial stocks issued on July 15th 2008 due to this problem. A thirty day ban on naked short selling for any and all stocks was issued on September 17th 2008 to combat the manipulation problem. Plus any short selling at all, naked or otherwise, was banned in 799+ financial stocks from September 19th through October 2nd 2008. Following is a bit of info on naked short selling.
Naked Shorting -- Why not just ignore the law? LINKS
The Deep Capture Blog
Here is a chart from Deep Capture showing how naked shorting exploded when WaMu hit the $15.00 area and helped take WaMu down to $5.00. The chart stops there, but the trends continued. The blue bars are Failure to Deliver (FTD) volume and the red line is the price. Washington Mutual: Price versus Failures-to-Deliver (09/26/08)
The Naked Short Selling That Toppled Wall Street (10/02/08)
A Shorts Story (01/23/09)
Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman (03/19/09)
The Dark Side of the Looking Glass The Corruption of Our Capital Markets - Slide Show Video Lecture on How Rogue Hedge Funds Are Killing Businesses for Profit. (with naked shorting) (79:44 with the end notes). In July 2009, too late for WaMu, the SEC began requiring clearing houses to buy shares on the open market to cover for failure to deliver shares. This presentation is about the old system which WaMu and so many others suffered under.
SEC Press Release Index for 2008. Of most interest are 2008-140, 143, 155, 204, and 211.
SEC Press Release Index for 2009. Of most interest are 2009-76, and especially 2009-172.
SEC Failure to Deliver Data.
SEC FOIA/PA Program.
Tax and Related Matters:
The bailout was made law Oct 3 2008, and is now known as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)
Complete text of the EESA (pdf)
Summery of the EESA (pdf)
further EESA (pdfs)
TARP expenditures as of February 20 2009, pdf.link.

FAS 157 is the mark to the market rule, that went into effect November 15, 2007. Banks in bank mergers have to value assets at the current market rate. This killed mergers in bad markets, when they arguably are needed most, as either the selling bank sells at market and takes a big loss on long term valuable assets, or the buying bank pays above market and must record big immediate losses by recording the assets at market. Even if they balance the losses between them, neither party wants to take the hit.
Investopedia FAS/FASB 157 and from the FASB, FAS/FASB 157
Why FAS 157 strikes dread into bankers (11/12/07)
A FAS 157 Primer (11/15/07)
FAS 157: The FASB's Prelude and Fugue on Fair Value of Liabilities (05/04/08)
Wall Street Says -2 + -2 = 4 as Liabilities Get New Bond Math (06/02/08)
WaMu stock down 22 percent over accounting rules (09/10/08)
Rule hobbling suitors batters WaMu stock (09/11/08)
Notice 2008-83: Application of Section 382(h) to Banks is the IRS ruling that removed the mark to the market rule for banks, on October 1st 2008. (10/20/08)
New Tax Rule Enabled Wachovia Deal (10/09/08)
Tax rule might have helped WaMu (10/17/08)

TPG Capital - the largest WaMu shareholder. Though WaMu was only five percent of their portfolio. Originally 822,857 WaMu common shares at $8.75 a share, and Series S and Series T Preferred Stock, for a total investment of two billion dollars (link- top of pg 13). The Series S and Series T Preferred Stock was automatically converted into 227.7 million shares of WaMu common stock on June 30, 2008. TPG reduced their position along the way. They say the seizure of WaMu caused them a loss of $1.3 billion dollars.

JPMorgan Chase:
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
JPM WaMu Analyst Presentation (pdf)
JPM Chase conference call on the WaMu purchase, given 9:15pm EST Thurs. 09/25/08 - this link brings up an autoplay audio - Conference Call.
To download a copy of the conference call to play at your convenience, right click this link Conf Call and choose Save Target as.... It is a 20MB windows media audio file, about a five minute download over a high speed internet connection. If you just want the body of the call without the question and answer period use this link first half, if you just want the question and answer portion use this link Q&A.
JP Morgan Chase is the biggest player in the Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps market. They are also the most over leveraged in this area. It is important to note that the financial crisis was not caused by subprime loans, it was caused by side bets, CDO's or Credit Default Swaps, a derivative, contracted on packaged bundles of subprime mortgages. These contractual obligations can be leveraged and also written against each other, over and over, and their combined dollar values in the banks portfolios are immense. They were highly profitable in good times, but as subprime mortgages failed the defaults often cause the much larger amounts of all associated side bet contracts to fail as well, and these domino through the system. This is what caused the financial crisis, banks, investment banks and insurance companies being unable to make good on their credit default obligations. JPMorgan is the primary originator of this market and the biggest player in it. Lehman Bros and Bear Stearns were its primary competitors. AIG was also a big player, as were many hedge funds. WaMu did not deal in derivatives.
The JPM Derivatives Monster (09/07/01)
JPM Derivatives Monster Grows (01/04/02)
The JPMorgan Guide to Credit Derivatives (pdf)

More on Derivatives:
Why J.P. Morgan Chase has the market panicked (10/08/02)
US Bank Derivative Exposure - September 30, 2007 (Large)
US Bank Derivative Exposure - Q1 2008, (explained)
JPMorgan, Facing Federal Probe, Exits Municipal Swaps (09/04/08)
Did JPMorgan Almost Fail? (10/02/08)
Credit Derivatives Role in the Crash - The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room (10/15/2008)
JP Morgan ‘brought down’ Lehman Brothers (10/05/08)
What Barack Obama Needs to Know About Tim Geithner, the AIG Fiasco and Citigroup (11/24/08)
Rioting at the Gates of Thermopylae: The Fed & Central Banks Shudder (12/15/08)
JPMorgan Said to Reap $5 Billion Derivatives Profit (Update1) (03/03/09)
Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won (12/23/09)


Some tips to filing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests:
Making the FOIA Work for You
How to Make a FOIA Request
FOIA Letter Generator
How to file a FOIA request

Decoding the Lingo of the Financial Crisis
Law.com law dictionary

Documentaries on the financial crisis in general, not WaMu specific:
1. CNBC House of Cards The Definitive Look At The Origins Of Today's Global Economic Crisis (1:31:10).
2. PBS Inside the Meltdown Investigating how the economy went so bad so fast and what Bernanke and Paulson didn't see, couldn't stop and weren't able to fix (56:23).
3. Boom, Bust & BLAME The Inside Story of America's Economic Crisis. CNBC's special web series on the crisis, and includes short videos.
4. PBS Frontline: The Warning. Long before the meltdown, one woman tried to warn about a threat to the financial system (54:59). A documentary about how the unregulated derivatives market lead to the financial crisis. JPMC is the leading derivatives market participant. Sheila Bair advocated that hedge funds, many whom are major derivative players, not be regulated.


***NOTE: 2012 brings the homeowners,

investors, and shareholders ALL getting

involved with litigation. It is estimated that JP

Morgan Chase and the FDIC are embroiled in

over 10,000 lawsuits. WHY would there need

to be 10,000 plus lawsuits if potentially a

large number of people were not allegedly

harmed by the FDIC and JP Morgan Chase?





CLICK HERE for a FREE Securitization Look-up ---->  https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/free-securitization-check-courtesyrob-harrington

-     MERS: https://www.mers-servicerid.org/sis/search

-     SECinfo: http://www.secinfo.com/

-     Freddie Mac Loan Search: https://www.freddiemac.com/corporate

-          Fannie Mae Loan Search: http://fanniemae.com/loanlookup/

-          County Records searches: Call the local title company of the property and request the basic (free) look-up. 

-          State license searches: Google (by State) “Division of Banking & Insurance”

-          - Alleged Robo-Signers:









2011/01/25/robo-signer-list-updated-jan-25-2011/ http://ml-implode.com


Additional look-up links:

Fixed Rate & Balloon Calculators: http://tcalc.timevalue.com

Neg-Am, Option Arm, and More calculators: http://www.decisionaide.com/

MPCalculators/menus/MP calculators.asp Interest Rate histories: http://www.mortgage-x.com

I/O calculator: http://www.dinkytown.net/java/mortgageinterestonly.html

OCC-Office of the comptroller of the Currency: http://www.occ.treas.gov

FDIC- for TILA: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6500-1400.html

HUD-for RESPA: http://wwwhud.gov/offices/hsg/res/respa hm.cfm

Doc Magic – Calculating finance charges and APR: https://www.docmagic.com

Scribed: http://scribed.com/

State Case Laws: http://www.fairfightforyourhome.com/archives/1356

Report for UDAP for each state: http://www.scribd.com/doc/14473414/

50-state-report-on-unfair-and-deceptive-acts-and-practices HAMP Handbook: https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/index.jsp



Thank you Dr. Graves.

This is the most essential tool I have ever found to properly utilize the legal process, control the attorneys and Judges, and to preserve and protect 100’s of years of property rights, due process, fact and law, and the U.S. and State Constitutions.
                                                      -Rob Harrington
      (I have benefited using it. I am also now an affiliate!)






The fall of America began in Floriduh.... Florida Fair Foreclosure Act of 2012- Fair to criminals?

  • Posted by Rob Harrington August 17, 2011 at 7:00am

How do you defeat FASCISM?

Defeat Florida’s Very, Very (un)Fair Foreclosure Act of 2012

The Florida Legislature will soon decide the fate of the overall general push by State Governments, The A.G.'s, the Federal Government, and the Bar Associations, to make "foreclosure" a State sponsored PROPERTY CONFISCATION effort. This is really no different than pre-war Germany "legalizing" the confiscation of Jewish property to ramp up some particular power agenda based on Corporatism and Fascism.In the 30’s, the Nazis offered people of the Jewish faith 10% of their proprty value. By the 40’s…. When our government steps in to finally confiscate millions of American properties for zero dollars, we will all know we have surpassed Nazi Germany in the total; suppression of our liberties and freedom.

The current Legislation floating around Tallahassee, like a whore soliciting herself on Monroe Street, highlights three of the following unconcionable and despicable aspects of "legalizing" fraud for the sake of Florida "commerce."


(from Chip Parker's blog:)

  • Where the amount of principal and interest equals or exceeds 120% of the just value of the home, it will allow the mortgage company to foreclose without going through the judicial process.  That means no foreclosure complaint, no defense, no due process, no justice.  It will be as easy to take your home as it is to repo a car.
  • It will repeal Florida Statutes § 57.105, which awards attorney fees to homeowners who successfully defeat mortgage companies in court.  At the same time, it assesses attorney fees against a homeowner and his lawyer (in equal parts) if the mortgage company prevails.  The design here is to stop consumer lawyers from taking any more foreclosure cases by making it impossible to make money and even personally expose the lawyer to penalties.  Consumer lawyers will have no upside potential and all downside risk.
  • It will eliminate the right of a homeowner to set aside a wrongful foreclosure, even if the plaintiff committed fraud in the process of taking the home.  The ONLY recourse would be awarding money damages.  This language is to appease the title companies by retroactively ratifying all that foreclosure fraud that has taken place over the last decade.  Once the bank takes your home, you’ll never get it back, no matter what.

It obviously seems foreclosurefraud veils the actual root of the RICO conspiracy by downplaying the WIDESPREAD MORTGAGE FRAUD AND APPRAISAL FRAUD CREATED BY THE BANKS AND THEIR SUBCONTRACTOR/TRADING PARTNERS back in the early and middle parts of the 2000's. Nobody in Tallahassee wants to even think about, nor solve, that particular prickly and embarrassing issue.


Matt Weidner has set forth the call of all Floridians to take back their State government in his recent blog

Let’s All Work Together to Defeat Florida’s Very, Very (un)Fair For...


If you don't understand what Fascism is, then learn about it now. Very soon it will be too late, (if it already isn't...) Many of the Jewish faith never made it out of Germany alive even though they had close to a decade to figure out which way the stench of an evil wind was blowing. Like wind, Fascism can change course and intensity without actually being seen or felt in real time.


For the last 40 years, unlike teaching fear and contempt regarding Communism, Fascism, in its many variant historical forms, was never taught very well to American school children.


Definition and history of FASCISM from Wikipedia:

(Wikipedia) [44]
Under fascism, the profit motive continues to be the primary motivation of contributors to the economy.[43] Along with support of private property and the profit motive, fascists also support the market economy.[45]

Italian Fascism's economic system of corporatism was promoted as reconciling the interests of capital and labour.[46]


Highly related to Fascism is Corporatism


(Wikipedia) Corporatism is related to the sociological concept of structural functionalism.[6] Corporate social interaction is common within kinship groups such as families, clans and ethnicities.[7] Aside from humans, certain animal species are known to exhibit strong corporate social organization, such as penguins.[8][9]

Corporatist types of community and social interaction are common to many ideologies, including: absolutism, capitalism, conservatism, fascism, liberalism, progressivism, reactionism, socialism, and syndicalism.[10]


How to identify Fascist characteristics:


Fourteen Defining
Characteristics Of Fascism
By Dr. Lawrence Britt
Source Free Inquiry.co

Dr. Lawrence Britt has examined the fascist regimes of Hitler (Germany), Mussolini (Italy), Franco (Spain), Suharto (Indonesia) and several Latin American regimes. Britt found 14 defining characteristics common to each:


1. Powerful and Continuing Nationalism - Fascist regimes tend to make constant use of patriotic mottos, slogans, symbols, songs, and other paraphernalia. Flags are seen everywhere, as are flag symbols on clothing and in public displays.


2. Disdain for the Recognition of Human Rights - Because of fear of enemies and the need for security, the people in fascist regimes are persuaded that human rights can be ignored in certain cases because of "need." The people tend to look the other way or even approve of torture, summary executions, assassinations, long incarcerations of prisoners, etc.


3. Identification of Enemies/Scapegoats as a Unifying Cause - The people are rallied into a unifying patriotic frenzy over the need to eliminate a perceived common threat or foe: racial, ethnic or religious minorities; liberals; communists; socialists, terrorists, etc.


4. Supremacy of the Military - Even when there are widespread

domestic problems, the military is given a disproportionate amount of government funding, and the domestic agenda is neglected. Soldiers and military service are glamorized.


5. Rampant Sexism - The governments of fascist nations tend to be almost exclusively male-dominated. Under fascist regimes, traditional gender roles are made more rigid. Divorce, abortion and homosexuality are suppressed and the state is represented as the ultimate guardian of the family institution.


6. Controlled Mass Media - Sometimes to media is directly controlled by the government, but in other cases, the media is indirectly controlled by government regulation, or sympathetic media spokespeople and executives. Censorship, especially in war time, is very common.


7. Obsession with National Security - Fear is used as a motivational tool by the government over the masses.


 8. Religion and Government are Intertwined - Governments in fascist nations tend to use the most common religion in the nation as a tool to manipulate public opinion. Religious rhetoric and terminology is common from government leaders, even when the major tenets of the religion are diametrically opposed to the government's policies or actions.


9. Corporate Power is Protected - The industrial and business aristocracy of a fascist nation often are the ones who put the government leaders into power, creating a mutually beneficial business/government relationship and power elite.


10. Labor Power is Suppressed - Because the organizing power of labor is the only real threat to a fascist government, labor unions are either eliminated entirely, or are severely suppressed.


11. Disdain for Intellectuals and the Arts - Fascist nations tend to promote and tolerate open hostility to higher education, and academia. It is not uncommon for professors and other academics to be censored or even arrested. Free expression in the arts and letters is openly attacked.


12. Obsession with Crime and Punishment - Under fascist regimes, the police are given almost limitless power to enforce laws. The people are often willing to overlook police abuses and even forego civil liberties in the name of patriotism. There is often a national police force with virtually unlimited power in fascist nations.


13. Rampant Cronyism and Corruption - Fascist regimes almost always are governed by groups of friends and associates who appoint each other to government positions and use governmental power and authority to protect their friends from accountability. It is not uncommon in fascist regimes for national resources and even treasures to be appropriated or even outright stolen by government leaders.


14. Fraudulent Elections - Sometimes elections in fascist nations are a complete sham. Other times elections are manipulated by smear campaigns against or even assassination of opposition candidates, use of legislation to control voting numbers or political district boundaries, and manipulation of the media. Fascist nations also typically use their judiciaries to manipulate or control elections.



(Do you finally get it?)

Government Set to Sell Foreclosures in Bulk- 1/9/12

From Chip Parker/Jacksonville Bankruptcy Attorney:

Is Florida the Next Non-Judicial Foreclosure State?

by Chip Parker, Jacksonville Bankruptcy Attorney · Posted in Foreclosure News

  If the mortgage industry has its way, the passage of a new bill floating around Tallahassee will ensure that Floridians will be displaced from their homes without legal representation or due process.  In typical Orwellian style, this bill is entitled the Fair Foreclosure Act – it’s anything but . . .

Florida often makes the national news when it comes to foreclosures, and it’s never positive.  According to a recent 24/7 Wall Street study, three of the ten housing markets most likely to collapse in 2012 ar....  Naples, Miami and Ft. Lauderdale all make the top 10, and the rest of the Sunshine State isn’t far behind.

In its preamble, the FFA actually says, “Once suit has been filed, the public interest is served by moving foreclosure cases to final resolution expeditiously in order to get real property back into the stream of commerce.”  Of course, it is this glut of foreclosed homes flooding the real estate market that has all but ensured its collapse.  REO properties typically sell far below market value, and when so many REOs exist, it drives the overall market to new lows.  The vicious cycle is complete as more homeowners suffer increased losses from a down market.

So the bill’s stated purpose is flawed right from the outset, but getting our homes back into the “stream of commerce” really isn’t the purpose of the Fair Foreclosure Act.  Its sole design is to take Floridians’ property without due process or equal protection under the law.

Florida has a proud history of whoring for the mortgage industry, and while states across the country are fighting to restore honor and integrity to our judicial system, Florida has taken a different approach.  In Florida, the Supreme Court and our elected state officials are doing what they can to ensure their benefactors . . . the banks . . . get what they want.

Remember Foreclosure Court?   It unconstitutionally employed retired senior judges to act as mortgage mercenaries – ramrodding defective foreclosures through the judicial system despite national ridicule.  I am actually shocked it fell victim to Governor Scott’s massive spending cuts.  That must have been a mistake.

Then, with the addition of Pam Bondi as our new Attorney General, the mortgage industry took firm control of our prosecutors as well.  Ms. Bondi all but killed any investigation into foreclosure fraud, and fired two assistant prosecutors who gained national attention for piecing together a massive conspiracy by the mortgage industry to defraud our state court judges in foreclosure cases.

BUT, these acts of treason pale in comparison to the Fair Foreclosure Act, which proposes to do the following:

(read more here)  http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/is-florida-the-next-non-judicia...


 Independence Day?

  • Posted by Rob Harrington July 4, 2010 at 7:00am

July 4th, 2010 ---

Today, I will remember my father who passed away so recently. He was a retired officer of the United States Air Force. A fervent defender of the Constitution and of fact and law, and an avid student of History, this highly decorated, honest man devoted his entire life to preserving our noble freedoms.

Last Memorial day in Washington D.C., as my mother and I visited Arlington National Cemetary where he is to be buried with full military honors, 100,000′s of Vietnam veterans were also visting D.C. for “Rolling Thunder” to also pay their respects to fallen brothers and sisters of the Vietnam War. This was the same War my father earned a Bronze Star among many other decorations for valor and dedication while risking his own personal safety and life.

                                   Mom and Dad - 2011

It was that Sunday I picked out a book in his vast historical library to begin a read for the long, sad trip home back to Florida. Florida is where I have been fighting fraud and for property rights for several long, frustrating years. The book I chose was written about the Vietnam War entitled “The War of the Innocents,” by Charles Bracelen Flood. Published in 1970, Mr Flood foresaw the main reason WHY the South Vietnamese and the U.S. would EVENTUALLY LOSE the war against the Communist Viet Cong. The ex-Army, Harvard graduate keenly observed that the poor Vietnamese peasant farmers were CONSTANTLY having their PROPERTIES SEIZED ILLEGALLY BY A CORRUPT GOVERNMENT AND THEIR CORRUPT, WEALTHY BUSINESS PARTNERS.

The constant harrassment, removal, and dislocation of the poor, peasant farmers and their families contributed greatly to the lack of support of their corrupt Saigon Government, and indeed the lack of responsibility of its own soldiers and citizens to fight effectively against the Communists.

In 2010, even an 8 year old being removed from their home due to a questionable foreclosure could draw the same conclusion regarding a corrupt system that aids and abets illegal and fraudulent harrassment, removal and dislocation of too many families who’s unalienable rights are being denied. Today, I will remember the millions of Americans who were defrauded by the Banks and are now being removed from their homes by the very governments who were supposed to protect them. Their protections are DENIED almost daily by the very consumer laws that are NOT being enforced nor upheld.


Tomorrow, I begin researching “Fraud on the Courts” on forged complaints and so-called “supporting” documents made by so-called “officers of the court” in yet another legal battle on a case already dismissed once before.

Today, on the morning of the 4th of July, I will miss my father terribly. Today, I weep in utter despair as I write this message to whoever cares to read it. I sincerely question that his whole life was dedicated to being deceived by a collosal lie?

On July 4th, 2010, this is NOT a happy day for me. Is this really Independence Day in foreclosureland?


 -Rob Harrington

Co-Founder / National WAMU Homeowners Support Group



  Join us on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/National-Wamu-Homeowners-Support-Group-Rob-Harrington/118976548137045 


“WaMu Screwed … The Wrong People.”

Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy:
A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)



DISCLAIMER/DISCLOSURE: Rob Harrington is NOT an attorney, nor a licensed Private Investigator. I am currently a marketing director of a Private Investigative firm, BPIA, that specializes in analysis and reporting of alleged institutional mortgage fraud.   However,  NO information that I share should be construed as legal advice. Always consult with a qualified foreclosure defense attorney regarding your foreclosure. I have no liability to the readers or group members as to the outcome of their research or legal case. (I am only a ticked-off, entrepreneurial homeowner who stands for property rights, free speech, due process, justice, and fairness in the USA – You know, the stuff our country originally stood for...)Furthermore, I have NO investment position in JPMorgan Chase or any stocks or bonds and I do NOT offer investment advice...

Help support your property rights, fact & law, and due process ... AND help support this affiliate website - Click here now & order  Jurisdictionary®  

Click here for a FREE Securitization Look-up
---->  https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/free-securitization-check-courtesyrob-harrington/

FULL DISCLOSURE: I am no longer working with BPIA again as a National Marketing Rep and Intake Consultant. Never confuse activism with commerce. We are going to re-build the NWHSG again, but this time, a committee will lead. If you are interested in National Activism for allegedly defrauded WAMU Homeowners, feel free to contact me and I will put you back in touch with others who share your concerns and goals.

The Harrington Family's WAMU story:



Imagine paying on your mortgage loan and all of a sudden, your payment mysteriously spikes up around an ADDITIONAL (and unsustainable) $1500.00 per month. WaMu employees could not seem to answer your question as to why your payment increased OUTSIDE of your contract's terms and conditions.


5 years later, during the discovery phase in litigation of your foreclosure, you find that the "mystery increase" had basically nothing to do with any increase of interest rate, increase of taxes, or increase of insurance costs, or anything that was CONTRACTUALLY AGREED UPON AT CLOSING.


Years later, what you finally discovered by court-ordered process, was that a WaMu employee changed the initially agreed upon and proper annual property tax escrow amount from about $10,000 per year to around $4500 per year, thusly causing the escrow related $1500 increase per month, about a year and a half into your locked-in 30 year mortgage from hell, and that this change was never disclosed prior to closing! Imagine that you later find out that your full-doc loan was manipulated by presumably the same employee to eliminate close to 40% of your debt against your debt to income ratio, along with the undisclosed future "property tax bomb payment shock," to force the LPS Desktop Underwriting software to approve a loan that was already turned down by an honest WaMu underwriter. That is called "mortgage fraud." "Mortgage Fraud" is a felony in every State in this country. If you, the consumer, would have lied on your credit application concerning debt to income numbers, you would go to prison. Under Florida Law, fraud and material misrepresentations in the inducement of a loan should make a contract unenforceable.


Where does your loss of your initial investment of hundreds of thousands of dollars go, your future bad credit, your future financial costs of that bad credit, and what is looking like a lost decade of your life, due to stress, fear, and hard economic costs resulting from prolonged, unnecessary litigation when a third party bank claims no liability, offers no solution, and yet receives compensation by the government to provide a solution. Additionally, this bank still wants a "free house" at the expense of defrauded victims of provable crimes?


Furthermore, this third party bank is also having difficulty proving they have any investment in this fraudulent loan. This bank cannot answer basic questions regarding the ownership and travels of the fraudulently induced note and mortgage. Yet, this bank has promoted and executed a continuous scorched earth litigation policy of bad faith dealings with the Harrington family, and material misrepresentations and misleading legal arguments before the court.  This shocking story only gets worse from here. Sadly, this was only the beginning of the real story.


The legal system can intimidate and overwhelm anyone –  We have almost 6 years of litigation battles, countless frivolous motions entered against us including threats of sanctions and contempt, baseless accusations, and the list goes on and on, culminating in years of wasted time, money and effort. The Okaloosa County case was already dismissed in 2009 without prejudice. Yet, here we are in 2014 wasting away in the "third" case.


All we are asking for is a fair solution to what amounts to losing everything we worked honestly to build over decades preceding the initial ill-fated conversation with a WaMu loan officer representing, at that time in April 2005, the largest (and most reputable?) bank in the country, Washington Mutual Bank.


Who would have known that 7 years later, the extent of the mass criminal behavior by the banking industry, the lack of regulation by our so-called regulators, the lack of abiding by laws set forth to protect the American consumers from predatory lending, and the over all negative related effects to our imploding economy as directly related to potentially millions of fraudulently induced mortgage loans - at the hands of bank employees themselves - would have led us all here today? 


Please contact me today!

Thank you,


Rob Harrington

(850) 259-6422



CLICK HERE for a FREE Securitization Look-up  https://bpia.wufoo.com/forms/free-securitization-check-courtesyrob-harrington/

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